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266 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
RiotRobot f3f6f3e39a v6.0.0-rc.1 2020-04-30 11:14:04 +01:00
RiotRobot f905586dbd Prepare changelog for v6.0.0-rc.1 2020-04-30 11:14:03 +01:00
David Baker f393cea2c2 Merge pull request #1362 from matrix-org/dbkr/sessions_there_on_login_are_old_rel
Add initialFetch param to willUpdateDevices / devicesUpdated
2020-04-29 18:14:13 +01:00
David Baker e937998b40 Add initialFetch param to willUpdateDevices / devicesUpdated
This indicates whether the device database is being populated initially
2020-04-29 17:44:25 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 7ff68f3844 Merge pull request #1361 from matrix-org/bwindels/fixrequestreadyrace-rc
Fix race between sending .request and receiving .ready over to_device
2020-04-29 17:26:11 +01:00
Bruno Windels 04529bd524 add to_device verif request to txnId -> request map before sending
so if the .ready event arrives before the request finishes,
it still ends up in the correct VerificationRequest
2020-04-29 18:20:16 +02:00
J. Ryan Stinnett dca60ae4ae Merge pull request #1358 from matrix-org/bwindels/fixwaitforeventrace-rc
Handle race between sending and await next event from other party
2020-04-29 15:21:35 +01:00
Bruno Windels ff46a8fa9e handle race between sending and await next event from other party 2020-04-29 15:52:20 +02:00
David Baker a351ee9f76 Merge pull request #1356 from matrix-org/dbkr/another_round_of_toast_rel
Add crypto.willUpdateDevices event and make getStoredDevices/getStoredDevicesForUser synchronous
2020-04-29 12:50:00 +01:00
David Baker a5b14092cd Make getStoredDevice calls sync 2020-04-29 12:23:03 +01:00
David Baker 90f1de9c3f Add crypto.willUpdateDevices event and make getStoredDevices/getStoredDevicesForUser synchronous
Add an event fired before devices are updated, so apps can monitor
changes in devices by observing the state before and after.

BREAKING CHANGE:
Make getStoredDevices/getStoredDevicesForUser synchronous so they
can safely be called from the event listener without racing with
the data being updated. They didn't do any async work so didn't need
to be async.

Add doc for crypto.devicesUpdated
2020-04-29 12:23:00 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 7dc926596f Merge pull request #1355 from matrix-org/jryans/rm-extra-key-backup-setup-rc
Remove redundant key backup setup path
2020-04-29 09:46:17 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett e775515c38 Remove the other copy instead 2020-04-28 21:34:17 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett c116f2b1bc Remove redundant key backup setup path
Bootstrap was create key backup twice due to some code duplication we missed in
previous refactorings.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/13423
2020-04-28 21:34:17 +01:00
RiotRobot 1cb6134758 v5.3.1-rc.4 2020-04-23 15:41:07 +01:00
RiotRobot a255b8e450 Prepare changelog for v5.3.1-rc.4 2020-04-23 15:41:07 +01:00
Bruno Windels 324f036b35 Merge pull request #1347 from matrix-org/bwindels/retry4s-rc
Retry account data upload requests
2020-04-23 14:33:36 +00:00
Bruno Windels 479a284e10 move fn to http-api and add jsdoc 2020-04-23 16:29:08 +02:00
Bruno Windels e0660ce01c log while retrying 2020-04-23 16:29:07 +02:00
Bruno Windels 3a3f6cb7ca cleanup, return straight away 2020-04-23 16:29:07 +02:00
Bruno Windels 9797e6021b exclude aborted requests and matrix errors when creating connectionerror
- throw an AbortError when aborting is detected
 - don't turn AbortError's into a ConnectionError
 - also consider the string "aborted" an AbortError for unit tests
 - unit tests like to reject the request with a MatrixError,
   so exclude those too
2020-04-23 16:29:07 +02:00
Bruno Windels a9212d33b1 retry PUT account data requests 2020-04-23 16:29:07 +02:00
Bruno Windels d32d3fd864 retry util function 2020-04-23 16:29:07 +02:00
Bruno Windels a19cdd06cf throw ConnectionError when request fails 2020-04-23 16:29:07 +02:00
Bruno Windels f4d0f89fda cleanup: use class for MatrixError
this way we get stacktraces as well
2020-04-23 16:29:07 +02:00
Bruno Windels 39836f115b Merge pull request #1341 from matrix-org/bwindels/fixfilterlookup-rc
Fix: handle filter not found
2020-04-21 14:15:03 +00:00
David Baker 7cc61a887c Merge pull request #1339 from matrix-org/dbkr/getAccountDataFromServer_404_rel
Make getAccountDataFromServer return null if not found
2020-04-21 15:10:20 +01:00
Bruno Windels 67fb027d39 filter out invalid filter id values like 'undefined'
this way we don't attempt to fetch filters when validating them
with filterId==="undefined"
2020-04-21 16:00:45 +02:00
Bruno Windels c6b61ea0ea Fix unknown filters returning 400 rather than 404
This made getFilter in sync retrying continuously
I also refactored getOrCreateFilter to use await
2020-04-21 16:00:45 +02:00
David Baker b3860f3754 Make getAccountDataFromServer return null if not found
Callers assume that if the account data isn't there, the method will
return null rather than throw an exception. This meant that this only
actually worked in these cases when the sync had completed and it was
using the locally stored account data, so this ceased to be a
problem in practice when we made it wait for the initial sync to finish
before entering the security setup flow.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/13169
2020-04-21 14:32:26 +01:00
David Baker f42fa7e791 Merge pull request #1337 from matrix-org/dbkr/setdefaultkey_fail_rel
Fix setDefaultKeyId to fail if the request fails
2020-04-21 14:21:42 +01:00
David Baker b592c41f96 Fix setDefaultKeyId to fail if the request fails
It returned only when the echo came down the sync stream, but we
forgot to make it fail if the reuqest failed and it would just
never return in this case.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/13162
2020-04-21 13:52:48 +01:00
Bruno Windels 7b7fdb0a65 Merge pull request #1333 from matrix-org/bwindels/onlyonefilterplease-rc
Fix: don't do extra /filter request when enabling lazy loading of members
2020-04-20 16:36:26 +00:00
Bruno Windels be91c8580d rename build function 2020-04-20 18:22:30 +02:00
Bruno Windels befaa782f6 when enabling LL, set the flag on Filter, rather than doing /filter 2020-04-20 18:22:30 +02:00
David Baker b3752bb2c6 Merge pull request #1331 from matrix-org/dbkr/fix_reject_no_auth_flow_found_rel
Reject attemptAuth promise if no auth flow found
2020-04-20 13:38:49 +01:00
Michael Kohler 02e145b0de Reject attemptAuth promise if no auth flow found 2020-04-20 13:34:18 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 26cae5543b Merge pull request #1330 from matrix-org/dbkr/serialise_prekey_decryptions_rel
Serialise Olm prekey decryptions
2020-04-20 10:14:24 +01:00
David Baker b0573dec77 Add a catch so the error doesn't propagate to later decryptions 2020-04-20 10:08:13 +01:00
David Baker c5f4e762e5 Serialise Olm prekey decryptions
If they overlap, they can both try to create new sessions, but this
removes the OTK so it will only work once.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/13229
2020-04-20 10:08:07 +01:00
RiotRobot c3903f2796 v5.3.1-rc.3 2020-04-17 17:35:49 +01:00
RiotRobot 18564553ad Prepare changelog for v5.3.1-rc.3 2020-04-17 17:35:48 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett fe3e87a9d6 Merge pull request #1323 from matrix-org/dbkr/fix_ssss_reset_rel
Fix cross-signing/SSSS reset
2020-04-17 13:42:47 +01:00
Bruno Windels 78c734d2e9 Merge pull request #1325 from matrix-org/bwindels/fixkeybackupcrash-rc
Fix: crash when backup key needs fixing from corruption issue
2020-04-17 12:23:08 +00:00
Bruno Windels 5afa16d454 method is on crypto 2020-04-17 14:19:55 +02:00
David Baker 149f59e9be lint 2020-04-16 20:42:00 +01:00
David Baker 761892d6b1 Fix cross-signing/SSSS reset
We re-used the old SSSS key even when resetting, meaning we prompted
the user to create a new passphrase but then ignored it and kept using
the old one.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/13212
2020-04-16 20:41:55 +01:00
RiotRobot faf18b1996 v5.3.1-rc.2 2020-04-16 18:39:06 +01:00
RiotRobot 218deddd00 Prepare changelog for v5.3.1-rc.2 2020-04-16 18:39:06 +01:00
Bruno Windels d6fe650c4c Merge pull request #1321 from matrix-org/bwindels/untrustedqrcodereciprocate-rc
Implement QR code reciprocate for self-verification with untrusted MSK
2020-04-16 12:38:04 +00:00
Bruno Windels 951191d99a update comments 2020-04-16 14:31:44 +02:00
Bruno Windels 2654f4bf0f implement qr code reciprocate for self-verif with untrusted MSK 2020-04-16 13:26:56 +02:00
RiotRobot 195f3a7550 v5.3.1-rc.1 2020-04-15 19:05:12 +01:00
RiotRobot 1c9343ed8f Prepare changelog for v5.3.1-rc.1 2020-04-15 19:05:11 +01:00
RiotRobot 5c7d9981f8 Merge branch 'release-v5.3.0' into release-v5.3.1 2020-04-15 19:02:40 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 63bc17a6b4 Merge pull request #1319 from matrix-org/jryans/release-script
Adapt release script for riot-desktop
2020-04-15 18:26:04 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 629490c4ae Adapt release script for riot-desktop
This allows the bulk of the release script to be used for riot-desktop, while
skipping the NPM and develop branch parts that do not apply.

Part of https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/13176
2020-04-15 18:10:46 +01:00
Bruno Windels d59d62f96a Merge pull request #1318 from matrix-org/bwindels/fixindexernotifs
Fix: prevent spurious notifications from indexer
2020-04-15 16:50:18 +00:00
Bruno Windels 8a460c2368 fix jsdoc 2020-04-15 18:33:55 +02:00
Bruno Windels 6f60183316 allow creating event mappers that map events whose events are not reemitted 2020-04-15 17:08:25 +02:00
J. Ryan Stinnett a21c62519b Merge pull request #1317 from matrix-org/jryans/gen-user-obj
Always create our own user object
2020-04-14 16:19:45 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 1b8f6d1739 Always create our own user object
This ensures our own user object is always available for tasks like
verification, even if you aren't in any rooms.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/13165
2020-04-14 16:02:00 +01:00
Hubert Chathi e087bce61a Merge pull request #1311 from matrix-org/uhoreg/fix_backup_key_format
Fix incorrect backup key format in SSSS
2020-04-13 17:38:45 -04:00
Hubert Chathi d2f24c3e87 cut long line to appease lint 2020-04-13 17:03:17 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 5d606bba66 add test for passthrough on backups 2020-04-13 16:54:02 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 864fe459b7 improve readability of tests 2020-04-13 16:27:46 -04:00
Bruno Windels 8992438aa6 Merge pull request #1315 from matrix-org/bwindels/fixe2eecrash
Fix e2ee crash after refreshing after having received a cross-singing key reset
2020-04-10 10:20:20 +00:00
Bruno Windels 197d5ebb44 fix e2ee crash after refreshing after cross-singing key reset 2020-04-10 10:37:12 +02:00
Hubert Chathi 4039498eee use cached backup key if available 2020-04-09 17:05:01 -04:00
Bruno Windels a686231a5b Merge pull request #1314 from matrix-org/bwindels/catchverifysenderrors
Fix: catch send errors in SAS verifier
2020-04-09 16:32:09 +00:00
Bruno Windels 97cf4bff1f fix tests 2020-04-09 18:21:20 +02:00
Bruno Windels 11727833a2 mark request as cancelled immediately after verifier is cancelled
in case send errors prevent us from receiving remote echo
2020-04-09 17:54:45 +02:00
Hubert Chathi df38fde336 apply changes from code review 2020-04-09 11:48:58 -04:00
Bruno Windels 00233d610b pass on send errors so request gets cancelled 2020-04-09 17:23:44 +02:00
Bruno Windels d1c9030fac Merge pull request #1312 from matrix-org/bwindels/fixresetkeys
Clear cross-signing keys when detecting the keys have changed
2020-04-09 13:34:26 +00:00
Bruno Windels 70071eef41 also emit user trust has changed 2020-04-09 14:09:51 +02:00
Bruno Windels 65dd56f53a remove obsolete comment 2020-04-09 13:27:13 +02:00
Bruno Windels c8fb4af369 fix comment style 2020-04-09 13:13:17 +02:00
Bruno Windels 9e1ba992e3 Clear cross-signing keys when detecting the keys have changed 2020-04-09 12:24:29 +02:00
J. Ryan Stinnett bad09fed44 Merge pull request #1310 from matrix-org/jryans/upgrade-2020-04-08
Upgrade deps
2020-04-09 10:19:09 +01:00
Hubert Chathi 5bd146bb85 lint 2020-04-09 00:21:31 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 75703f273f fix unit tests 2020-04-09 00:18:21 -04:00
Hubert Chathi ca7b49d209 fix incorrect backup key format in SSSS 2020-04-09 00:08:17 -04:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 30bce8a682 yarn upgrade 2020-04-08 14:41:36 +01:00
RiotRobot f413f0ee5f v5.3.0-rc.1 2020-04-08 13:46:11 +01:00
RiotRobot be6778a931 Prepare changelog for v5.3.0-rc.1 2020-04-08 13:46:10 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 84637c6ebd Merge pull request #1308 from matrix-org/jryans/backup-key-cache-format
Store key backup key in cache as Uint8Array
2020-04-08 11:32:18 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 2ed6e9ba2f Convert recovery key to Uint8Array explicitly 2020-04-08 00:43:52 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 2e3cb54d38 Restore redundant conversion for tests 2020-04-07 19:21:25 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 0efac7eae0 Store key backup key in cache as Uint8Array
Bootstrap was incorrectly storing the key backup key as base64 encoded, when
instead it should be a uint8Array.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/13057
2020-04-07 18:28:48 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett dc56f05d03 Throw error when trying to cache keys in the wrong format 2020-04-07 18:06:57 +01:00
Hubert Chathi 4d2625278c Merge pull request #1307 from MTRNord/fix-keys_query_endpoint
Use the correct request body for the /keys/query endpoint.
2020-04-07 12:01:06 -04:00
Marcel bff8a947a1 Fix expectBobQueryKeys test 2020-04-07 16:53:28 +02:00
Marcel 9cb7406ebd Fix downloadKeys test 2020-04-07 16:44:30 +02:00
Marcel 38681ca6ca Fix expectAliQueryKeys test 2020-04-07 16:31:15 +02:00
Marcel 916696c906 Fix expectKeyQuery test 2020-04-07 16:19:46 +02:00
Marcel 1b3c4c935e Use the correct request body for the /keys/query endpoint.
https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.0#post-matrix-client-r0-keys-query
2020-04-07 14:08:49 +02:00
David Baker 66417e6742 Merge pull request #1305 from matrix-org/dbkr/uia_ignore_poll_after_success
Avoid creating two devices on registration
2020-04-07 10:32:08 +01:00
David Baker 6ad4d6dd62 also fix typo 2020-04-07 10:21:57 +01:00
David Baker 59607f8dbf Clear resolve / reject function after rejecting too 2020-04-07 10:20:58 +01:00
David Baker 62380a48d5 Merge pull request #1306 from matrix-org/dbkr/max_warnings_81
Lower max-warnings to 81
2020-04-07 10:19:45 +01:00
David Baker 4245372495 Lower max-warnings to 81
We apparently fixed 11 warnings at some point. Let's keep it that way.
2020-04-07 10:06:23 +01:00
David Baker 964a448470 Avoid creating two devices on registration
Ignore poll requests after a UIA session has finished. Sometimes
the app calls poll() even after the registration has succeeded
which causes the API call to happen again which, in the case of
registration, creates a phantom device.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/13040
2020-04-06 19:45:18 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 2151f28d4c Merge pull request #1303 from matrix-org/jryans/backup-key-not-cached
Move key backup key creation before caching
2020-04-06 18:41:58 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 060549656e Move key backup key creation before caching
For some reason, we were trying to cache the key backup key before it was
created, and as a result we wouldn't cache the key until perhaps a second time
through bootstrapping.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/13023
2020-04-06 16:03:24 +01:00
Zoe 7dabf507a2 Merge pull request #1298 from matrix-org/foldleft/12843-resend-requests
Expose function to force-reset outgoing room key requests
2020-04-06 13:43:06 +01:00
Zoe d69afa47a1 review feedback 2020-04-06 13:30:36 +01:00
Bruno Windels 275a8175aa Merge pull request #1302 from matrix-org/bwindels/selfverifux
Add isSelfVerification property to VerificationRequest
2020-04-03 16:02:05 +00:00
Bruno Windels 40bebf4cbd Merge pull request #1297 from matrix-org/bwindels/qr-reciprocate
QR code reciprocation
2020-04-03 12:28:34 +00:00
Zoe b8bc323c03 add a crypto-level function for resending key requests 2020-04-03 11:47:13 +01:00
Zoe c6d32ea2b0 Expose function to force-reset outgoing room key requests 2020-04-02 16:25:50 +01:00
Bruno Windels 2ace35ad6b add isSelfVerification helper 2020-04-02 17:16:06 +02:00
Bruno Windels b5ea8d3a78 Merge branch 'bwindels/qr-reciprocate' into bwindels/selfverifux 2020-04-02 17:15:32 +02:00
Bruno Windels f3a05f6ed0 fix jsdoc 2020-04-02 13:37:15 +02:00
Bruno Windels 43eae4929b remove ts annotations as I don't want to convert the whole file now 2020-04-02 13:31:17 +02:00
Bruno Windels 6144962c24 cancel with m.user code when user doesn't reciprocate 2020-04-02 12:53:52 +02:00
Bruno Windels 544cc36006 explain a bit why we're doing things here 2020-04-02 11:31:44 +02:00
Hubert Chathi 1834e6688f Merge pull request #1294 from matrix-org/uhoreg/check_sssss_passphrase
Add ability to check symmetric SSSS key before we try to use it
2020-04-01 16:01:34 -04:00
David Baker e1ee56aa43 Merge pull request #1296 from matrix-org/dbkr/debug_stuck_events
Add some debug logging for events stuck to bottom of timeline
2020-04-01 18:54:52 +01:00
David Baker a1779719be Add some debug logging for events stuck to bottom of timeline 2020-04-01 18:48:59 +01:00
Bruno Windels 0e464af627 Merge pull request #1295 from matrix-org/bwindels/fixdoublerequestexplosion
Fix: spontanous verification request cancellation under some circumstances
2020-04-01 17:17:24 +00:00
Bruno Windels fd7f0c3b5a Ignore phase while checking if other party supports scanning
(as the phase hasn't been set yet)

Also, set the qrCodeData in handleEvent as we need it to be async
2020-04-01 19:01:53 +02:00
Bruno Windels ed210a4fb1 Use static constructor that can be async (as looking up device is async)
Also fix static methods not to use this
2020-04-01 19:00:57 +02:00
Bruno Windels c2a0504980 update comments 2020-04-01 18:23:34 +02:00
Bruno Windels b6708871d3 fix olmlib import 2020-04-01 18:23:34 +02:00
Bruno Windels 275ea6aacb spec recommends 11 random bytes for shared secret 2020-04-01 18:23:34 +02:00
Bruno Windels f97d413603 expose chosen method after request has started
so we can show a different ux now that it's not just SAS anymore,
but also reciprocate
2020-04-01 18:23:34 +02:00
Bruno Windels 2c7ea0606b move shared secret to QRCodeData 2020-04-01 18:23:34 +02:00
Bruno Windels d7a7100912 reuse keys from qr code data to sign
so we don't sign the wrong keys if a malicious HS admin
forged a cross-sign identity reset
2020-04-01 18:23:34 +02:00
Bruno Windels 2c54b8d77e ask the user if the other user scanned the QR code 2020-04-01 18:23:34 +02:00
Bruno Windels b30f278e03 checking the userid isn't a thing anymore AFAIK 2020-04-01 18:23:34 +02:00
Bruno Windels b642030a34 keep a copy of the master/device key and mode, for use in reciprocate 2020-04-01 18:23:34 +02:00
Bruno Windels 725976d472 Add QR code buffer generation to VerificationRequest (from react-sdk)
Doing this so later we can keep the other user master signing key on it
so we can make sure we cross-sign that one once we decide to sign.
2020-04-01 18:23:34 +02:00
Bruno Windels 80d87e1bf1 prevent the same event being handled twice in the verification request, result in cancellation 2020-04-01 17:13:24 +02:00
Hubert Chathi d01f527e71 only try to set keyInfo if it exists 2020-03-31 16:54:06 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 3e68c82171 apply changes from code review 2020-03-31 16:34:41 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 51bde23207 Merge branch 'develop' into uhoreg/check_sssss_passphrase 2020-03-31 10:41:39 -04:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 934ed37fdc Merge pull request #1293 from matrix-org/jryans/4s-prompt-overload
Receive private key for caching from the app layer
2020-03-31 11:04:51 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 4a965f5408 Convert secret storage key creation to object 2020-03-31 10:45:02 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 6343da33c3 Merge pull request #1292 from matrix-org/jryans/id-change-red
Track whether we have verified a user before
2020-03-31 10:07:20 +01:00
Hubert Chathi e6edee863f add ability to check symmetric SSSS key before we try to use it 2020-03-30 17:25:03 -04:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 9a1d62438d Receive private key for caching from the app layer
This passes through the new secret storage key as well as the key info so that
bootstrap can use it immediately without triggering an immediate prompt.

Part of https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/12867
2020-03-30 21:46:22 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett d2ba3039c7 Add missing awaits in bootstrap path 2020-03-30 21:46:22 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett b6ad4c10bc Track whether we have verified a user before
This tracks whether we have ever cross-signing verified a user before (at least
as far as the current device has ever observed). This info helps to present an
alert in case the user subsequently becomes unverified.

Part of https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/12808
2020-03-30 14:51:49 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 93954d314e Remove unused variable in device list 2020-03-30 14:51:49 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 282f85f1dd Add missing await when changing key IDs 2020-03-30 14:51:49 +01:00
RiotRobot 223d37ffce Merge branch 'master' into develop 2020-03-30 13:23:17 +01:00
RiotRobot 3d20388ca0 v5.2.0 2020-03-30 13:20:20 +01:00
RiotRobot 198c9d934e Prepare changelog for v5.2.0 2020-03-30 13:20:20 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett d43005d91e Merge pull request #1290 from matrix-org/dbkr/send_is_verified_rel
Fix isVerified returning false
2020-03-30 10:28:51 +01:00
Bruno Windels 02264b4572 Merge pull request #1222 from matrix-org/bwindels/fixtestfailure
Fix: error during tests
2020-03-30 08:36:15 +00:00
Bruno Windels add652f18e Merge pull request #1288 from matrix-org/bwindels/alwayssenddone
Send .done event for to_device verification
2020-03-27 16:30:28 +00:00
David Baker 1b9146b9e7 Merge pull request #1291 from matrix-org/dbkr/request_key_backup_key
Request the key backup key & restore backup
2020-03-27 15:43:16 +00:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 5178819b51 Merge pull request #1276 from mjattiot/hotfix/screen_sharing
Make screen sharing works on Chrome using getDisplayMedia()
2020-03-27 15:40:53 +00:00
David Baker f57c25ec27 Make test pass again 2020-03-27 15:13:46 +00:00
David Baker 794429b68b Request the key backup key & restore backup
After a successful verification with ourselves, request the key
backup key too and restore a key backup if we get it.

Also cache the key backup key when we cache the SSK & USK so we have
it available to share.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/12704
2020-03-27 14:40:15 +00:00
David Baker 983a04bb00 Merge pull request #1289 from matrix-org/dbkr/send_is_verified
Fix isVerified returning false
2020-03-27 14:28:47 +00:00
David Baker adbef16b9d Also pass the parameter in 2020-03-27 14:26:58 +00:00
David Baker 157ea49328 Fix isVerified returning false
which would cause key backups uploads to be missing is_verified
because it was set to `undefined` which would cause the backup to
fail

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/12901
2020-03-27 14:26:53 +00:00
David Baker 17386e7aae Also pass the parameter in 2020-03-27 14:14:45 +00:00
David Baker cb19cd673f Fix isVerified returning false
which would cause key backups uploads to be missing is_verified
because it was set to `undefined` which would cause the backup to
fail

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/12901
2020-03-27 14:11:32 +00:00
Bruno Windels 4f0a297cf3 remove obsolete comment 2020-03-27 12:08:43 +01:00
Bruno Windels 6553e331cd also send .done event for to_device verification 2020-03-27 12:04:48 +01:00
Bruno Windels 21908aea6c Merge pull request #1286 from matrix-org/bwindels/verifignoredupes
Fix: verification gets cancelled when event gets duplicated
2020-03-26 17:07:09 +00:00
David Baker 7c40798ee0 Merge pull request #1287 from matrix-org/dbkr/secret_request_front_door
Use requestSecret on the client to request secrets
2020-03-26 16:16:02 +00:00
David Baker 8cdc635cad lint and aldo indent in a more traditional way 2020-03-26 16:12:11 +00:00
David Baker 7f5ac072e6 Use requestSecret on the client to request secrets
Rather than accessing private method to get the secret storage
object (this was a bit confusing when I grepped for 'requestSecret'
and didn't find anything).
2020-03-26 16:01:35 +00:00
Travis Ralston d69af72c7a Merge pull request #1277 from Awesome-Technologies/develop
Allow guests to fetch TURN servers
2020-03-26 09:33:41 -06:00
Bruno Windels ece1e202de indenting 2020-03-26 15:04:28 +01:00
Bruno Windels 91f38a362d ignore duplicate verification events 2020-03-26 15:04:13 +01:00
RiotRobot 5a3cc314be v5.2.0-rc.1 2020-03-26 12:55:17 +00:00
RiotRobot 3dfaafd177 Prepare changelog for v5.2.0-rc.1 2020-03-26 12:55:16 +00:00
David Baker bdba61975b Merge pull request #1285 from matrix-org/dbkr/trust_cross_signing_flag
Add a flag for whether cross signing signatures are trusted
2020-03-26 12:19:08 +00:00
David Baker 3b9023ec2b add comment 2020-03-26 12:04:16 +00:00
David Baker 4dfc7958b6 lint 2020-03-26 10:07:17 +00:00
David Baker 2fad318726 Make the flag only affect trust of other people's devices 2020-03-26 09:58:05 +00:00
David Baker 480b0e64a6 lint 2020-03-25 18:44:55 +00:00
David Baker 6ec7b5d404 Add a flag for whether cross signing signatures are trusted 2020-03-25 18:36:08 +00:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 0781d78da8 Merge pull request #1282 from matrix-org/jryans/robust-secret-share
Cache user and self signing keys during bootstrap
2020-03-25 17:50:58 +00:00
Zoe 513a256ec1 Merge pull request #1283 from matrix-org/foldleft/remove-extra-promise
remove unnecessary promise
2020-03-25 12:52:42 +00:00
Zoe 9372790666 remove unnecessary promise 2020-03-25 11:47:59 +00:00
J. Ryan Stinnett a6532b7881 Fix logging lints 2020-03-24 18:34:05 +00:00
J. Ryan Stinnett cea3582ed1 Always attempt caching via bootstrap 2020-03-24 18:28:31 +00:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 6bd22a3e9c Add logging to secret request side 2020-03-24 17:44:44 +00:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 7b93b99054 Cache USK and SSK private key during bootstrap 2020-03-24 17:35:59 +00:00
Michael Albert c6eb1525b5 Allow guests to fetch TURN servers
Signed-off-by: Michael Albert <michael.albert@awesome-technologies.de>
2020-03-24 18:04:26 +01:00
J. Ryan Stinnett a4b8ba0bb3 Add logging when replying to secret requests 2020-03-24 15:51:35 +00:00
Zoe 02216b15e5 Merge pull request #1281 from matrix-org/foldleft/12704-key-requests
Functions to cache session backups key automatically
2020-03-24 15:32:09 +00:00
David Baker 42efdf1e0a Merge pull request #1279 from matrix-org/dbkr/unify_cross_signing_checks
Add function for checking cross-signing is ready
2020-03-24 13:34:19 +00:00
David Baker 465f9e634e Merge pull request #1272 from matrix-org/dbkr/symmetric-ssss-migrate
Migration to symmetric SSSS
2020-03-24 13:12:17 +00:00
David Baker 7e92f0e5c8 OK, that really is all the comment formatting 2020-03-24 13:08:49 +00:00
David Baker 859a0d8db2 More comment formatting 2020-03-24 13:08:12 +00:00
David Baker 71740cabb5 comment formatting 2020-03-24 13:06:08 +00:00
David Baker 8f77680750 Typo
Co-Authored-By: J. Ryan Stinnett <jryans@gmail.com>
2020-03-24 13:05:15 +00:00
David Baker 509e4b337d Update for new name 2020-03-24 13:01:46 +00:00
David Baker 942ff0c9fd Better name
Co-Authored-By: J. Ryan Stinnett <jryans@gmail.com>
2020-03-24 13:00:53 +00:00
David Baker 24c3dd1f1a Merge pull request #1280 from matrix-org/uhoreg/reduce_olm_creation
reduce number of one-time-key requests
2020-03-24 10:30:23 +00:00
Hubert Chathi 4f58e9945b factor out failed device notif to a function, and record all failed devices
instead of filtering out already-notified devices
2020-03-24 00:15:04 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 547ded9155 handle failed devices that we aren't going to retry 2020-03-23 23:14:36 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 4f112e8379 only re-try creating olm sessions for servers that failed to respond
If the server responded, then retrying likely won't help.  Retrying is mainly
to help with slow servers.
2020-03-23 22:36:10 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 4d63f8ed04 don't always do second phase of olm creation
don't need to do the shorter timeout when doing preparation to encrypt, and
skip the second phase if the first phase already took longer than a normal
otk claim
2020-03-23 21:26:56 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 944d39c836 add some comments 2020-03-23 16:51:44 -04:00
Bruno Windels 433977b918 Merge pull request #1275 from matrix-org/bwindels/assumemethodswhentodevice
Fix: assume the requested method is supported by other party with to_device
2020-03-23 19:39:27 +00:00
David Baker d9796e3bec Fix indenting 2020-03-23 19:00:02 +00:00
David Baker 0a7b9109f0 Move aes functions to their own file 2020-03-23 18:56:32 +00:00
David Baker 89bf9ff65b doc style fix 2020-03-23 18:40:53 +00:00
David Baker 7f6e223c0c Add function for checking cross-signing is ready
Aggregate function that checks the various things are in place for
cross-signing to work.
2020-03-23 18:34:16 +00:00
David Baker c696e5238b Merge pull request #1278 from matrix-org/dbkr/blacklist_use_device_trust
Use checkDeviceTrust when computing untrusted devices
2020-03-23 14:58:06 +00:00
David Baker d303fd0c7c Fix test 2020-03-23 14:53:55 +00:00
David Baker e1ad2f8a21 Use checkDeviceTrust when computing untrusted devices
Apparently we missed using cross-signing trust in the js-sdk itself
2020-03-23 14:28:10 +00:00
Zoe 7053cf0182 Functions to cache session backups key automatically 2020-03-23 14:24:35 +00:00
mjattiot e25158975b formatting
Signed-off-by: mjattiot <mjattiot@opensense.fr>
2020-03-20 15:22:56 +01:00
mjattiot 7e028a82fc improved compatibility
Signed-off-by: mjattiot <mjattiot@opensense.fr>
2020-03-20 15:22:56 +01:00
mjattiot 17fe3e4dc1 init
Signed-off-by: mjattiot <mjattiot@opensense.fr>
2020-03-20 15:22:56 +01:00
Bruno Windels 4bd09c45a0 assume the requested method is supported by other party during to_device verification 2020-03-20 13:29:29 +01:00
Zoe 6a7a255081 Merge pull request #1271 from matrix-org/foldleft/12704-key-storage
Rename ssss cache functions to be more general
2020-03-20 11:17:21 +00:00
Zoe 6701fdd486 Rename ssss cache functions to be more general 2020-03-20 10:18:06 +00:00
David Baker ddce14b20b Use the typeof test to avoid undefined 2020-03-19 21:12:57 +00:00
David Baker f1317e824b Don't assume subtleCrypto exists if there's a window
Jest has a window object but doesn't have subtleCrypto
2020-03-19 21:04:36 +00:00
David Baker db285af0b5 Add callback to get the user's current key backup passphrase
And also add a null check
2020-03-19 20:36:00 +00:00
David Baker 0434bf5a48 Add functions to get the raw key backup key 2020-03-19 20:34:57 +00:00
Zoe 78d9111646 Add a store for backup keys 2020-03-19 15:30:28 +00:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 0f28a89c52 Merge pull request #1268 from matrix-org/jryans/send-only-new-key-sigs
Upload only new device signature of master key
2020-03-19 14:56:29 +00:00
Hubert Chathi 92db6599d8 Merge pull request #1270 from matrix-org/uhoreg/expose_prepare_to_encrypt
expose prepareToEncrypt in the client API
2020-03-19 10:56:16 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 70fb5dcaa4 Merge pull request #1269 from matrix-org/uhoreg/device_list_no_dying
don't kill the whole device download if one device gives an error
2020-03-19 10:56:00 -04:00
David Baker a265574da1 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/develop' into dbkr/symmetric-ssss-migrate 2020-03-19 14:27:25 +00:00
Hubert Chathi 9911766435 expose prepareToEncrypt in the client API 2020-03-18 18:53:26 -04:00
Hubert Chathi fb08ef9a9b don't kill the whole device download if one device gives an error 2020-03-18 15:28:54 -04:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 2fab06111c Upload only new device signature of master key
This changes bootstrap to only upload the new device signature of the master
key. We were previously _adding_ the new signature, but then uploading both old
and new device key signatures of the master key.

This was particularly bad when re-uploading signatures from deleted devices, as
that would cause the homeserver to reject the entire upload.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/12752
2020-03-18 18:35:37 +00:00
Bruno Windels 11e3b1ab53 Merge pull request #1267 from matrix-org/bwindels/handleselfverifstartrace
handle racing .start event during self verification
2020-03-18 14:06:45 +00:00
Zoe 3c78f7dbe1 Merge pull request #1266 from matrix-org/foldleft/fix-label-error
A crypto.keySignatureUploadFailure event reported the wrong source
2020-03-18 11:21:16 +00:00
Bruno Windels 999cebc304 handle racing .start event during self verification
by comparing the device id rather than the user id, as defined in the MSC
2020-03-17 17:51:32 +01:00
RiotRobot b2e154377a Merge branch 'master' into develop 2020-03-17 14:09:49 +00:00
David Baker 8120041ba7 Merge branch 'symmetric-ssss-migrate' of git://github.com/uhoreg/matrix-js-sdk into uhoreg-symmetric-ssss-migrate 2020-03-17 13:11:01 +00:00
Michael Telatynski 68bc8edaae Merge pull request #1263 from matrix-org/t3chguy/fix_editing
Fix editing of unsent messages by waiting for actual event id
2020-03-17 13:00:55 +00:00
Zoe 7ec339985a a crypto.keySignatureUploadFailure event reported the wrong source 2020-03-17 11:42:03 +00:00
Michael Telatynski 43889cfb31 use async/await instead
Signed-off-by: Michael Telatynski <7t3chguy@gmail.com>
2020-03-17 11:14:25 +00:00
Bruno Windels 9e4e14802d Merge pull request #1264 from matrix-org/bwindels/fixolmapierror
Fix: ensureOlmSessionsForDevices parameter format
2020-03-17 11:08:23 +00:00
Bruno Windels 9bebb22746 devicesByUser should be userId => array of devices 2020-03-17 09:51:28 +01:00
Hubert Chathi 3b06b0ffc1 fix lint 2020-03-16 17:22:12 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 1b24d55b24 misc fixes and cleanups 2020-03-16 17:20:54 -04:00
Hubert Chathi c8c6444f6a migrate backup key from asymmetric SSSS to symmetric SSSS 2020-03-16 11:05:07 -04:00
Hubert Chathi 45a88f0517 add function to check that secret storage needs upgrading 2020-03-16 11:00:11 -04:00
Michael Telatynski 53cb3ca79b return the additional promise to simplify the rejection chain
Signed-off-by: Michael Telatynski <7t3chguy@gmail.com>
2020-03-16 12:23:13 +00:00
Michael Telatynski 68526284f1 fix rejection handling
Signed-off-by: Michael Telatynski <7t3chguy@gmail.com>
2020-03-16 10:34:39 +00:00
Zoe 68cebc7ff9 If a key upload fails, throw an error and emit an event (#1254) 2020-03-16 10:24:31 +00:00
Michael Telatynski 38286b74e3 tidy up
Signed-off-by: Michael Telatynski <7t3chguy@gmail.com>
2020-03-16 10:10:22 +00:00
Michael Telatynski 86f56082f0 Make use of scheduler instead of an additional promise
Signed-off-by: Michael Telatynski <7t3chguy@gmail.com>
2020-03-16 10:09:17 +00:00
Michael Telatynski e87bbfc535 Fix editing of unsent messages by waiting for actual event id
Signed-off-by: Michael Telatynski <7t3chguy@gmail.com>
2020-03-16 09:29:37 +00:00
Travis Ralston 758e12d6dd Merge pull request #1261 from matrix-org/travis/yarn-cleanup
Remove stuff that yarn install doesn't think we need
2020-03-13 09:25:23 -06:00
Hubert Chathi e373508211 some fixes in SSSS migration 2020-03-12 18:08:54 -04:00
Bruno Windels 9051edad37 Merge pull request #1258 from matrix-org/bwindels/nullcheckonreceipts
Fix: prevent error being thrown during sync in some cases
2020-03-12 17:09:10 +00:00
Travis Ralston 678b268008 Remove stuff that yarn install doesn't think we need 2020-03-12 10:44:52 -06:00
J. Ryan Stinnett c204812d9c Merge pull request #1259 from matrix-org/jryans/verified-to-bool
Force `is_verified` for key backups to bool and fix computation
2020-03-12 15:39:26 +00:00
J. Ryan Stinnett 3b7def880f Check key backup trust for the right user ID
This corrects the key backup trust computation so that we use the user ID for
the device we're checking inside of always using the client's main user ID,
which would always resulted in false for other people.

Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/12693
2020-03-12 14:47:28 +00:00
J. Ryan Stinnett e5ec2f03c2 Convert trustedLocally to a bool in all cases
This ensure we always have a boolean value, even when device is null.

Part of https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/12693
2020-03-12 14:21:46 +00:00
Bruno Windels a1b3e8055f check if push actions has a tweaks object 2020-03-12 12:59:43 +01:00
Bruno Windels 1e503261f2 Merge pull request #1257 from matrix-org/bwindels/devicelegacyverif
Add a method for legacy single device verification, returning a verification request
2020-03-12 11:30:08 +00:00
David Baker 9107a3e569 Merge pull request #1256 from matrix-org/dbkr/yarn_upgrade_20200311
yarn upgrade
2020-03-12 09:44:51 +00:00
Bruno Windels b66a1d30a0 method for legacy single device verification, returning a verification request rather than a verifier 2020-03-11 15:53:38 +01:00
David Baker 51e1f56873 yarn upgrade 2020-03-11 14:47:48 +00:00
Hubert Chathi c6b5936f8a use the right operator 2020-02-28 16:09:24 -05:00
Hubert Chathi 1151bdc6db initial work in migrating ssss to symmetric 2020-02-27 22:56:34 -05:00
Hubert Chathi ed223d1d76 remove unnecessary awaits 2020-02-27 22:54:43 -05:00
Hubert Chathi 5d52053caa use symmetric encryption for SSSS 2020-02-24 17:38:53 -05:00
Bruno Windels c4e449fc45 add null check for when there is no response 2020-02-20 11:42:33 +01:00
51 changed files with 3910 additions and 1135 deletions
+189
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,192 @@
Changes in [6.0.0-rc.1](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/releases/tag/v6.0.0-rc.1) (2020-04-30)
==========================================================================================================
[Full Changelog](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/compare/v5.3.1-rc.4...v6.0.0-rc.1)
BREAKING CHANGES
---
* client.getStoredDevicesForUser and client.getStoredDevices are no longer async
All Changes
---
* Add initialFetch param to willUpdateDevices / devicesUpdated
[\#1362](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1362)
* Fix race between sending .request and receiving .ready over to_device
[\#1361](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1361)
* Handle race between sending and await next event from other party
[\#1358](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1358)
* Add crypto.willUpdateDevices event and make
getStoredDevices/getStoredDevicesForUser synchronous
[\#1356](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1356)
* Remove redundant key backup setup path
[\#1355](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1355)
Changes in [5.3.1-rc.4](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/releases/tag/v5.3.1-rc.4) (2020-04-23)
==========================================================================================================
[Full Changelog](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/compare/v5.3.1-rc.3...v5.3.1-rc.4)
* Retry account data upload requests
[\#1347](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1347)
* Fix: handle filter not found
[\#1341](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1341)
* Make getAccountDataFromServer return null if not found
[\#1339](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1339)
* Fix setDefaultKeyId to fail if the request fails
[\#1337](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1337)
* Fix: don't do extra /filter request when enabling lazy loading of members
[\#1333](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1333)
* Reject attemptAuth promise if no auth flow found
[\#1331](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1331)
* Serialise Olm prekey decryptions
[\#1330](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1330)
Changes in [5.3.1-rc.3](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/releases/tag/v5.3.1-rc.3) (2020-04-17)
==========================================================================================================
[Full Changelog](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/compare/v5.3.1-rc.2...v5.3.1-rc.3)
* Fix cross-signing/SSSS reset
[\#1323](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1323)
* Fix: crash when backup key needs fixing from corruption issue
[\#1325](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1325)
Changes in [5.3.1-rc.2](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/releases/tag/v5.3.1-rc.2) (2020-04-16)
==========================================================================================================
[Full Changelog](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/compare/v5.3.1-rc.1...v5.3.1-rc.2)
* Implement QR code reciprocate for self-verification with untrusted MSK
[\#1321](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1321)
Changes in [5.3.1-rc.1](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/releases/tag/v5.3.1-rc.1) (2020-04-15)
==========================================================================================================
[Full Changelog](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/compare/v5.3.0-rc.1...v5.3.1-rc.1)
* Adapt release script for riot-desktop
[\#1319](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1319)
* Fix: prevent spurious notifications from indexer
[\#1318](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1318)
* Always create our own user object
[\#1317](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1317)
* Fix incorrect backup key format in SSSS
[\#1311](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1311)
* Fix e2ee crash after refreshing after having received a cross-singing key
reset
[\#1315](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1315)
* Fix: catch send errors in SAS verifier
[\#1314](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1314)
* Clear cross-signing keys when detecting the keys have changed
[\#1312](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1312)
* Upgrade deps
[\#1310](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1310)
Changes in [5.3.0-rc.1](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/releases/tag/v5.3.0-rc.1) (2020-04-08)
==========================================================================================================
[Full Changelog](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/compare/v5.2.0...v5.3.0-rc.1)
* Store key backup key in cache as Uint8Array
[\#1308](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1308)
* Use the correct request body for the /keys/query endpoint.
[\#1307](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1307)
* Avoid creating two devices on registration
[\#1305](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1305)
* Lower max-warnings to 81
[\#1306](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1306)
* Move key backup key creation before caching
[\#1303](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1303)
* Expose function to force-reset outgoing room key requests
[\#1298](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1298)
* Add isSelfVerification property to VerificationRequest
[\#1302](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1302)
* QR code reciprocation
[\#1297](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1297)
* Add ability to check symmetric SSSS key before we try to use it
[\#1294](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1294)
* Add some debug logging for events stuck to bottom of timeline
[\#1296](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1296)
* Fix: spontanous verification request cancellation under some circumstances
[\#1295](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1295)
* Receive private key for caching from the app layer
[\#1293](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1293)
* Track whether we have verified a user before
[\#1292](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1292)
* Fix: error during tests
[\#1222](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1222)
* Send .done event for to_device verification
[\#1288](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1288)
* Request the key backup key & restore backup
[\#1291](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1291)
* Make screen sharing works on Chrome using getDisplayMedia()
[\#1276](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1276)
* Fix isVerified returning false
[\#1289](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1289)
* Fix: verification gets cancelled when event gets duplicated
[\#1286](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1286)
* Use requestSecret on the client to request secrets
[\#1287](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1287)
* Allow guests to fetch TURN servers
[\#1277](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1277)
Changes in [5.2.0](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/releases/tag/v5.2.0) (2020-03-30)
================================================================================================
[Full Changelog](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/compare/v5.2.0-rc.1...v5.2.0)
* Fix isVerified returning false
[\#1290](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1290)
Changes in [5.2.0-rc.1](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/releases/tag/v5.2.0-rc.1) (2020-03-26)
==========================================================================================================
[Full Changelog](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/compare/v5.1.1...v5.2.0-rc.1)
* Add a flag for whether cross signing signatures are trusted
[\#1285](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1285)
* Cache user and self signing keys during bootstrap
[\#1282](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1282)
* remove unnecessary promise
[\#1283](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1283)
* Functions to cache session backups key automatically
[\#1281](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1281)
* Add function for checking cross-signing is ready
[\#1279](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1279)
* Use symmetric encryption for SSSS
[\#1228](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1228)
* Migrate SSSS to use symmetric algorithm
[\#1238](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1238)
* Migration to symmetric SSSS
[\#1272](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1272)
* Reduce number of one-time-key requests
[\#1280](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1280)
* Fix: assume the requested method is supported by other party with to_device
[\#1275](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1275)
* Use checkDeviceTrust when computing untrusted devices
[\#1278](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1278)
* Add a store for backup keys
[\#1271](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1271)
* Upload only new device signature of master key
[\#1268](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1268)
* Expose prepareToEncrypt in the client API
[\#1270](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1270)
* Don't kill the whole device download if one device gives an error
[\#1269](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1269)
* Handle racing .start event during self verification
[\#1267](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1267)
* A crypto.keySignatureUploadFailure event reported the wrong source
[\#1266](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1266)
* Fix editing of unsent messages by waiting for actual event id
[\#1263](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1263)
* Fix: ensureOlmSessionsForDevices parameter format
[\#1264](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1264)
* Remove stuff that yarn install doesn't think we need
[\#1261](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1261)
* Fix: prevent error being thrown during sync in some cases
[\#1258](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1258)
* Force `is_verified` for key backups to bool and fix computation
[\#1259](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1259)
* Add a method for legacy single device verification, returning a verification
request
[\#1257](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1257)
* yarn upgrade
[\#1256](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/pull/1256)
Changes in [5.1.1](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/releases/tag/v5.1.1) (2020-03-17)
================================================================================================
[Full Changelog](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/compare/v5.1.1-rc.1...v5.1.1)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "matrix-js-sdk",
"version": "5.1.1",
"version": "6.0.0-rc.1",
"description": "Matrix Client-Server SDK for Javascript",
"scripts": {
"prepare": "yarn build",
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"build:minify-browser": "terser dist/browser-matrix.js --compress --mangle --source-map --output dist/browser-matrix.min.js",
"gendoc": "jsdoc -c jsdoc.json -P package.json",
"lint": "yarn lint:types && yarn lint:ts && yarn lint:js",
"lint:js": "eslint --max-warnings 93 src spec",
"lint:js": "eslint --max-warnings 81 src spec",
"lint:types": "tsc --noEmit",
"lint:ts": "tslint --project ./tsconfig.json -t stylish",
"test": "jest spec/ --coverage --testEnvironment node",
+26 -15
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ $USAGE
-c changelog_file: specify name of file containing changelog
-x: skip updating the changelog
-z: skip generating the jsdoc
-n: skip publish to NPM
EOF
}
@@ -60,9 +61,10 @@ fi
skip_changelog=
skip_jsdoc=
skip_npm=
changelog_file="CHANGELOG.md"
expected_npm_user="matrixdotorg"
while getopts hc:u:xz f; do
while getopts hc:u:xzn f; do
case $f in
h)
help
@@ -77,6 +79,9 @@ while getopts hc:u:xz f; do
z)
skip_jsdoc=1
;;
n)
skip_npm=1
;;
u)
expected_npm_user="$OPTARG"
;;
@@ -96,10 +101,12 @@ fi
# Login and publish continues to use `npm`, as it seems to have more clearly
# defined options and semantics than `yarn` for writing to the registry.
actual_npm_user=`npm whoami`;
if [ $expected_npm_user != $actual_npm_user ]; then
echo "you need to be logged into npm as $expected_npm_user, but you are logged in as $actual_npm_user" >&2
exit 1
if [ -z "$skip_npm" ]; then
actual_npm_user=`npm whoami`;
if [ $expected_npm_user != $actual_npm_user ]; then
echo "you need to be logged into npm as $expected_npm_user, but you are logged in as $actual_npm_user" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
# ignore leading v on release
@@ -298,11 +305,13 @@ rm "${latest_changes}"
# defined options and semantics than `yarn` for writing to the registry.
# Tag both releases and prereleases as `next` so the last stable release remains
# the default.
npm publish --tag next
if [ $prerelease -eq 0 ]; then
# For a release, also add the default `latest` tag.
package=$(cat package.json | jq -er .name)
npm dist-tag add "$package@$release" latest
if [ -z "$skip_npm" ]; then
npm publish --tag next
if [ $prerelease -eq 0 ]; then
# For a release, also add the default `latest` tag.
package=$(cat package.json | jq -er .name)
npm dist-tag add "$package@$release" latest
fi
fi
if [ -z "$skip_jsdoc" ]; then
@@ -338,8 +347,10 @@ if [ -z "$skip_jsdoc" ]; then
git push origin gh-pages
fi
# finally, merge master back onto develop
git checkout develop
git pull
git merge master
git push origin develop
# finally, merge master back onto develop (if it exists)
if [ $(git branch -lr | grep origin/develop -c) -ge 1 ]; then
git checkout develop
git pull
git merge master
git push origin develop
fi
+1 -1
View File
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ TestClient.prototype.expectKeyQuery = function(response) {
200, (path, content) => {
Object.keys(response.device_keys).forEach((userId) => {
expect(content.device_keys[userId]).toEqual(
{},
[],
"Expected key query for " + userId + ", got " +
Object.keys(content.device_keys),
);
+2 -2
View File
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ function expectAliQueryKeys() {
aliTestClient.httpBackend.when("POST", "/keys/query")
.respond(200, function(path, content) {
expect(content.device_keys[bobUserId]).toEqual(
{},
[],
"Expected Alice to key query for " + bobUserId + ", got " +
Object.keys(content.device_keys),
);
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ function expectBobQueryKeys() {
"POST", "/keys/query",
).respond(200, function(path, content) {
expect(content.device_keys[aliUserId]).toEqual(
{},
[],
"Expected Bob to key query for " + aliUserId + ", got " +
Object.keys(content.device_keys),
);
+2 -2
View File
@@ -347,8 +347,8 @@ describe("MatrixClient", function() {
httpBackend.when("POST", "/keys/query").check(function(req) {
expect(req.data).toEqual({device_keys: {
'boris': {},
'chaz': {},
'boris': [],
'chaz': [],
}});
}).respond(200, {
device_keys: {
+3 -2
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import HttpBackend from "matrix-mock-request";
import {MatrixClient} from "../../src/matrix";
import {MatrixScheduler} from "../../src/scheduler";
import {MemoryStore} from "../../src/store/memory";
import {MatrixError} from "../../src/http-api";
describe("MatrixClient opts", function() {
const baseUrl = "http://localhost.or.something";
@@ -132,10 +133,10 @@ describe("MatrixClient opts", function() {
});
it("shouldn't retry sending events", function(done) {
httpBackend.when("PUT", "/txn1").fail(500, {
httpBackend.when("PUT", "/txn1").fail(500, new MatrixError({
errcode: "M_SOMETHING",
error: "Ruh roh",
});
}));
client.sendTextMessage("!foo:bar", "a body", "txn1").then(function(res) {
expect(false).toBe(true, "sendTextMessage resolved but shouldn't");
}, function(err) {
@@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ describe.each([
["MemoryCryptoStore", () => {
const store = new IndexedDBCryptoStore(undefined, "tests");
store._backend = new MemoryCryptoStore();
store._backendPromise = Promise.resolve(store._backend);
return store;
}],
])("CrossSigning > createCryptoStoreCacheCallbacks [%s]", function(name, dbFactory) {
@@ -297,6 +297,10 @@ describe("MegolmDecryption", function() {
},
}));
mockCrypto.checkDeviceTrust.mockReturnValue({
isVerified: () => false,
});
const megolmEncryption = new MegolmEncryption({
userId: '@user:id',
crypto: mockCrypto,
+26
View File
@@ -541,5 +541,31 @@ describe("MegolmBackup", function() {
expect(res.clearEvent.content).toEqual('testytest');
});
});
it('has working cache functions', async function() {
const key = Uint8Array.from([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]);
await client._crypto.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(key);
const result = await client._crypto.getSessionBackupPrivateKey();
expect(result).toEqual(key);
});
it('caches session backup keys as it encounters them', async function() {
const cachedNull = await client._crypto.getSessionBackupPrivateKey();
expect(cachedNull).toBeNull();
client._http.authedRequest = function() {
return Promise.resolve(KEY_BACKUP_DATA);
};
await new Promise((resolve) => {
client.restoreKeyBackupWithRecoveryKey(
"EsTc LW2K PGiF wKEA 3As5 g5c4 BXwk qeeJ ZJV8 Q9fu gUMN UE4d",
ROOM_ID,
SESSION_ID,
BACKUP_INFO,
{ cacheCompleteCallback: resolve },
);
});
const cachedKey = await client._crypto.getSessionBackupPrivateKey();
expect(cachedKey).not.toBeNull();
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
/*
Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*/
import {
IndexedDBCryptoStore,
} from '../../../src/crypto/store/indexeddb-crypto-store';
import {MemoryCryptoStore} from '../../../src/crypto/store/memory-crypto-store';
import 'fake-indexeddb/auto';
import 'jest-localstorage-mock';
import {
ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES,
} from '../../../src/crypto/OutgoingRoomKeyRequestManager';
const requests = [
{
requestId: "A",
requestBody: { session_id: "A", room_id: "A" },
state: ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES.SENT,
},
{
requestId: "B",
requestBody: { session_id: "B", room_id: "B" },
state: ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES.SENT,
},
{
requestId: "C",
requestBody: { session_id: "C", room_id: "C" },
state: ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES.UNSENT,
},
];
describe.each([
["IndexedDBCryptoStore",
() => new IndexedDBCryptoStore(global.indexedDB, "tests")],
["LocalStorageCryptoStore",
() => new IndexedDBCryptoStore(undefined, "tests")],
["MemoryCryptoStore", () => {
const store = new IndexedDBCryptoStore(undefined, "tests");
store._backend = new MemoryCryptoStore();
store._backendPromise = Promise.resolve(store._backend);
return store;
}],
])("Outgoing room key requests [%s]", function(name, dbFactory) {
let store;
beforeAll(async () => {
store = dbFactory();
await store.startup();
await Promise.all(requests.map((request) =>
store.getOrAddOutgoingRoomKeyRequest(request),
));
});
it("getAllOutgoingRoomKeyRequestsByState retrieves all entries in a given state",
async () => {
const r = await
store.getAllOutgoingRoomKeyRequestsByState(ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES.SENT);
expect(r).toHaveLength(2);
requests.filter((e) => e.state == ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES.SENT).forEach((e) => {
expect(r).toContainEqual(e);
});
});
test("getOutgoingRoomKeyRequestByState retrieves any entry in a given state",
async () => {
const r =
await store.getOutgoingRoomKeyRequestByState([ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES.SENT]);
expect(r).not.toBeNull();
expect(r).not.toBeUndefined();
expect(r.state).toEqual(ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES.SENT);
expect(requests).toContainEqual(r);
});
});
+725 -83
View File
@@ -16,10 +16,20 @@ limitations under the License.
import '../../olm-loader';
import * as olmlib from "../../../src/crypto/olmlib";
import {SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1} from "../../../src/crypto/SecretStorage";
import {SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES} from "../../../src/crypto/SecretStorage";
import {MatrixEvent} from "../../../src/models/event";
import {TestClient} from '../../TestClient';
import {makeTestClients} from './verification/util';
import {encryptAES} from "../../../src/crypto/aes";
import * as utils from "../../../src/utils";
try {
const crypto = require('crypto');
utils.setCrypto(crypto);
} catch (err) {
console.log('nodejs was compiled without crypto support');
}
async function makeTestClient(userInfo, options) {
const client = (new TestClient(
@@ -40,6 +50,13 @@ async function makeTestClient(userInfo, options) {
return client;
}
// Wrapper around pkSign to return a signed object. pkSign returns the
// signature, rather than the signed object.
function sign(obj, key, userId) {
olmlib.pkSign(obj, key, userId);
return obj;
}
describe("Secrets", function() {
if (!global.Olm) {
console.warn('Not running megolm backup unit tests: libolm not present');
@@ -51,9 +68,8 @@ describe("Secrets", function() {
});
it("should store and retrieve a secret", async function() {
const decryption = new global.Olm.PkDecryption();
const pubkey = decryption.generate_key();
const privkey = decryption.get_private_key();
const key = new Uint8Array(16);
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) key[i] = i;
const signing = new global.Olm.PkSigning();
const signingKey = signing.generate_seed();
@@ -69,7 +85,7 @@ describe("Secrets", function() {
const getKey = jest.fn(e => {
expect(Object.keys(e.keys)).toEqual(["abc"]);
return ['abc', privkey];
return ['abc', key];
});
const alice = await makeTestClient(
@@ -100,8 +116,7 @@ describe("Secrets", function() {
};
const keyAccountData = {
algorithm: SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1,
pubkey: pubkey,
algorithm: SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES,
};
await alice._crypto._crossSigningInfo.signObject(keyAccountData, 'master');
@@ -112,11 +127,11 @@ describe("Secrets", function() {
}),
]);
expect(await secretStorage.isStored("foo")).toBe(false);
expect(await secretStorage.isStored("foo")).toBeFalsy();
await secretStorage.store("foo", "bar", ["abc"]);
expect(await secretStorage.isStored("foo")).toBe(true);
expect(await secretStorage.isStored("foo")).toBeTruthy();
expect(await secretStorage.get("foo")).toBe("bar");
expect(getKey).toHaveBeenCalled();
@@ -149,6 +164,13 @@ describe("Secrets", function() {
});
it("should encrypt with default key if keys is null", async function() {
const key = new Uint8Array(16);
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) key[i] = i;
const getKey = jest.fn(e => {
expect(Object.keys(e.keys)).toEqual([newKeyId]);
return [newKeyId, key];
});
let keys = {};
const alice = await makeTestClient(
{userId: "@alice:example.com", deviceId: "Osborne2"},
@@ -156,6 +178,7 @@ describe("Secrets", function() {
cryptoCallbacks: {
getCrossSigningKey: t => keys[t],
saveCrossSigningKeys: k => keys = k,
getSecretStorageKey: getKey,
},
},
);
@@ -170,7 +193,7 @@ describe("Secrets", function() {
alice.resetCrossSigningKeys();
const newKeyId = await alice.addSecretStorageKey(
SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1,
SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES,
);
// we don't await on this because it waits for the event to come down the sync
// which won't happen in the test setup
@@ -251,89 +274,708 @@ describe("Secrets", function() {
expect(secret).toBe("bar");
});
it("bootstraps when no storage or cross-signing keys locally", async function() {
const bob = await makeTestClient(
{
userId: "@bob:example.com",
deviceId: "bob1",
},
describe("bootstrap", function() {
// keys used in some of the tests
const XSK = new Uint8Array(
olmlib.decodeBase64("3lo2YdJugHjfE+Or7KJ47NuKbhE7AAGLgQ/dc19913Q="),
);
bob.uploadDeviceSigningKeys = async () => {};
bob.uploadKeySignatures = async () => {};
bob.setAccountData = async function(eventType, contents, callback) {
const event = new MatrixEvent({
type: eventType,
content: contents,
const XSPubKey = "DRb8pFVJyEJ9OWvXeUoM0jq/C2Wt+NxzBZVuk2nRb+0";
const USK = new Uint8Array(
olmlib.decodeBase64("lKWi3hJGUie5xxHgySoz8PHFnZv6wvNaud/p2shN9VU="),
);
const USPubKey = "CUpoiTtHiyXpUmd+3ohb7JVxAlUaOG1NYs9Jlx8soQU";
const SSK = new Uint8Array(
olmlib.decodeBase64("1R6JVlXX99UcfUZzKuCDGQgJTw8ur1/ofgPD8pp+96M="),
);
const SSPubKey = "0DfNsRDzEvkCLA0gD3m7VAGJ5VClhjEsewI35xq873Q";
const backupKey = new Uint8Array(
olmlib.decodeBase64(
"OTmOKrPsWP1qxmt0s2qat4vYxULG+U9cmFAWFco3A5U=",
),
);
const SSSSKey = new Uint8Array(
olmlib.decodeBase64(
"XrmITOOdBhw6yY5Bh7trb/bgp1FRdIGyCUxxMP873R0=",
),
);
const SSSSPubKey = "v3A8HTypbccUm6jaRCRw5l+7lSdzQUACeY9xpQ5BVmE";
it("bootstraps when no storage or cross-signing keys locally", async function() {
const key = new Uint8Array(16);
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) key[i] = i;
const getKey = jest.fn(e => {
return [Object.keys(e.keys)[0], key];
});
this.store.storeAccountDataEvents([
event,
]);
this.emit("accountData", event);
};
await bob.bootstrapSecretStorage();
const crossSigning = bob._crypto._crossSigningInfo;
const secretStorage = bob._crypto._secretStorage;
expect(crossSigning.getId()).toBeTruthy();
expect(await crossSigning.isStoredInSecretStorage(secretStorage)).toBeTruthy();
expect(await secretStorage.hasKey()).toBeTruthy();
});
it("bootstraps when cross-signing keys in secret storage", async function() {
const decryption = new global.Olm.PkDecryption();
const storagePublicKey = decryption.generate_key();
const storagePrivateKey = decryption.get_private_key();
const bob = await makeTestClient(
{
userId: "@bob:example.com",
deviceId: "bob1",
},
{
cryptoCallbacks: {
getSecretStorageKey: async request => {
const defaultKeyId = await bob.getDefaultSecretStorageKeyId();
expect(Object.keys(request.keys)).toEqual([defaultKeyId]);
return [defaultKeyId, storagePrivateKey];
const bob = await makeTestClient(
{
userId: "@bob:example.com",
deviceId: "bob1",
},
{
cryptoCallbacks: {
getSecretStorageKey: getKey,
},
},
},
);
);
bob.uploadDeviceSigningKeys = async () => {};
bob.uploadKeySignatures = async () => {};
bob.setAccountData = async function(eventType, contents, callback) {
const event = new MatrixEvent({
type: eventType,
content: contents,
});
this.store.storeAccountDataEvents([
event,
]);
this.emit("accountData", event);
};
bob.uploadDeviceSigningKeys = async () => {};
bob.uploadKeySignatures = async () => {};
bob.setAccountData = async function(eventType, contents, callback) {
const event = new MatrixEvent({
type: eventType,
content: contents,
});
this.store.storeAccountDataEvents([
event,
]);
this.emit("accountData", event);
};
bob._crypto.checkKeyBackup = async () => {};
await bob.bootstrapSecretStorage();
const crossSigning = bob._crypto._crossSigningInfo;
const secretStorage = bob._crypto._secretStorage;
const crossSigning = bob._crypto._crossSigningInfo;
const secretStorage = bob._crypto._secretStorage;
// Set up cross-signing keys from scratch with specific storage key
await bob.bootstrapSecretStorage({
createSecretStorageKey: async () => ({ pubkey: storagePublicKey }),
expect(crossSigning.getId()).toBeTruthy();
expect(await crossSigning.isStoredInSecretStorage(secretStorage))
.toBeTruthy();
expect(await secretStorage.hasKey()).toBeTruthy();
});
// Clear local cross-signing keys and read from secret storage
bob._crypto._deviceList.storeCrossSigningForUser(
"@bob:example.com",
crossSigning.toStorage(),
);
crossSigning.keys = {};
await bob.bootstrapSecretStorage();
it("bootstraps when cross-signing keys in secret storage", async function() {
const decryption = new global.Olm.PkDecryption();
const storagePublicKey = decryption.generate_key();
const storagePrivateKey = decryption.get_private_key();
expect(crossSigning.getId()).toBeTruthy();
expect(await crossSigning.isStoredInSecretStorage(secretStorage)).toBeTruthy();
expect(await secretStorage.hasKey()).toBeTruthy();
const bob = await makeTestClient(
{
userId: "@bob:example.com",
deviceId: "bob1",
},
{
cryptoCallbacks: {
getSecretStorageKey: async request => {
const defaultKeyId = await bob.getDefaultSecretStorageKeyId();
expect(Object.keys(request.keys)).toEqual([defaultKeyId]);
return [defaultKeyId, storagePrivateKey];
},
},
},
);
bob.uploadDeviceSigningKeys = async () => {};
bob.uploadKeySignatures = async () => {};
bob.setAccountData = async function(eventType, contents, callback) {
const event = new MatrixEvent({
type: eventType,
content: contents,
});
this.store.storeAccountDataEvents([
event,
]);
this.emit("accountData", event);
};
bob._crypto.checkKeyBackup = async () => {};
const crossSigning = bob._crypto._crossSigningInfo;
const secretStorage = bob._crypto._secretStorage;
// Set up cross-signing keys from scratch with specific storage key
await bob.bootstrapSecretStorage({
createSecretStorageKey: async () => ({
// `pubkey` not used anymore with symmetric 4S
keyInfo: { pubkey: storagePublicKey },
privateKey: storagePrivateKey,
}),
});
// Clear local cross-signing keys and read from secret storage
bob._crypto._deviceList.storeCrossSigningForUser(
"@bob:example.com",
crossSigning.toStorage(),
);
crossSigning.keys = {};
await bob.bootstrapSecretStorage();
expect(crossSigning.getId()).toBeTruthy();
expect(await crossSigning.isStoredInSecretStorage(secretStorage))
.toBeTruthy();
expect(await secretStorage.hasKey()).toBeTruthy();
});
it("converts asymmetric SSSS to symmetric SSSS", async function() {
let crossSigningKeys = {};
const secretStorageKeys = {
"old_key_id": SSSSKey,
"new_key_id": SSSSKey,
};
const alice = await makeTestClient(
{userId: "@alice:example.com", deviceId: "Osborne2"},
{
cryptoCallbacks: {
getCrossSigningKey: t => crossSigningKeys[t],
saveCrossSigningKeys: k => crossSigningKeys = k,
getSecretStorageKey: ({keys}, name) => {
for (const keyId of Object.keys(keys)) {
if (secretStorageKeys[keyId]) {
return [keyId, secretStorageKeys[keyId]];
}
}
},
},
},
);
const encryption = new global.Olm.PkEncryption();
encryption.set_recipient_key(SSSSPubKey);
alice.store.storeAccountDataEvents([
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.secret_storage.default_key",
content: {
key: "old_key_id",
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.secret_storage.key.old_key_id",
content: sign({
algorithm: "m.secret_storage.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2",
passphrase: {
algorithm: "m.pbkdf2",
iterations: 500000,
salt: "GbkvwKHVMveo1zGVSb2GMMdCinG2npJK",
},
pubkey: SSSSPubKey,
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.master",
content: {
encrypted: {
old_key_id: encryption.encrypt(olmlib.encodeBase64(XSK)),
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.self_signing",
content: {
encrypted: {
old_key_id: encryption.encrypt(olmlib.encodeBase64(SSK)),
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.user_signing",
content: {
encrypted: {
old_key_id: encryption.encrypt(olmlib.encodeBase64(USK)),
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.megolm_backup.v1",
content: {
encrypted: {
old_key_id: encryption.encrypt(
olmlib.encodeBase64(backupKey),
),
},
},
}),
]);
encryption.free();
alice._crypto._deviceList.storeCrossSigningForUser("@alice:example.com", {
keys: {
master: {
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["master"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${XSPubKey}`]: XSPubKey,
},
},
self_signing: sign({
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["self_signing"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${SSPubKey}`]: SSPubKey,
},
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
user_signing: sign({
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["user_signing"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${USPubKey}`]: USPubKey,
},
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
},
});
alice.getKeyBackupVersion = async () => {
return {
version: "1",
algorithm: "m.megolm_backup.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2",
auth_data: sign({
public_key: "pxEXhg+4vdMf/kFwP4bVawFWdb0EmytL3eFJx++zQ0A",
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
};
};
const origAddSecretStorageKey = alice._crypto.addSecretStorageKey;
alice._crypto.addSecretStorageKey = async function(algorithm, opts, keyId) {
return await origAddSecretStorageKey.call(
alice._crypto, algorithm, opts, keyId || "new_key_id",
);
};
alice.setAccountData = async function(name, data) {
const event = new MatrixEvent({
type: name,
content: data,
});
alice.store.storeAccountDataEvents([event]);
this.emit("accountData", event);
};
await alice.bootstrapSecretStorage();
// it should create a new key with the same parameters
expect(alice.getAccountData("m.secret_storage.default_key").getContent())
.toEqual({key: "new_key_id"});
const newKeyInfo = alice.getAccountData("m.secret_storage.key.new_key_id")
.getContent();
expect(newKeyInfo.algorithm)
.toEqual("m.secret_storage.v1.aes-hmac-sha2");
expect(newKeyInfo.passphrase).toEqual({
algorithm: "m.pbkdf2",
iterations: 500000,
salt: "GbkvwKHVMveo1zGVSb2GMMdCinG2npJK",
});
expect(newKeyInfo).toHaveProperty("iv");
expect(newKeyInfo).toHaveProperty("mac");
expect(alice.checkSecretStorageKey(secretStorageKeys.new_key_id, newKeyInfo))
.toBeTruthy();
const crossSigningMaster = alice.getAccountData("m.cross_signing.master")
.getContent();
expect(crossSigningMaster.encrypted).toHaveProperty("new_key_id");
expect(crossSigningMaster.encrypted).not.toHaveProperty("old_key_id");
expect(await alice.getSecret("m.cross_signing.master"))
.toEqual(olmlib.encodeBase64(XSK));
const USKInfo = alice.getAccountData("m.cross_signing.self_signing")
.getContent();
expect(USKInfo.encrypted).toHaveProperty("new_key_id");
expect(USKInfo.encrypted).not.toHaveProperty("old_key_id");
expect(await alice.getSecret("m.cross_signing.user_signing"))
.toEqual(olmlib.encodeBase64(USK));
const SSKInfo = alice.getAccountData("m.cross_signing.self_signing")
.getContent();
expect(SSKInfo.encrypted).toHaveProperty("new_key_id");
expect(SSKInfo.encrypted).not.toHaveProperty("old_key_id");
expect(await alice.getSecret("m.cross_signing.self_signing"))
.toEqual(olmlib.encodeBase64(SSK));
const backupKeyInfo = alice.getAccountData("m.megolm_backup.v1")
.getContent();
expect(backupKeyInfo.encrypted).toHaveProperty("new_key_id");
expect(backupKeyInfo.encrypted).not.toHaveProperty("old_key_id");
expect(await alice.getSecret("m.megolm_backup.v1"))
.toEqual(olmlib.encodeBase64(backupKey));
});
it("converts asymmetric SSSS with passthrough", async function() {
let crossSigningKeys = {};
const secretStorageKeys = {
"old_key_id": SSSSKey,
"new_key_id": SSSSKey,
};
const alice = await makeTestClient(
{userId: "@alice:example.com", deviceId: "Osborne2"},
{
cryptoCallbacks: {
getCrossSigningKey: t => crossSigningKeys[t],
saveCrossSigningKeys: k => crossSigningKeys = k,
getSecretStorageKey: ({keys}, name) => {
for (const keyId of Object.keys(keys)) {
if (secretStorageKeys[keyId]) {
return [keyId, secretStorageKeys[keyId]];
}
}
},
},
},
);
const encryption = new global.Olm.PkEncryption();
encryption.set_recipient_key(SSSSPubKey);
alice.store.storeAccountDataEvents([
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.secret_storage.default_key",
content: {
key: "old_key_id",
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.secret_storage.key.old_key_id",
content: sign({
algorithm: "m.secret_storage.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2",
passphrase: {
algorithm: "m.pbkdf2",
iterations: 500000,
salt: "GbkvwKHVMveo1zGVSb2GMMdCinG2npJK",
},
pubkey: "v3A8HTypbccUm6jaRCRw5l+7lSdzQUACeY9xpQ5BVmE",
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.master",
content: {
encrypted: {
old_key_id: encryption.encrypt(olmlib.encodeBase64(XSK)),
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.self_signing",
content: {
encrypted: {
old_key_id: encryption.encrypt(olmlib.encodeBase64(SSK)),
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.user_signing",
content: {
encrypted: {
old_key_id: encryption.encrypt(olmlib.encodeBase64(USK)),
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.megolm_backup.v1",
content: {
encrypted: {
old_key_id: {
passthrough: true,
},
},
},
}),
]);
encryption.free();
alice._crypto._deviceList.storeCrossSigningForUser("@alice:example.com", {
keys: {
master: {
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["master"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${XSPubKey}`]: XSPubKey,
},
},
self_signing: sign({
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["self_signing"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${SSPubKey}`]: SSPubKey,
},
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
user_signing: sign({
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["user_signing"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${USPubKey}`]: USPubKey,
},
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
},
});
alice.getKeyBackupVersion = async () => {
return {
version: "1",
algorithm: "m.megolm_backup.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2",
auth_data: sign({
public_key: "v3A8HTypbccUm6jaRCRw5l+7lSdzQUACeY9xpQ5BVmE",
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
};
};
const origAddSecretStorageKey = alice._crypto.addSecretStorageKey;
alice._crypto.addSecretStorageKey = async function(algorithm, opts, keyId) {
return await origAddSecretStorageKey.call(
alice._crypto, algorithm, opts, keyId || "new_key_id",
);
};
alice.setAccountData = async function(name, data) {
const event = new MatrixEvent({
type: name,
content: data,
});
alice.store.storeAccountDataEvents([event]);
this.emit("accountData", event);
};
await alice.bootstrapSecretStorage();
// the new backup key should be the encoded SSSS key
const backupKeyInfo = alice.getAccountData("m.megolm_backup.v1")
.getContent();
expect(backupKeyInfo.encrypted).toHaveProperty("new_key_id");
expect(backupKeyInfo.encrypted).not.toHaveProperty("old_key_id");
expect(await alice.getSecret("m.megolm_backup.v1"))
.toEqual(olmlib.encodeBase64(SSSSKey));
});
it("adds passphrase checking if it's lacking", async function() {
let crossSigningKeys = {
master: XSK,
user_signing: USK,
self_signing: SSK,
};
const secretStorageKeys = {
key_id: SSSSKey,
};
const alice = await makeTestClient(
{userId: "@alice:example.com", deviceId: "Osborne2"},
{
cryptoCallbacks: {
getCrossSigningKey: t => crossSigningKeys[t],
saveCrossSigningKeys: k => crossSigningKeys = k,
getSecretStorageKey: ({keys}, name) => {
for (const keyId of Object.keys(keys)) {
if (secretStorageKeys[keyId]) {
return [keyId, secretStorageKeys[keyId]];
}
}
},
},
},
);
alice.store.storeAccountDataEvents([
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.secret_storage.default_key",
content: {
key: "key_id",
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.secret_storage.key.key_id",
content: {
algorithm: "m.secret_storage.v1.aes-hmac-sha2",
passphrase: {
algorithm: "m.pbkdf2",
iterations: 500000,
salt: "GbkvwKHVMveo1zGVSb2GMMdCinG2npJK",
},
},
}),
// we never use these values, other than checking that they
// exist, so just use dummy values
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.master",
content: {
encrypted: {
key_id: {ciphertext: "bla", mac: "bla", iv: "bla"},
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.self_signing",
content: {
encrypted: {
key_id: {ciphertext: "bla", mac: "bla", iv: "bla"},
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.user_signing",
content: {
encrypted: {
key_id: {ciphertext: "bla", mac: "bla", iv: "bla"},
},
},
}),
]);
alice._crypto._deviceList.storeCrossSigningForUser("@alice:example.com", {
keys: {
master: {
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["master"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${XSPubKey}`]: XSPubKey,
},
},
self_signing: sign({
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["self_signing"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${SSPubKey}`]: SSPubKey,
},
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
user_signing: sign({
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["user_signing"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${USPubKey}`]: USPubKey,
},
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
},
});
alice.getKeyBackupVersion = async () => {
return {
version: "1",
algorithm: "m.megolm_backup.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2",
auth_data: sign({
public_key: "pxEXhg+4vdMf/kFwP4bVawFWdb0EmytL3eFJx++zQ0A",
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
};
};
alice.setAccountData = async function(name, data) {
const event = new MatrixEvent({
type: name,
content: data,
});
alice.store.storeAccountDataEvents([event]);
this.emit("accountData", event);
};
await alice.bootstrapSecretStorage();
expect(alice.getAccountData("m.secret_storage.default_key").getContent())
.toEqual({key: "key_id"});
const keyInfo = alice.getAccountData("m.secret_storage.key.key_id")
.getContent();
expect(keyInfo.algorithm)
.toEqual("m.secret_storage.v1.aes-hmac-sha2");
expect(keyInfo.passphrase).toEqual({
algorithm: "m.pbkdf2",
iterations: 500000,
salt: "GbkvwKHVMveo1zGVSb2GMMdCinG2npJK",
});
expect(keyInfo).toHaveProperty("iv");
expect(keyInfo).toHaveProperty("mac");
expect(alice.checkSecretStorageKey(secretStorageKeys.key_id, keyInfo))
.toBeTruthy();
});
it("fixes backup keys in the wrong format", async function() {
let crossSigningKeys = {
master: XSK,
user_signing: USK,
self_signing: SSK,
};
const secretStorageKeys = {
key_id: SSSSKey,
};
const alice = await makeTestClient(
{userId: "@alice:example.com", deviceId: "Osborne2"},
{
cryptoCallbacks: {
getCrossSigningKey: t => crossSigningKeys[t],
saveCrossSigningKeys: k => crossSigningKeys = k,
getSecretStorageKey: ({keys}, name) => {
for (const keyId of Object.keys(keys)) {
if (secretStorageKeys[keyId]) {
return [keyId, secretStorageKeys[keyId]];
}
}
},
},
},
);
alice.store.storeAccountDataEvents([
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.secret_storage.default_key",
content: {
key: "key_id",
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.secret_storage.key.key_id",
content: {
algorithm: "m.secret_storage.v1.aes-hmac-sha2",
passphrase: {
algorithm: "m.pbkdf2",
iterations: 500000,
salt: "GbkvwKHVMveo1zGVSb2GMMdCinG2npJK",
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.master",
content: {
encrypted: {
key_id: {ciphertext: "bla", mac: "bla", iv: "bla"},
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.self_signing",
content: {
encrypted: {
key_id: {ciphertext: "bla", mac: "bla", iv: "bla"},
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.cross_signing.user_signing",
content: {
encrypted: {
key_id: {ciphertext: "bla", mac: "bla", iv: "bla"},
},
},
}),
new MatrixEvent({
type: "m.megolm_backup.v1",
content: {
encrypted: {
key_id: await encryptAES(
"123,45,6,7,89,1,234,56,78,90,12,34,5,67,8,90",
secretStorageKeys.key_id, "m.megolm_backup.v1",
),
},
},
}),
]);
alice._crypto._deviceList.storeCrossSigningForUser("@alice:example.com", {
keys: {
master: {
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["master"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${XSPubKey}`]: XSPubKey,
},
},
self_signing: sign({
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["self_signing"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${SSPubKey}`]: SSPubKey,
},
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
user_signing: sign({
user_id: "@alice:example.com",
usage: ["user_signing"],
keys: {
[`ed25519:${USPubKey}`]: USPubKey,
},
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
},
});
alice.getKeyBackupVersion = async () => {
return {
version: "1",
algorithm: "m.megolm_backup.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2",
auth_data: sign({
public_key: "pxEXhg+4vdMf/kFwP4bVawFWdb0EmytL3eFJx++zQ0A",
}, XSK, "@alice:example.com"),
};
};
alice.setAccountData = async function(name, data) {
const event = new MatrixEvent({
type: name,
content: data,
});
alice.store.storeAccountDataEvents([event]);
this.emit("accountData", event);
};
await alice.bootstrapSecretStorage();
const backupKey = alice.getAccountData("m.megolm_backup.v1")
.getContent();
expect(backupKey.encrypted).toHaveProperty("key_id");
expect(await alice.getSecret("m.megolm_backup.v1"))
.toEqual("ey0GB1kB6jhOWgwiBUMIWg==");
});
});
});
+10 -1
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,16 @@ describe("SAS verification", function() {
});
it("should error on an unexpected event", async function() {
const sas = new SAS({}, "@alice:example.com", "ABCDEFG");
//channel, baseApis, userId, deviceId, startEvent, request
const request = {
onVerifierCancelled: function() {},
};
const channel = {
send: function() {
return Promise.resolve();
},
};
const sas = new SAS(channel, {}, "@alice:example.com", "ABCDEFG", null, request);
sas.handleEvent(new MatrixEvent({
sender: "@alice:example.com",
type: "es.inquisition",
@@ -64,12 +64,20 @@ describe("self-verifications", () => {
}),
};
const storeSessionBackupPrivateKey = jest.fn();
const restoreKeyBackupWithCache = jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve());
const client = {
_crypto: {
_crossSigningInfo,
_secretStorage,
storeSessionBackupPrivateKey,
getSessionBackupPrivateKey: () => null,
},
requestSecret: _secretStorage.request.bind(_secretStorage),
getUserId: () => userId,
getKeyBackupVersion: () => Promise.resolve({}),
restoreKeyBackupWithCache,
};
const request = {
@@ -88,15 +96,20 @@ describe("self-verifications", () => {
const result = await verification.done();
/* We should request, and store, two keys */
/* We should request, and store, two cross signing key and the key backup key */
expect(cacheCallbacks.storeCrossSigningKeyCache.mock.calls.length).toBe(2);
expect(_secretStorage.request.mock.calls.length).toBe(2);
expect(_secretStorage.request.mock.calls.length).toBe(3);
expect(cacheCallbacks.storeCrossSigningKeyCache.mock.calls[0][1])
.toEqual(testKey);
expect(cacheCallbacks.storeCrossSigningKeyCache.mock.calls[1][1])
.toEqual(testKey);
expect(storeSessionBackupPrivateKey.mock.calls[0][0])
.toEqual(testKey);
expect(restoreKeyBackupWithCache).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(result).toBeInstanceOf(Array);
expect(result[0][0]).toBe(testKeyPub);
expect(result[1][0]).toBe(testKeyPub);
+29
View File
@@ -143,4 +143,33 @@ describe("InteractiveAuth", function() {
expect(stateUpdated).toBeCalledTimes(1);
});
});
it("should start an auth stage and reject if no auth flow", function() {
const doRequest = jest.fn();
const stateUpdated = jest.fn();
const ia = new InteractiveAuth({
matrixClient: new FakeClient(),
doRequest: doRequest,
stateUpdated: stateUpdated,
});
doRequest.mockImplementation(function(authData) {
logger.log("request1", authData);
expect(authData).toEqual({});
const err = new MatrixError({
session: "sessionId",
flows: [],
params: {
"logintype": { param: "aa" },
},
});
err.httpStatus = 401;
throw err;
});
return ia.attemptAuth().catch(function(error) {
expect(error.message).toBe('No appropriate authentication flow found');
});
});
});
+4 -2
View File
@@ -502,10 +502,12 @@ export class AutoDiscovery {
request(
{ method: "GET", uri: url, timeout: 5000 },
(err, response, body) => {
if (err || response.statusCode < 200 || response.statusCode >= 300) {
if (err || response &&
(response.statusCode < 200 || response.statusCode >= 300)
) {
let action = "FAIL_PROMPT";
let reason = (err ? err.message : null) || "General failure";
if (response.statusCode === 404) {
if (response && response.statusCode === 404) {
action = "IGNORE";
reason = AutoDiscovery.ERROR_MISSING_WELLKNOWN;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1757,7 +1757,7 @@ MatrixBaseApis.prototype.downloadKeysForUsers = function(userIds, opts) {
content.token = opts.token;
}
userIds.forEach((u) => {
content.device_keys[u] = {};
content.device_keys[u] = [];
});
return this._http.authedRequest(undefined, "POST", "/keys/query", undefined, content);
+221 -82
View File
@@ -35,19 +35,25 @@ import {StubStore} from "./store/stub";
import {createNewMatrixCall} from "./webrtc/call";
import * as utils from './utils';
import {sleep} from './utils';
import {MatrixError, PREFIX_MEDIA_R0, PREFIX_UNSTABLE} from "./http-api";
import {
MatrixError,
PREFIX_MEDIA_R0,
PREFIX_UNSTABLE,
retryNetworkOperation,
} from "./http-api";
import {getHttpUriForMxc} from "./content-repo";
import * as ContentHelpers from "./content-helpers";
import * as olmlib from "./crypto/olmlib";
import {ReEmitter} from './ReEmitter';
import {RoomList} from './crypto/RoomList';
import {logger} from './logger';
import {Crypto, isCryptoAvailable} from './crypto';
import {Crypto, isCryptoAvailable, fixBackupKey} from './crypto';
import {decodeRecoveryKey} from './crypto/recoverykey';
import {keyFromAuthData} from './crypto/key_passphrase';
import {randomString} from './randomstring';
import {PushProcessor} from "./pushprocessor";
import {encodeBase64, decodeBase64} from "./crypto/olmlib";
import { User } from "./models/user";
const SCROLLBACK_DELAY_MS = 3000;
export const CRYPTO_ENABLED = isCryptoAvailable();
@@ -217,8 +223,10 @@ function keyFromRecoverySession(session, decryptionKey) {
* Args:
* {object} keys Information about the keys:
* {
* <key name>: {
* pubkey: {UInt8Array}
* keys: {
* <key name>: {
* pubkey: {UInt8Array}
* }, ...
* }
* }
* {string} name the name of the value we want to read out of SSSS, for UI purposes.
@@ -281,13 +289,19 @@ export function MatrixClient(opts) {
this.scheduler = opts.scheduler;
if (this.scheduler) {
const self = this;
this.scheduler.setProcessFunction(function(eventToSend) {
this.scheduler.setProcessFunction(async function(eventToSend) {
const room = self.getRoom(eventToSend.getRoomId());
if (eventToSend.status !== EventStatus.SENDING) {
_updatePendingEventStatus(room, eventToSend,
EventStatus.SENDING);
}
return _sendEventHttpRequest(self, eventToSend);
const res = await _sendEventHttpRequest(self, eventToSend);
if (room) {
// ensure we update pending event before the next scheduler run so that any listeners to event id
// updates on the synchronous event emitter get a chance to run first.
room.updatePendingEvent(eventToSend, EventStatus.SENT, res.event_id);
}
return res;
});
}
this.clientRunning = false;
@@ -723,6 +737,7 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.initCrypto = async function() {
"crypto.roomKeyRequestCancellation",
"crypto.warning",
"crypto.devicesUpdated",
"crypto.willUpdateDevices",
"deviceVerificationChanged",
"userTrustStatusChanged",
"crossSigning.keysChanged",
@@ -752,7 +767,6 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.isCryptoEnabled = function() {
return this._crypto !== null;
};
/**
* Get the Ed25519 key for this device
*
@@ -812,9 +826,9 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.downloadKeys = function(userIds, forceDownload) {
*
* @param {string} userId the user to list keys for.
*
* @return {Promise<module:crypto/deviceinfo[]>} list of devices
* @return {module:crypto/deviceinfo[]} list of devices
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.getStoredDevicesForUser = async function(userId) {
MatrixClient.prototype.getStoredDevicesForUser = function(userId) {
if (this._crypto === null) {
throw new Error("End-to-end encryption disabled");
}
@@ -827,9 +841,9 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.getStoredDevicesForUser = async function(userId) {
* @param {string} userId the user to list keys for.
* @param {string} deviceId unique identifier for the device
*
* @return {Promise<?module:crypto/deviceinfo>} device or null
* @return {module:crypto/deviceinfo} device or null
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.getStoredDevice = async function(userId, deviceId) {
MatrixClient.prototype.getStoredDevice = function(userId, deviceId) {
if (this._crypto === null) {
throw new Error("End-to-end encryption disabled");
}
@@ -1127,6 +1141,12 @@ function wrapCryptoFuncs(MatrixClient, names) {
* @returns {boolean} true if the key matches, otherwise false
*/
/**
* Perform any background tasks that can be done before a message is ready to
* send, in order to speed up sending of the message.
*
* @param {module:models/room} room the room the event is in
*/
wrapCryptoFuncs(MatrixClient, [
"resetCrossSigningKeys",
"getCrossSigningId",
@@ -1135,6 +1155,11 @@ wrapCryptoFuncs(MatrixClient, [
"checkDeviceTrust",
"checkOwnCrossSigningTrust",
"checkCrossSigningPrivateKey",
"legacyDeviceVerification",
"prepareToEncrypt",
"isCrossSigningReady",
"getCryptoTrustCrossSignedDevices",
"setCryptoTrustCrossSignedDevices",
]);
/**
@@ -1161,7 +1186,9 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.checkEventSenderTrust = async function(event) {
* @param {string} password Passphrase string that can be entered by the user
* when restoring the backup as an alternative to entering the recovery key.
* Optional.
* @returns {Promise<String>} The user-facing recovery key string.
* @returns {Promise<Object>} Object with public key metadata, encoded private
* recovery key which should be disposed of after displaying to the user,
* and raw private key to avoid round tripping if needed.
*/
/**
@@ -1233,7 +1260,9 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.checkEventSenderTrust = async function(event) {
* @param {boolean} checkKey check if the secret is encrypted by a trusted
* key
*
* @return {boolean} whether or not the secret is stored
* @return {object?} map of key name to key info the secret is encrypted
* with, or null if it is not present or not encrypted with a trusted
* key
*/
/**
@@ -1281,12 +1310,14 @@ wrapCryptoFuncs(MatrixClient, [
"bootstrapSecretStorage",
"addSecretStorageKey",
"hasSecretStorageKey",
"secretStorageKeyNeedsUpgrade",
"storeSecret",
"getSecret",
"isSecretStored",
"requestSecret",
"getDefaultSecretStorageKeyId",
"setDefaultSecretStorageKeyId",
"checkSecretStorageKey",
"checkSecretStoragePrivateKey",
]);
@@ -1542,7 +1573,7 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.prepareKeyBackupVersion = async function(
throw new Error("End-to-end encryption disabled");
}
const [keyInfo, encodedPrivateKey, privateKey] =
const { keyInfo, encodedPrivateKey, privateKey } =
await this.createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase(password);
if (secureSecretStorage) {
@@ -1567,7 +1598,9 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.prepareKeyBackupVersion = async function(
/**
* Check whether the key backup private key is stored in secret storage.
* @return {Promise<boolean>} Whether the backup key is stored.
* @return {Promise<object?>} map of key name to key info the secret is
* encrypted with, or null if it is not present or not encrypted with a
* trusted key
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.isKeyBackupKeyStored = async function() {
return this.isSecretStored("m.megolm_backup.v1", false /* checkKey */);
@@ -1720,6 +1753,35 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.isValidRecoveryKey = function(recoveryKey) {
}
};
/**
* Get the raw key for a key backup from the password
* Used when migrating key backups into SSSS
*
* The cross-signing API is currently UNSTABLE and may change without notice.
*
* @param {string} password Passphrase
* @param {object} backupInfo Backup metadata from `checkKeyBackup`
* @return {Promise<Buffer>} key backup key
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.keyBackupKeyFromPassword = function(
password, backupInfo,
) {
return keyFromAuthData(backupInfo.auth_data, password);
};
/**
* Get the raw key for a key backup from the recovery key
* Used when migrating key backups into SSSS
*
* The cross-signing API is currently UNSTABLE and may change without notice.
*
* @param {string} recoveryKey The recovery key
* @return {Buffer} key backup key
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.keyBackupKeyFromRecoveryKey = function(recoveryKey) {
return decodeRecoveryKey(recoveryKey);
};
MatrixClient.RESTORE_BACKUP_ERROR_BAD_KEY = 'RESTORE_BACKUP_ERROR_BAD_KEY';
/**
@@ -1731,15 +1793,16 @@ MatrixClient.RESTORE_BACKUP_ERROR_BAD_KEY = 'RESTORE_BACKUP_ERROR_BAD_KEY';
* @param {string} [targetSessionId] Session ID to target a specific session.
* Restores all sessions if omitted.
* @param {object} backupInfo Backup metadata from `checkKeyBackup`
* @param {object} opts Optional params such as callbacks
* @return {Promise<object>} Status of restoration with `total` and `imported`
* key counts.
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.restoreKeyBackupWithPassword = async function(
password, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo,
password, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo, opts,
) {
const privKey = await keyFromAuthData(backupInfo.auth_data, password);
return this._restoreKeyBackup(
privKey, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo,
privKey, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo, opts,
);
};
@@ -1752,15 +1815,26 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.restoreKeyBackupWithPassword = async function(
* Restores all rooms if omitted.
* @param {string} [targetSessionId] Session ID to target a specific session.
* Restores all sessions if omitted.
* @param {object} opts Optional params such as callbacks
* @return {Promise<object>} Status of restoration with `total` and `imported`
* key counts.
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.restoreKeyBackupWithSecretStorage = async function(
backupInfo, targetRoomId, targetSessionId,
backupInfo, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, opts,
) {
const privKey = decodeBase64(await this.getSecret("m.megolm_backup.v1"));
const storedKey = await this.getSecret("m.megolm_backup.v1");
// ensure that the key is in the right format. If not, fix the key and
// store the fixed version
const fixedKey = fixBackupKey(storedKey);
if (fixedKey) {
const [keyId] = await this._crypto.getSecretStorageKey();
await this.storeSecret("m.megolm_backup.v1", fixedKey, [keyId]);
}
const privKey = decodeBase64(fixedKey || storedKey);
return this._restoreKeyBackup(
privKey, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo,
privKey, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo, opts,
);
};
@@ -1773,20 +1847,47 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.restoreKeyBackupWithSecretStorage = async function(
* @param {string} [targetSessionId] Session ID to target a specific session.
* Restores all sessions if omitted.
* @param {object} backupInfo Backup metadata from `checkKeyBackup`
* @param {object} opts Optional params such as callbacks
* @return {Promise<object>} Status of restoration with `total` and `imported`
* key counts.
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.restoreKeyBackupWithRecoveryKey = function(
recoveryKey, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo,
recoveryKey, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo, opts,
) {
const privKey = decodeRecoveryKey(recoveryKey);
return this._restoreKeyBackup(
privKey, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo,
privKey, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo, opts,
);
};
/**
* Restore from an existing key backup using a cached key, or fail
*
* @param {string} [targetRoomId] Room ID to target a specific room.
* Restores all rooms if omitted.
* @param {string} [targetSessionId] Session ID to target a specific session.
* Restores all sessions if omitted.
* @param {object} backupInfo Backup metadata from `checkKeyBackup`
* @param {object} opts Optional params such as callbacks
* @return {Promise<object>} Status of restoration with `total` and `imported`
* key counts.
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.restoreKeyBackupWithCache = async function(
targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo, opts,
) {
const privKey = await this._crypto.getSessionBackupPrivateKey();
if (!privKey) {
throw new Error("Couldn't get key");
}
return this._restoreKeyBackup(
privKey, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo, opts,
);
};
MatrixClient.prototype._restoreKeyBackup = function(
privKey, targetRoomId, targetSessionId, backupInfo,
{ cacheCompleteCallback }={}, // For sequencing during tests
) {
if (this._crypto === null) {
throw new Error("End-to-end encryption disabled");
@@ -1814,6 +1915,13 @@ MatrixClient.prototype._restoreKeyBackup = function(
return Promise.reject({errcode: MatrixClient.RESTORE_BACKUP_ERROR_BAD_KEY});
}
// Cache the key, if possible.
// This is async.
this._crypto.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(privKey)
.catch((e) => {
console.warn("Error caching session backup key:", e);
}).then(cacheCompleteCallback);
return this._http.authedRequest(
undefined, "GET", path.path, path.queryData, undefined,
{prefix: PREFIX_UNSTABLE},
@@ -1984,6 +2092,7 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.getUsers = function() {
/**
* Set account data event for the current user.
* It will retry the request up to 5 times.
* @param {string} eventType The event type
* @param {Object} contents the contents object for the event
* @param {module:client.callback} callback Optional.
@@ -1995,9 +2104,13 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.setAccountData = function(eventType, contents, callback)
$userId: this.credentials.userId,
$type: eventType,
});
return this._http.authedRequest(
callback, "PUT", path, undefined, contents,
);
const promise = retryNetworkOperation(5, () => {
return this._http.authedRequest(undefined, "PUT", path, undefined, contents);
});
if (callback) {
promise.then(result => callback(null, result), callback);
}
return promise;
};
/**
@@ -2032,9 +2145,17 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.getAccountDataFromServer = async function(eventType) {
$userId: this.credentials.userId,
$type: eventType,
});
return this._http.authedRequest(
undefined, "GET", path, undefined,
);
try {
const result = await this._http.authedRequest(
undefined, "GET", path, undefined,
);
return result;
} catch (e) {
if (e.data && e.data.errcode === 'M_NOT_FOUND') {
return null;
}
throw e;
}
};
/**
@@ -2425,12 +2546,15 @@ function _sendEvent(client, room, event, callback) {
if (!promise) {
promise = _sendEventHttpRequest(client, event);
if (room) {
promise = promise.then(res => {
room.updatePendingEvent(event, EventStatus.SENT, res.event_id);
return res;
});
}
}
return promise;
}).then(function(res) { // the request was sent OK
if (room) {
room.updatePendingEvent(event, EventStatus.SENT, res.event_id);
}
if (callback) {
callback(null, res);
}
@@ -4405,64 +4529,54 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.getFilter = function(userId, filterId, allowCached) {
* @param {Filter} filter
* @return {Promise<String>} Filter ID
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.getOrCreateFilter = function(filterName, filter) {
MatrixClient.prototype.getOrCreateFilter = async function(filterName, filter) {
const filterId = this.store.getFilterIdByName(filterName);
let promise = Promise.resolve();
const self = this;
let existingId = undefined;
if (filterId) {
// check that the existing filter matches our expectations
promise = self.getFilter(self.credentials.userId,
filterId, true,
).then(function(existingFilter) {
const oldDef = existingFilter.getDefinition();
const newDef = filter.getDefinition();
try {
const existingFilter =
await this.getFilter(this.credentials.userId, filterId, true);
if (existingFilter) {
const oldDef = existingFilter.getDefinition();
const newDef = filter.getDefinition();
if (utils.deepCompare(oldDef, newDef)) {
// super, just use that.
// debuglog("Using existing filter ID %s: %s", filterId,
// JSON.stringify(oldDef));
return Promise.resolve(filterId);
if (utils.deepCompare(oldDef, newDef)) {
// super, just use that.
// debuglog("Using existing filter ID %s: %s", filterId,
// JSON.stringify(oldDef));
existingId = filterId;
}
}
// debuglog("Existing filter ID %s: %s; new filter: %s",
// filterId, JSON.stringify(oldDef), JSON.stringify(newDef));
self.store.setFilterIdByName(filterName, undefined);
return undefined;
}, function(error) {
} catch (error) {
// Synapse currently returns the following when the filter cannot be found:
// {
// errcode: "M_UNKNOWN",
// name: "M_UNKNOWN",
// message: "No row found",
// data: Object, httpStatus: 404
// }
if (error.httpStatus === 404 &&
(error.errcode === "M_UNKNOWN" || error.errcode === "M_NOT_FOUND")) {
// Clear existing filterId from localStorage
// if it no longer exists on the server
self.store.setFilterIdByName(filterName, undefined);
// Return a undefined value for existingId further down the promise chain
return undefined;
} else {
if (error.errcode !== "M_UNKNOWN" && error.errcode !== "M_NOT_FOUND") {
throw error;
}
});
}
// if the filter doesn't exist anymore on the server, remove from store
if (!existingId) {
this.store.setFilterIdByName(filterName, undefined);
}
}
return promise.then(function(existingId) {
if (existingId) {
return existingId;
}
if (existingId) {
return existingId;
}
// create a new filter
return self.createFilter(filter.getDefinition(),
).then(function(createdFilter) {
// debuglog("Created new filter ID %s: %s", createdFilter.filterId,
// JSON.stringify(createdFilter.getDefinition()));
self.store.setFilterIdByName(filterName, createdFilter.filterId);
return createdFilter.filterId;
});
});
// create a new filter
const createdFilter = await this.createFilter(filter.getDefinition());
// debuglog("Created new filter ID %s: %s", createdFilter.filterId,
// JSON.stringify(createdFilter.getDefinition()));
this.store.setFilterIdByName(filterName, createdFilter.filterId);
return createdFilter.filterId;
};
@@ -4640,6 +4754,13 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.startClient = async function(opts) {
};
}
// Create our own user object artificially (instead of waiting for sync)
// so it's always available, even if the user is not in any rooms etc.
const userId = this.getUserId();
if (userId) {
this.store.storeUser(new User(userId));
}
if (this._crypto) {
this._crypto.uploadDeviceKeys();
this._crypto.start();
@@ -5113,9 +5234,6 @@ function checkTurnServers(client) {
if (!client._supportsVoip) {
return;
}
if (client.isGuest()) {
return; // guests can't access TURN servers
}
client.turnServer().then(function(res) {
if (res.uris) {
@@ -5156,17 +5274,20 @@ function _resolve(callback, resolve, res) {
resolve(res);
}
function _PojoToMatrixEventMapper(client) {
function _PojoToMatrixEventMapper(client, options) {
const preventReEmit = Boolean(options && options.preventReEmit);
function mapper(plainOldJsObject) {
const event = new MatrixEvent(plainOldJsObject);
if (event.isEncrypted()) {
client.reEmitter.reEmit(event, [
"Event.decrypted",
]);
if (!preventReEmit) {
client.reEmitter.reEmit(event, [
"Event.decrypted",
]);
}
event.attemptDecryption(client._crypto);
}
const room = client.getRoom(event.getRoomId());
if (room) {
if (room && !preventReEmit) {
room.reEmitter.reEmit(event, ["Event.replaced"]);
}
return event;
@@ -5175,10 +5296,12 @@ function _PojoToMatrixEventMapper(client) {
}
/**
* @param {object} [options]
* @param {bool} options.preventReEmit don't reemit events emitted on an event mapped by this mapper on the client
* @return {Function}
*/
MatrixClient.prototype.getEventMapper = function() {
return _PojoToMatrixEventMapper(this);
MatrixClient.prototype.getEventMapper = function(options = undefined) {
return _PojoToMatrixEventMapper(this, options);
};
/**
@@ -5464,6 +5587,22 @@ MatrixClient.prototype.generateClientSecret = function() {
* });
*/
/**
* Fires whenever the stored devices for a user have changed
* @event module:client~MatrixClient#"crypto.devicesUpdated"
* @param {String[]} users A list of user IDs that were updated
* @param {bool} initialFetch If true, the store was empty (apart
* from our own device) and has been seeded.
*/
/**
* Fires whenever the stored devices for a user will be updated
* @event module:client~MatrixClient#"crypto.willUpdateDevices"
* @param {String[]} users A list of user IDs that will be updated
* @param {bool} initialFetch If true, the store is empty (apart
* from our own device) and is being seeded.
*/
/**
* Fires whenever the status of e2e key backup changes, as returned by getKeyBackupEnabled()
* @event module:client~MatrixClient#"crypto.keyBackupStatus"
+83 -18
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,12 @@ export class CrossSigningInfo extends EventEmitter {
this._cacheCallbacks = cacheCallbacks || {};
this.keys = {};
this.firstUse = true;
// This tracks whether we've ever verified this user with any identity.
// When you verify a user, any devices online at the time that receive
// the verifying signature via the homeserver will latch this to true
// and can use it in the future to detect cases where the user has
// become unverifed later for any reason.
this.crossSigningVerifiedBefore = false;
}
/**
@@ -132,6 +138,7 @@ export class CrossSigningInfo extends EventEmitter {
return {
keys: this.keys,
firstUse: this.firstUse,
crossSigningVerifiedBefore: this.crossSigningVerifiedBefore,
};
}
@@ -141,14 +148,28 @@ export class CrossSigningInfo extends EventEmitter {
* want to know this anyway...
*
* @param {SecretStorage} secretStorage The secret store using account data
* @returns {boolean} Whether all private keys were found in storage
* @returns {object} map of key name to key info the secret is encrypted
* with, or null if it is not present or not encrypted with a trusted
* key
*/
async isStoredInSecretStorage(secretStorage) {
let stored = true;
for (const type of ["master", "self_signing", "user_signing"]) {
stored &= await secretStorage.isStored(`m.cross_signing.${type}`, false);
// check what SSSS keys have encrypted the master key (if any)
const stored =
await secretStorage.isStored("m.cross_signing.master", false) || {};
// then check which of those SSSS keys have also encrypted the SSK and USK
function intersect(s) {
for (const k of Object.keys(stored)) {
if (!s[k]) {
delete stored[k];
}
}
}
return stored;
for (const type of ["self_signing", "user_signing"]) {
intersect(
await secretStorage.isStored(`m.cross_signing.${type}`, false) || {},
);
}
return Object.keys(stored).length ? stored : null;
}
/**
@@ -289,6 +310,13 @@ export class CrossSigningInfo extends EventEmitter {
}
}
/**
* unsets the keys, used when another session has reset the keys, to disable cross-signing
*/
clearKeys() {
this.keys = {};
}
setKeys(keys) {
const signingKeys = {};
if (keys.master) {
@@ -361,6 +389,14 @@ export class CrossSigningInfo extends EventEmitter {
}
}
updateCrossSigningVerifiedBefore(isCrossSigningVerified) {
// It is critical that this value latches forward from false to true but
// never back to false to avoid a downgrade attack.
if (!this.crossSigningVerifiedBefore && isCrossSigningVerified) {
this.crossSigningVerifiedBefore = true;
}
}
async signObject(data, type) {
if (!this.keys[type]) {
throw new Error(
@@ -419,13 +455,13 @@ export class CrossSigningInfo extends EventEmitter {
&& this.getId("self_signing")
&& this.getId("self_signing") === userCrossSigning.getId("self_signing")
) {
return new UserTrustLevel(true, this.firstUse);
return new UserTrustLevel(true, true, this.firstUse);
}
if (!this.keys.user_signing) {
// If there's no user signing key, they can't possibly be verified.
// They may be TOFU trusted though.
return new UserTrustLevel(false, userCrossSigning.firstUse);
return new UserTrustLevel(false, false, userCrossSigning.firstUse);
}
let userTrusted;
@@ -437,7 +473,11 @@ export class CrossSigningInfo extends EventEmitter {
} catch (e) {
userTrusted = false;
}
return new UserTrustLevel(userTrusted, userCrossSigning.firstUse);
return new UserTrustLevel(
userTrusted,
userCrossSigning.crossSigningVerifiedBefore,
userCrossSigning.firstUse,
);
}
/**
@@ -446,17 +486,20 @@ export class CrossSigningInfo extends EventEmitter {
* @param {CrossSigningInfo} userCrossSigning Cross signing info for user
* @param {module:crypto/deviceinfo} device The device to check
* @param {bool} localTrust Whether the device is trusted locally
* @param {bool} trustCrossSignedDevices Whether we trust cross signed devices
*
* @returns {DeviceTrustLevel}
*/
checkDeviceTrust(userCrossSigning, device, localTrust) {
checkDeviceTrust(userCrossSigning, device, localTrust, trustCrossSignedDevices) {
const userTrust = this.checkUserTrust(userCrossSigning);
const userSSK = userCrossSigning.keys.self_signing;
if (!userSSK) {
// if the user has no self-signing key then we cannot make any
// trust assertions about this device from cross-signing
return new DeviceTrustLevel(false, false, localTrust);
return new DeviceTrustLevel(
false, false, localTrust, trustCrossSignedDevices,
);
}
const deviceObj = deviceToObject(device, userCrossSigning.userId);
@@ -468,9 +511,13 @@ export class CrossSigningInfo extends EventEmitter {
deviceObj, publicKeyFromKeyInfo(userSSK), userCrossSigning.userId,
);
// ...then we trust this device as much as far as we trust the user
return DeviceTrustLevel.fromUserTrustLevel(userTrust, localTrust);
return DeviceTrustLevel.fromUserTrustLevel(
userTrust, localTrust, trustCrossSignedDevices,
);
} catch (e) {
return new DeviceTrustLevel(false, false, localTrust);
return new DeviceTrustLevel(
false, false, localTrust, trustCrossSignedDevices,
);
}
}
@@ -502,8 +549,9 @@ export const CrossSigningLevel = {
* Represents the ways in which we trust a user
*/
export class UserTrustLevel {
constructor(crossSigningVerified, tofu) {
constructor(crossSigningVerified, crossSigningVerifiedBefore, tofu) {
this._crossSigningVerified = crossSigningVerified;
this._crossSigningVerifiedBefore = crossSigningVerifiedBefore;
this._tofu = tofu;
}
@@ -521,6 +569,14 @@ export class UserTrustLevel {
return this._crossSigningVerified;
}
/**
* @returns {bool} true if we ever verified this user before (at least for
* the history of verifications observed by this device).
*/
wasCrossSigningVerified() {
return this._crossSigningVerifiedBefore;
}
/**
* @returns {bool} true if this user's key is trusted on first use
*/
@@ -533,17 +589,19 @@ export class UserTrustLevel {
* Represents the ways in which we trust a device
*/
export class DeviceTrustLevel {
constructor(crossSigningVerified, tofu, localVerified) {
constructor(crossSigningVerified, tofu, localVerified, trustCrossSignedDevices) {
this._crossSigningVerified = crossSigningVerified;
this._tofu = tofu;
this._localVerified = localVerified;
this._trustCrossSignedDevices = trustCrossSignedDevices;
}
static fromUserTrustLevel(userTrustLevel, localVerified) {
static fromUserTrustLevel(userTrustLevel, localVerified, trustCrossSignedDevices) {
return new DeviceTrustLevel(
userTrustLevel._crossSigningVerified,
userTrustLevel._tofu,
localVerified,
trustCrossSignedDevices,
);
}
@@ -551,7 +609,9 @@ export class DeviceTrustLevel {
* @returns {bool} true if this device is verified via any means
*/
isVerified() {
return this.isCrossSigningVerified() || this.isLocallyVerified();
return Boolean(this.isLocallyVerified() || (
this._trustCrossSignedDevices && this.isCrossSigningVerified()
));
}
/**
@@ -585,17 +645,22 @@ export function createCryptoStoreCacheCallbacks(store) {
'readonly',
[IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_ACCOUNT],
(txn) => {
store.getCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, resolve, type);
store.getSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, resolve, type);
},
);
});
},
storeCrossSigningKeyCache: function(type, key) {
if (!(key instanceof Uint8Array)) {
throw new Error(
`storeCrossSigningKeyCache expects Uint8Array, got ${key}`,
);
}
return store.doTxn(
'readwrite',
[IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_ACCOUNT],
(txn) => {
store.storeCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, type, key);
store.storeSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, type, key);
},
);
},
+28 -10
View File
@@ -109,6 +109,9 @@ export class DeviceList extends EventEmitter {
this._savePromiseTime = null;
// The timer used to delay the save
this._saveTimer = null;
// True if we have fetched data from the server or loaded a non-empty
// set of device data from the store
this._hasFetched = null;
}
/**
@@ -118,6 +121,7 @@ export class DeviceList extends EventEmitter {
await this._cryptoStore.doTxn(
'readonly', [IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_DEVICE_DATA], (txn) => {
this._cryptoStore.getEndToEndDeviceData(txn, (deviceData) => {
this._hasFetched = Boolean(deviceData && deviceData.devices);
this._devices = deviceData ? deviceData.devices : {},
this._crossSigningInfo = deviceData ?
deviceData.crossSigningInfo || {} : {};
@@ -317,6 +321,15 @@ export class DeviceList extends EventEmitter {
return stored;
}
/**
* Returns a list of all user IDs the DeviceList knows about
*
* @return {array} All known user IDs
*/
getKnownUserIds() {
return Object.keys(this._devices);
}
/**
* Get the stored device keys for a user id
*
@@ -643,6 +656,7 @@ export class DeviceList extends EventEmitter {
});
const finished = (success) => {
this.emit("crypto.willUpdateDevices", users, !this._hasFetched);
users.forEach((u) => {
this._dirty = true;
@@ -668,7 +682,8 @@ export class DeviceList extends EventEmitter {
}
});
this.saveIfDirty();
this.emit("crypto.devicesUpdated", users);
this.emit("crypto.devicesUpdated", users, !this._hasFetched);
this._hasFetched = true;
};
return prom;
@@ -767,31 +782,34 @@ class DeviceListUpdateSerialiser {
this._baseApis.downloadKeysForUsers(
downloadUsers, opts,
).then((res) => {
).then(async (res) => {
const dk = res.device_keys || {};
const masterKeys = res.master_keys || {};
const ssks = res.self_signing_keys || {};
const usks = res.user_signing_keys || {};
// do each user in a separate promise, to avoid wedging the CPU
// yield to other things that want to execute in between users, to
// avoid wedging the CPU
// (https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/3158)
//
// of course we ought to do this in a web worker or similar, but
// this serves as an easy solution for now.
let prom = Promise.resolve();
for (const userId of downloadUsers) {
prom = prom.then(sleep(5)).then(() => {
return this._processQueryResponseForUser(
await sleep(5);
try {
await this._processQueryResponseForUser(
userId, dk[userId], {
master: masterKeys[userId],
self_signing: ssks[userId],
user_signing: usks[userId],
},
);
});
} catch (e) {
// log the error but continue, so that one bad key
// doesn't kill the whole process
logger.error(`Error processing keys for ${userId}:`, e);
}
}
return prom;
}).then(() => {
logger.log('Completed key download for ' + downloadUsers);
@@ -812,7 +830,7 @@ class DeviceListUpdateSerialiser {
}
async _processQueryResponseForUser(
userId, dkResponse, crossSigningResponse, sskResponse,
userId, dkResponse, crossSigningResponse,
) {
logger.log('got device keys for ' + userId + ':', dkResponse);
logger.log('got cross-signing keys for ' + userId + ':', crossSigningResponse);
+3
View File
@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ export function OlmDevice(cryptoStore) {
// Keep track of sessions that we're starting, so that we don't start
// multiple sessions for the same device at the same time.
this._sessionsInProgress = {};
// Used by olm to serialise prekey message decryptions
this._olmPrekeyPromise = Promise.resolve();
}
/**
+16 -1
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ const SEND_KEY_REQUESTS_DELAY_MS = 500;
*
* @enum {number}
*/
const ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES = {
export const ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES = {
/** request not yet sent */
UNSENT: 0,
@@ -327,6 +327,21 @@ export class OutgoingRoomKeyRequestManager {
);
}
/**
* Find anything in `sent` state, and kick it around the loop again.
* This is intended for situations where something substantial has changed, and we
* don't really expect the other end to even care about the cancellation.
* For example, after initialization or self-verification.
* @return {Promise} An array of `sendRoomKeyRequest` outputs.
*/
async cancelAndResendAllOutgoingRequests() {
const outgoings = await this._cryptoStore.getAllOutgoingRoomKeyRequestsByState(
ROOM_KEY_REQUEST_STATES.SENT,
);
return Promise.all(outgoings.map(({ requestBody, recipients }) =>
this.sendRoomKeyRequest(requestBody, recipients, true)));
}
// start the background timer to send queued requests, if the timer isn't
// already running
_startTimer() {
+206 -116
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
Copyright 2019 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
Copyright 2019, 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -19,8 +19,16 @@ import {logger} from '../logger';
import * as olmlib from './olmlib';
import {pkVerify} from './olmlib';
import {randomString} from '../randomstring';
import {encryptAES, decryptAES} from './aes';
import {encodeBase64} from "./olmlib";
export const SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1 = "m.secret_storage.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2";
export const SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES
= "m.secret_storage.v1.aes-hmac-sha2";
// don't use curve25519 for writing data.
export const SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_CURVE25519
= "m.secret_storage.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2";
const ZERO_STR = "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0";
/**
* Implements Secure Secret Storage and Sharing (MSC1946)
@@ -45,7 +53,7 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
}
setDefaultKeyId(keyId) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
return new Promise(async (resolve, reject) => {
const listener = (ev) => {
if (
ev.getType() === 'm.secret_storage.default_key' &&
@@ -57,10 +65,15 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
};
this._baseApis.on('accountData', listener);
this._baseApis.setAccountData(
'm.secret_storage.default_key',
{ key: keyId },
);
try {
await this._baseApis.setAccountData(
'm.secret_storage.default_key',
{ key: keyId },
);
} catch (e) {
this._baseApis.removeListener('accountData', listener);
reject(e);
}
});
}
@@ -85,23 +98,15 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
}
switch (algorithm) {
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1:
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES:
{
const decryption = new global.Olm.PkDecryption();
try {
const { passphrase, pubkey } = opts;
// Copies in public key details of the form generated by
// the Crypto module's `createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase`.
if (passphrase && pubkey) {
keyData.passphrase = passphrase;
keyData.pubkey = pubkey;
} else if (pubkey) {
keyData.pubkey = pubkey;
} else {
keyData.pubkey = decryption.generate_key();
}
} finally {
decryption.free();
if (opts.passphrase) {
keyData.passphrase = opts.passphrase;
}
if (opts.key) {
const {iv, mac} = await SecretStorage._calculateKeyCheck(opts.key);
keyData.iv = iv;
keyData.mac = mac;
}
break;
}
@@ -155,6 +160,28 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
);
}
/**
* Get the key information for a given ID.
*
* @param {string} [keyId = default key's ID] The ID of the key to check
* for. Defaults to the default key ID if not provided.
* @returns {Array?} If the key was found, the return value is an array of
* the form [keyId, keyInfo]. Otherwise, null is returned.
*/
async getKey(keyId) {
if (!keyId) {
keyId = await this.getDefaultKeyId();
}
if (!keyId) {
return null;
}
const keyInfo = await this._baseApis.getAccountDataFromServer(
"m.secret_storage.key." + keyId,
);
return keyInfo ? [keyId, keyInfo] : null;
}
/**
* Check whether we have a key with a given ID.
*
@@ -163,16 +190,59 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
* @return {boolean} Whether we have the key.
*/
async hasKey(keyId) {
if (!keyId) {
keyId = await this.getDefaultKeyId();
}
if (!keyId) {
return !!(await this.getKey(keyId));
}
async keyNeedsUpgrade(keyId) {
const keyInfo = await this.getKey(keyId);
if (keyInfo && keyInfo[1].algorithm === SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_CURVE25519) {
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
return !!this._baseApis.getAccountDataFromServer(
"m.secret_storage.key." + keyId,
);
/**
* Check whether a key matches what we expect based on the key info
*
* @param {Uint8Array} key the key to check
* @param {object} info the key info
*
* @return {boolean} whether or not the key matches
*/
async checkKey(key, info) {
switch (info.algorithm) {
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES:
{
if (info.mac) {
const {mac} = await SecretStorage._calculateKeyCheck(key, info.iv);
return info.mac === mac;
} else {
// if we have no information, we have to assume the key is right
return true;
}
}
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_CURVE25519:
{
let decryption = null;
try {
decryption = new global.Olm.PkDecryption();
const gotPubkey = decryption.init_with_private_key(key);
// make sure it agrees with the given pubkey
return gotPubkey === info.pubkey;
} catch (e) {
return false;
} finally {
if (decryption) decryption.free();
}
}
default:
throw new Error("Unknown algorithm");
}
}
static async _calculateKeyCheck(key, iv) {
return await encryptAES(ZERO_STR, key, "", iv);
}
/**
@@ -207,24 +277,13 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
throw new Error("Unknown key: " + keyId);
}
// check signature of key info
pkVerify(
keyInfo,
this._crossSigningInfo.getId('master'),
this._crossSigningInfo.userId,
);
// encrypt secret, based on the algorithm
switch (keyInfo.algorithm) {
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1:
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES:
{
const encryption = new global.Olm.PkEncryption();
try {
encryption.set_recipient_key(keyInfo.pubkey);
encrypted[keyId] = encryption.encrypt(secret);
} finally {
encryption.free();
}
const keys = {[keyId]: keyInfo};
const [, encryption] = await this._getSecretStorageKey(keys, name);
encrypted[keyId] = await encryption.encrypt(secret);
break;
}
default:
@@ -238,29 +297,6 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
await this._baseApis.setAccountData(name, {encrypted});
}
/**
* Store a secret defined to be the same as the given key.
* No secret information will be stored, instead the secret will
* be stored with a marker to say that the contents of the secret is
* the value of the given key.
* This is useful for migration from systems that predate SSSS such as
* key backup.
*
* @param {string} name The name of the secret
* @param {string} keyId The ID of the key whose value will be the
* value of the secret
* @returns {Promise} resolved when account data is saved
*/
storePassthrough(name, keyId) {
return this._baseApis.setAccountData(name, {
encrypted: {
[keyId]: {
passthrough: true,
},
},
});
}
/**
* Temporary method to fix up existing accounts where secrets
* are incorrectly stored without the 'encrypted' level
@@ -317,7 +353,12 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
);
const encInfo = secretInfo.encrypted[keyId];
switch (keyInfo.algorithm) {
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1:
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES:
if (encInfo.iv && encInfo.ciphertext && encInfo.mac) {
keys[keyId] = keyInfo;
}
break;
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_CURVE25519:
if (
keyInfo.pubkey && (
(encInfo.ciphertext && encInfo.mac && encInfo.ephemeral) ||
@@ -341,18 +382,13 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
const encInfo = secretInfo.encrypted[keyId];
// We don't actually need the decryption object if it's a passthrough
// since we just want to return the key itself.
if (encInfo.passthrough) return decryption.get_private_key();
// since we just want to return the key itself. It must be base64
// encoded, since this is how a key would normally be stored.
if (encInfo.passthrough) return encodeBase64(decryption.get_private_key());
// decrypt secret
switch (keys[keyId].algorithm) {
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1:
return decryption.decrypt(
encInfo.ephemeral, encInfo.mac, encInfo.ciphertext,
);
}
return await decryption.decrypt(encInfo);
} finally {
if (decryption) decryption.free();
if (decryption && decryption.free) decryption.free();
}
}
@@ -362,22 +398,26 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
* @param {string} name the name of the secret
* @param {boolean} checkKey check if the secret is encrypted by a trusted key
*
* @return {boolean} whether or not the secret is stored
* @return {object?} map of key name to key info the secret is encrypted
* with, or null if it is not present or not encrypted with a trusted
* key
*/
async isStored(name, checkKey) {
// check if secret exists
let secretInfo = await this._baseApis.getAccountDataFromServer(name);
if (!secretInfo) return false;
if (!secretInfo) return null;
if (!secretInfo.encrypted) {
// try to fix it up
secretInfo = await this._fixupStoredSecret(name, secretInfo);
if (!secretInfo || !secretInfo.encrypted) {
return false;
return null;
}
}
if (checkKey === undefined) checkKey = true;
const ret = {};
// check if secret is encrypted by a known/trusted secret and
// encryption looks sane
for (const keyId of Object.keys(secretInfo.encrypted)) {
@@ -385,32 +425,55 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
const keyInfo = await this._baseApis.getAccountDataFromServer(
"m.secret_storage.key." + keyId,
);
if (!keyInfo) return false;
if (!keyInfo) continue;
const encInfo = secretInfo.encrypted[keyId];
if (checkKey) {
pkVerify(
keyInfo,
this._crossSigningInfo.getId('master'),
this._crossSigningInfo.userId,
);
}
// We don't actually need the decryption object if it's a passthrough
// since we just want to return the key itself.
if (encInfo.passthrough) return true;
if (encInfo.passthrough) {
try {
pkVerify(
keyInfo,
this._crossSigningInfo.getId('master'),
this._crossSigningInfo.userId,
);
} catch (e) {
// not trusted, so move on to the next key
continue;
}
ret[keyId] = keyInfo;
continue;
}
switch (keyInfo.algorithm) {
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1:
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES:
if (encInfo.iv && encInfo.ciphertext && encInfo.mac) {
ret[keyId] = keyInfo;
}
break;
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_CURVE25519:
if (keyInfo.pubkey && encInfo.ciphertext && encInfo.mac
&& encInfo.ephemeral) {
return true;
if (checkKey) {
try {
pkVerify(
keyInfo,
this._crossSigningInfo.getId('master'),
this._crossSigningInfo.userId,
);
} catch (e) {
// not trusted, so move on to the next key
continue;
}
}
ret[keyId] = keyInfo;
}
break;
default:
// do nothing if we don't understand the encryption algorithm
}
}
return false;
return Object.keys(ret).length ? ret : null;
}
/**
@@ -462,6 +525,7 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
for (const device of devices) {
toDevice[device] = requestData;
}
logger.info(`Request secret ${name} from ${devices}, id ${requestId}`);
this._baseApis.sendToDevice("m.secret.request", {
[this._baseApis.getUserId()]: toDevice,
});
@@ -515,6 +579,7 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
device_trust: this._baseApis.checkDeviceTrust(sender, deviceId),
});
if (secret) {
logger.info(`Preparing ${content.name} secret for ${deviceId}`);
const payload = {
type: "m.secret.send",
content: {
@@ -532,7 +597,7 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
this._baseApis,
{
[sender]: [
await this._baseApis.getStoredDevice(sender, deviceId),
this._baseApis.getStoredDevice(sender, deviceId),
],
},
);
@@ -542,7 +607,7 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
this._baseApis.deviceId,
this._baseApis._crypto._olmDevice,
sender,
this._baseApis._crypto.getStoredDevice(sender, deviceId),
this._baseApis.getStoredDevice(sender, deviceId),
payload,
);
const contentMap = {
@@ -551,7 +616,10 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
},
};
logger.info(`Sending ${content.name} secret for ${deviceId}`);
this._baseApis.sendToDevice("m.room.encrypted", contentMap);
} else {
logger.info(`Request denied for ${content.name} secret for ${deviceId}`);
}
}
}
@@ -563,7 +631,7 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
return;
}
const content = event.getContent();
logger.log("got secret share for request ", content.request_id);
logger.log("got secret share for request", content.request_id);
const requestControl = this._requests[content.request_id];
if (requestControl) {
// make sure that the device that sent it is one of the devices that
@@ -607,26 +675,48 @@ export class SecretStorage extends EventEmitter {
}
switch (keys[keyId].algorithm) {
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1:
{
const decryption = new global.Olm.PkDecryption();
let pubkey;
try {
pubkey = decryption.init_with_private_key(privateKey);
} catch (e) {
decryption.free();
throw new Error("getSecretStorageKey callback returned invalid key");
}
if (pubkey !== keys[keyId].pubkey) {
decryption.free();
throw new Error(
"getSecretStorageKey callback returned incorrect key",
);
}
return [keyId, decryption];
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES:
{
const decryption = {
encrypt: async function(secret) {
return await encryptAES(secret, privateKey, name);
},
decrypt: async function(encInfo) {
return await decryptAES(encInfo, privateKey, name);
},
};
return [keyId, decryption];
}
case SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_CURVE25519:
{
const pkDecryption = new global.Olm.PkDecryption();
let pubkey;
try {
pubkey = pkDecryption.init_with_private_key(privateKey);
} catch (e) {
pkDecryption.free();
throw new Error("getSecretStorageKey callback returned invalid key");
}
default:
throw new Error("Unknown key type: " + keys[keyId].algorithm);
if (pubkey !== keys[keyId].pubkey) {
pkDecryption.free();
throw new Error(
"getSecretStorageKey callback returned incorrect key",
);
}
const decryption = {
free: pkDecryption.free.bind(pkDecryption),
decrypt: async function(encInfo) {
return pkDecryption.decrypt(
encInfo.ephemeral, encInfo.mac, encInfo.ciphertext,
);
},
// needed for passthrough
get_private_key: pkDecryption.get_private_key.bind(pkDecryption),
};
return [keyId, decryption];
}
default:
throw new Error("Unknown key type: " + keys[keyId].algorithm);
}
}
}
+251
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
/*
Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*/
import {getCrypto} from '../utils';
import {decodeBase64, encodeBase64} from './olmlib';
const subtleCrypto = (typeof window !== "undefined" && window.crypto) ?
(window.crypto.subtle || window.crypto.webkitSubtle) : null;
// salt for HKDF, with 8 bytes of zeros
const zerosalt = new Uint8Array(8);
/**
* encrypt a string in Node.js
*
* @param {string} data the plaintext to encrypt
* @param {Uint8Array} key the encryption key to use
* @param {string} name the name of the secret
* @param {string} ivStr the initialization vector to use
*/
async function encryptNode(data, key, name, ivStr) {
const crypto = getCrypto();
if (!crypto) {
throw new Error("No usable crypto implementation");
}
let iv;
if (ivStr) {
iv = decodeBase64(ivStr);
} else {
iv = crypto.randomBytes(16);
}
// clear bit 63 of the IV to stop us hitting the 64-bit counter boundary
// (which would mean we wouldn't be able to decrypt on Android). The loss
// of a single bit of iv is a price we have to pay.
iv[8] &= 0x7f;
const [aesKey, hmacKey] = deriveKeysNode(key, name);
const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv("aes-256-ctr", aesKey, iv);
const ciphertext = cipher.update(data, "utf-8", "base64")
+ cipher.final("base64");
const hmac = crypto.createHmac("sha256", hmacKey)
.update(ciphertext, "base64").digest("base64");
return {
iv: encodeBase64(iv),
ciphertext: ciphertext,
mac: hmac,
};
}
/**
* decrypt a string in Node.js
*
* @param {object} data the encrypted data
* @param {string} data.ciphertext the ciphertext in base64
* @param {string} data.iv the initialization vector in base64
* @param {string} data.mac the HMAC in base64
* @param {Uint8Array} key the encryption key to use
* @param {string} name the name of the secret
*/
async function decryptNode(data, key, name) {
const crypto = getCrypto();
if (!crypto) {
throw new Error("No usable crypto implementation");
}
const [aesKey, hmacKey] = deriveKeysNode(key, name);
const hmac = crypto.createHmac("sha256", hmacKey)
.update(data.ciphertext, "base64").digest("base64");
if (hmac !== data.mac) {
throw new Error(`Error decrypting secret ${name}: bad MAC`);
}
const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(
"aes-256-ctr", aesKey, decodeBase64(data.iv),
);
return decipher.update(data.ciphertext, "base64", "utf-8")
+ decipher.final("utf-8");
}
function deriveKeysNode(key, name) {
const crypto = getCrypto();
const prk = crypto.createHmac("sha256", zerosalt)
.update(key).digest();
const b = Buffer.alloc(1, 1);
const aesKey = crypto.createHmac("sha256", prk)
.update(name, "utf-8").update(b).digest();
b[0] = 2;
const hmacKey = crypto.createHmac("sha256", prk)
.update(aesKey).update(name, "utf-8").update(b).digest();
return [aesKey, hmacKey];
}
/**
* encrypt a string in Node.js
*
* @param {string} data the plaintext to encrypt
* @param {Uint8Array} key the encryption key to use
* @param {string} name the name of the secret
* @param {string} ivStr the initialization vector to use
*/
async function encryptBrowser(data, key, name, ivStr) {
let iv;
if (ivStr) {
iv = decodeBase64(ivStr);
} else {
iv = new Uint8Array(16);
window.crypto.getRandomValues(iv);
}
// clear bit 63 of the IV to stop us hitting the 64-bit counter boundary
// (which would mean we wouldn't be able to decrypt on Android). The loss
// of a single bit of iv is a price we have to pay.
iv[8] &= 0x7f;
const [aesKey, hmacKey] = await deriveKeysBrowser(key, name);
const encodedData = new TextEncoder().encode(data);
const ciphertext = await subtleCrypto.encrypt(
{
name: "AES-CTR",
counter: iv,
length: 64,
},
aesKey,
encodedData,
);
const hmac = await subtleCrypto.sign(
{name: 'HMAC'},
hmacKey,
ciphertext,
);
return {
iv: encodeBase64(iv),
ciphertext: encodeBase64(ciphertext),
mac: encodeBase64(hmac),
};
}
/**
* decrypt a string in the browser
*
* @param {object} data the encrypted data
* @param {string} data.ciphertext the ciphertext in base64
* @param {string} data.iv the initialization vector in base64
* @param {string} data.mac the HMAC in base64
* @param {Uint8Array} key the encryption key to use
* @param {string} name the name of the secret
*/
async function decryptBrowser(data, key, name) {
const [aesKey, hmacKey] = await deriveKeysBrowser(key, name);
const ciphertext = decodeBase64(data.ciphertext);
if (!await subtleCrypto.verify(
{name: "HMAC"},
hmacKey,
decodeBase64(data.mac),
ciphertext,
)) {
throw new Error(`Error decrypting secret ${name}: bad MAC`);
}
const plaintext = await subtleCrypto.decrypt(
{
name: "AES-CTR",
counter: decodeBase64(data.iv),
length: 64,
},
aesKey,
ciphertext,
);
return new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(plaintext));
}
async function deriveKeysBrowser(key, name) {
const hkdfkey = await subtleCrypto.importKey(
'raw',
key,
{name: "HKDF"},
false,
["deriveBits"],
);
const keybits = await subtleCrypto.deriveBits(
{
name: "HKDF",
salt: zerosalt,
info: (new TextEncoder().encode(name)),
hash: "SHA-256",
},
hkdfkey,
512,
);
const aesKey = keybits.slice(0, 32);
const hmacKey = keybits.slice(32);
const aesProm = subtleCrypto.importKey(
'raw',
aesKey,
{name: 'AES-CTR'},
false,
['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
);
const hmacProm = subtleCrypto.importKey(
'raw',
hmacKey,
{
name: 'HMAC',
hash: {name: 'SHA-256'},
},
false,
['sign', 'verify'],
);
return await Promise.all([aesProm, hmacProm]);
}
export function encryptAES(...args) {
return subtleCrypto ? encryptBrowser(...args) : encryptNode(...args);
}
export function decryptAES(...args) {
return subtleCrypto ? decryptBrowser(...args) : decryptNode(...args);
}
+101 -51
View File
@@ -185,12 +185,14 @@ utils.inherits(MegolmEncryption, EncryptionAlgorithm);
*
* @param {Object} devicesInRoom The devices in this room, indexed by user ID
* @param {Object} blocked The devices that are blocked, indexed by user ID
* @param {boolean} [singleOlmCreationPhase] Only perform one round of olm
* session creation
*
* @return {Promise} Promise which resolves to the
* OutboundSessionInfo when setup is complete.
*/
MegolmEncryption.prototype._ensureOutboundSession = async function(
devicesInRoom, blocked,
devicesInRoom, blocked, singleOlmCreationPhase,
) {
let session;
@@ -270,56 +272,53 @@ MegolmEncryption.prototype._ensureOutboundSession = async function(
const errorDevices = [];
// meanwhile, establish olm sessions for devices that we don't
// already have a session for, and share keys with them. Use a
// shorter timeout when fetching one-time keys.
// already have a session for, and share keys with them. If
// we're doing two phases of olm session creation, use a
// shorter timeout when fetching one-time keys for the first
// phase.
const start = Date.now();
const failedServers = [];
await this._shareKeyWithDevices(
session, key, payload, devicesWithoutSession, errorDevices, 2000,
session, key, payload, devicesWithoutSession, errorDevices,
singleOlmCreationPhase ? 10000 : 2000, failedServers,
);
(async () => {
// Retry sending keys to devices that we were unable to establish
// an olm session for. This time, we use a longer timeout, but we
// do this in the background and don't block anything else while we
// do this.
const retryDevices = {};
for (const {userId, deviceInfo} of errorDevices) {
retryDevices[userId] = retryDevices[userId] || [];
retryDevices[userId].push(deviceInfo);
}
if (!singleOlmCreationPhase && (Date.now() - start < 10000)) {
// perform the second phase of olm session creation if requested,
// and if the first phase didn't take too long
(async () => {
// Retry sending keys to devices that we were unable to establish
// an olm session for. This time, we use a longer timeout, but we
// do this in the background and don't block anything else while we
// do this. We only need to retry users from servers that didn't
// respond the first time.
const retryDevices = {};
const failedServerMap = new Set;
for (const server of failedServers) {
failedServerMap.add(server);
}
const failedDevices = [];
for (const {userId, deviceInfo} of errorDevices) {
const userHS = userId.slice(userId.indexOf(":") + 1);
if (failedServerMap.has(userHS)) {
retryDevices[userId] = retryDevices[userId] || [];
retryDevices[userId].push(deviceInfo);
} else {
// if we aren't going to retry, then handle it
// as a failed device
failedDevices.push({userId, deviceInfo});
}
}
const failedDevices = [];
await this._shareKeyWithDevices(
session, key, payload, retryDevices, failedDevices,
);
const blockedMap = {};
const filteredFailedDevices =
await this._olmDevice.filterOutNotifiedErrorDevices(
failedDevices,
await this._shareKeyWithDevices(
session, key, payload, retryDevices, failedDevices,
);
for (const {userId, deviceInfo} of filteredFailedDevices) {
blockedMap[userId] = blockedMap[userId] || {};
// we use a similar format to what
// olmlib.ensureOlmSessionsForDevices returns, so that
// we can use the same function to split
blockedMap[userId][deviceInfo.deviceId] = {
device: {
code: "m.no_olm",
reason: WITHHELD_MESSAGES["m.no_olm"],
deviceInfo,
},
};
const deviceId = deviceInfo.deviceId;
// mark this device as "handled" because we don't want to try
// to claim a one-time-key for dead devices on every message.
session.markSharedWithDevice(userId, deviceId, key.chain_index);
}
// notify devices that we couldn't get an olm session
await this._notifyBlockedDevices(session, blockedMap);
})();
await this._notifyFailedOlmDevices(session, key, failedDevices);
})();
} else {
await this._notifyFailedOlmDevices(session, key, errorDevices);
}
})(),
(async () => {
// also, notify blocked devices that they're blocked
@@ -690,12 +689,15 @@ MegolmEncryption.prototype.reshareKeyWithDevice = async function(
*
* @param {Number} [otkTimeout] The timeout in milliseconds when requesting
* one-time keys for establishing new olm sessions.
*
* @param {Array} [failedServers] An array to fill with remote servers that
* failed to respond to one-time-key requests.
*/
MegolmEncryption.prototype._shareKeyWithDevices = async function(
session, key, payload, devicesByUser, errorDevices, otkTimeout,
session, key, payload, devicesByUser, errorDevices, otkTimeout, failedServers,
) {
const devicemap = await olmlib.ensureOlmSessionsForDevices(
this._olmDevice, this._baseApis, devicesByUser, otkTimeout,
this._olmDevice, this._baseApis, devicesByUser, otkTimeout, failedServers,
);
this._getDevicesWithoutSessions(devicemap, devicesByUser, errorDevices);
@@ -724,6 +726,52 @@ MegolmEncryption.prototype._shareKeyWithOlmSessions = async function(
}
};
/**
* Notify devices that we weren't able to create olm sessions.
*
* @param {module:crypto/algorithms/megolm.OutboundSessionInfo} session
*
* @param {object} key
*
* @param {Array<object>} failedDevices the devices that we were unable to
* create olm sessions for, as returned by _shareKeyWithDevices
*/
MegolmEncryption.prototype._notifyFailedOlmDevices = async function(
session, key, failedDevices,
) {
// mark the devices that failed as "handled" because we don't want to try
// to claim a one-time-key for dead devices on every message.
for (const {userId, deviceInfo} of failedDevices) {
const deviceId = deviceInfo.deviceId;
session.markSharedWithDevice(
userId, deviceId, key.chain_index,
);
}
const filteredFailedDevices =
await this._olmDevice.filterOutNotifiedErrorDevices(
failedDevices,
);
const blockedMap = {};
for (const {userId, deviceInfo} of filteredFailedDevices) {
blockedMap[userId] = blockedMap[userId] || {};
// we use a similar format to what
// olmlib.ensureOlmSessionsForDevices returns, so that
// we can use the same function to split
blockedMap[userId][deviceInfo.deviceId] = {
device: {
code: "m.no_olm",
reason: WITHHELD_MESSAGES["m.no_olm"],
deviceInfo,
},
};
}
// send the notifications
await this._notifyBlockedDevices(session, blockedMap);
};
/**
* Notify blocked devices that they have been blocked.
*
@@ -767,8 +815,6 @@ MegolmEncryption.prototype._notifyBlockedDevices = async function(
* @param {module:models/room} room the room the event is in
*/
MegolmEncryption.prototype.prepareToEncrypt = function(room) {
logger.debug(`Preparing to encrypt events for ${this._roomId}`);
if (this.encryptionPreparation) {
// We're already preparing something, so don't do anything else.
// FIXME: check if we need to restart
@@ -776,6 +822,8 @@ MegolmEncryption.prototype.prepareToEncrypt = function(room) {
return;
}
logger.debug(`Preparing to encrypt events for ${this._roomId}`);
this.encryptionPreparation = (async () => {
const [devicesInRoom, blocked] = await this._getDevicesInRoom(room);
@@ -786,7 +834,7 @@ MegolmEncryption.prototype.prepareToEncrypt = function(room) {
this._removeUnknownDevices(devicesInRoom);
}
await this._ensureOutboundSession(devicesInRoom, blocked);
await this._ensureOutboundSession(devicesInRoom, blocked, true);
delete this.encryptionPreparation;
})();
@@ -955,8 +1003,10 @@ MegolmEncryption.prototype._getDevicesInRoom = async function(room) {
continue;
}
const deviceTrust = this._crypto.checkDeviceTrust(userId, deviceId);
if (userDevices[deviceId].isBlocked() ||
(userDevices[deviceId].isUnverified() && isBlacklisting)
(!deviceTrust.isVerified() && isBlacklisting)
) {
if (!blocked[userId]) {
blocked[userId] = {};
+19
View File
@@ -264,6 +264,25 @@ OlmDecryption.prototype.decryptEvent = async function(event) {
*/
OlmDecryption.prototype._decryptMessage = async function(
theirDeviceIdentityKey, message,
) {
// This is a wrapper that serialises decryptions of prekey messages, because
// otherwise we race between deciding we have no active sessions for the message
// and creating a new one, which we can only do once because it removes the OTK.
if (message.type !== 0) {
// not a prekey message: we can safely just try & decrypt it
return this._reallyDecryptMessage(theirDeviceIdentityKey, message);
} else {
const myPromise = this._olmDevice._olmPrekeyPromise.then(() => {
return this._reallyDecryptMessage(theirDeviceIdentityKey, message);
});
// we want the error, but don't propagate it to the next decryption
this._olmDevice._olmPrekeyPromise = myPromise.catch(() => {});
return await myPromise;
}
};
OlmDecryption.prototype._reallyDecryptMessage = async function(
theirDeviceIdentityKey, message,
) {
const sessionIds = await this._olmDevice.getSessionIdsForDevice(
theirDeviceIdentityKey,
+633 -123
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ import {
UserTrustLevel,
createCryptoStoreCacheCallbacks,
} from './CrossSigning';
import {SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1, SecretStorage} from './SecretStorage';
import {SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES, SecretStorage} from './SecretStorage';
import {OutgoingRoomKeyRequestManager} from './OutgoingRoomKeyRequestManager';
import {IndexedDBCryptoStore} from './store/indexeddb-crypto-store';
import {
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ import {InRoomChannel, InRoomRequests} from "./verification/request/InRoomChanne
import {ToDeviceChannel, ToDeviceRequests} from "./verification/request/ToDeviceChannel";
import * as httpApi from "../http-api";
import {IllegalMethod} from "./verification/IllegalMethod";
import {KeySignatureUploadError} from "../errors";
const DeviceVerification = DeviceInfo.DeviceVerification;
@@ -119,6 +120,8 @@ export function Crypto(baseApis, sessionStore, userId, deviceId,
this._onDeviceListUserCrossSigningUpdated =
this._onDeviceListUserCrossSigningUpdated.bind(this);
this._trustCrossSignedDevices = true;
this._reEmitter = new ReEmitter(this);
this._baseApis = baseApis;
this._sessionStore = sessionStore;
@@ -166,7 +169,9 @@ export function Crypto(baseApis, sessionStore, userId, deviceId,
this._deviceList.on(
'userCrossSigningUpdated', this._onDeviceListUserCrossSigningUpdated,
);
this._reEmitter.reEmit(this._deviceList, ["crypto.devicesUpdated"]);
this._reEmitter.reEmit(this._deviceList, [
"crypto.devicesUpdated", "crypto.willUpdateDevices",
]);
// the last time we did a check for the number of one-time-keys on the
// server.
@@ -303,7 +308,8 @@ Crypto.prototype.init = async function(opts) {
'readonly', [IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_ACCOUNT],
(txn) => {
this._cryptoStore.getCrossSigningKeys(txn, (keys) => {
if (keys) {
// can be an empty object after resetting cross-signing keys, see _storeTrustedSelfKeys
if (keys && Object.keys(keys).length !== 0) {
logger.log("Loaded cross-signing public keys from crypto store");
this._crossSigningInfo.setKeys(keys);
}
@@ -318,13 +324,54 @@ Crypto.prototype.init = async function(opts) {
this._checkAndStartKeyBackup();
};
/**
* Whether to trust a others users signatures of their devices.
* If false, devices will only be considered 'verified' if we have
* verified that device individually (effectively disabling cross-signing).
*
* Default: true
*
* @return {bool} True if trusting cross-signed devices
*/
Crypto.prototype.getCryptoTrustCrossSignedDevices = function() {
return this._trustCrossSignedDevices;
};
/**
* See getCryptoTrustCrossSignedDevices
* This may be set before initCrypto() is called to ensure no races occur.
*
* @param {bool} val True to trust cross-signed devices
*/
Crypto.prototype.setCryptoTrustCrossSignedDevices = function(val) {
this._trustCrossSignedDevices = val;
for (const userId of this._deviceList.getKnownUserIds()) {
const devices = this._deviceList.getRawStoredDevicesForUser(userId);
for (const deviceId of Object.keys(devices)) {
const deviceTrust = this.checkDeviceTrust(userId, deviceId);
// If the device is locally verified then isVerified() is always true,
// so this will only have caused the value to change if the device is
// cross-signing verified but not locally verified
if (
!deviceTrust.isLocallyVerified() &&
deviceTrust.isCrossSigningVerified()
) {
const deviceObj = this._deviceList.getStoredDevice(userId, deviceId);
this.emit("deviceVerificationChanged", userId, deviceId, deviceObj);
}
}
}
};
/**
* Create a recovery key from a user-supplied passphrase.
*
* @param {string} password Passphrase string that can be entered by the user
* when restoring the backup as an alternative to entering the recovery key.
* Optional.
* @returns {Promise<Array>} Array with public key metadata, encoded private
* @returns {Promise<Object>} Object with public key metadata, encoded private
* recovery key which should be disposed of after displaying to the user,
* and raw private key to avoid round tripping if needed.
*/
@@ -345,18 +392,57 @@ Crypto.prototype.createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase = async function(password) {
}
const privateKey = decryption.get_private_key();
const encodedPrivateKey = encodeRecoveryKey(privateKey);
return [keyInfo, encodedPrivateKey, privateKey];
return { keyInfo, encodedPrivateKey, privateKey };
} finally {
if (decryption) decryption.free();
}
};
/**
* Checks whether cross signing:
* - is enabled on this account
* - is trusted by this device
* - has private keys stored in secret storage
* and that the account has a secret storage key
*
* If this function returns false, bootstrapSecretStorage() can be used
* to fix things such that it returns true. That is to say, after
* bootstrapSecretStorage() completes sucessfully, this function should
* return true.
*
* The cross-signing API is currently UNSTABLE and may change without notice.
*
* @return {bool} True if cross-signing is ready to be used on this device
*/
Crypto.prototype.isCrossSigningReady = async function() {
const publicKeysOnDevice = this._crossSigningInfo.getId();
const privateKeysInStorage = await this._crossSigningInfo.isStoredInSecretStorage(
this._secretStorage,
);
const secretStorageKeyInAccount = await this._secretStorage.hasKey();
return (
publicKeysOnDevice &&
privateKeysInStorage &&
secretStorageKeyInAccount
);
};
/**
* Bootstrap Secure Secret Storage if needed by creating a default key and
* signing it with the cross-signing master key. If everything is already set
* up, then no changes are made, so this is safe to run to ensure secret storage
* is ready for use.
*
* This function
* - creates a new Secure Secret Storage key if no default key exists
* - if a key backup exists, it is migrated to store the key in the Secret
* Storage
* - creates a backup if none exists, and one is requested
* - migrates Secure Secret Storage to use the latest algorithm, if an outdated
* algorithm is found
*
* @param {function} [opts.authUploadDeviceSigningKeys] Optional. Function
* called to await an interactive auth flow when uploading device signing keys.
* Args:
@@ -364,22 +450,30 @@ Crypto.prototype.createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase = async function(password) {
* auth data as an object.
* @param {function} [opts.createSecretStorageKey] Optional. Function
* called to await a secret storage key creation flow.
* Returns:
* {Promise<Object>} Object with public key metadata, encoded private
* recovery key which should be disposed of after displaying to the user,
* and raw private key to avoid round tripping if needed.
* @param {object} [opts.keyBackupInfo] The current key backup object. If passed,
* the passphrase and recovery key from this backup will be used.
* @param {bool} [opts.setupNewKeyBackup] If true, a new key backup version will be
* created and the private key stored in the new SSSS store. Ignored if keyBackupInfo
* is supplied.
* @param {bool} [opts.setupNewSecretStorage] Optional. Reset even if keys already exist.
* @param {func} [opts.getKeyBackupPassphrase] Optional. Function called to get the user's
* current key backup passphrase. Should return a promise that resolves with a Buffer
* containing the key, or rejects if the key cannot be obtained.
* Returns:
* {Promise} A promise which resolves to key creation data for
* SecretStorage#addKey: an object with `passphrase` and/or `pubkey` fields.
*/
Crypto.prototype.bootstrapSecretStorage = async function({
authUploadDeviceSigningKeys,
createSecretStorageKey = async () => { },
createSecretStorageKey = async () => ({ }),
keyBackupInfo,
setupNewKeyBackup,
setupNewSecretStorage,
getKeyBackupPassphrase,
} = {}) {
logger.log("Bootstrapping Secure Secret Storage");
@@ -394,93 +488,244 @@ Crypto.prototype.bootstrapSecretStorage = async function({
// use temporary callbacks to weave them through the various APIs.
const appCallbacks = Object.assign({}, this._baseApis._cryptoCallbacks);
try {
const inStorage = !setupNewSecretStorage &&
await this._crossSigningInfo.isStoredInSecretStorage(this._secretStorage);
if (!this._crossSigningInfo.getId() || !inStorage) {
logger.log(
"Cross-signing public and/or private keys not found, " +
"checking secret storage for private keys",
);
if (inStorage) {
logger.log("Cross-signing private keys found in secret storage");
await this.checkOwnCrossSigningTrust();
} else {
logger.log(
"Cross-signing private keys not found in secret storage, " +
"creating new keys",
);
this._baseApis._cryptoCallbacks.saveCrossSigningKeys =
keys => Object.assign(crossSigningPrivateKeys, keys);
this._baseApis._cryptoCallbacks.getCrossSigningKey =
name => crossSigningPrivateKeys[name];
await this.resetCrossSigningKeys(
CrossSigningLevel.MASTER,
{ authUploadDeviceSigningKeys },
);
// the ID of the new SSSS key, if we create one
let newKeyId = null;
// cache SSSS keys so that we don't need to constantly pester the user about it
const ssssKeys = {};
this._baseApis._cryptoCallbacks.getSecretStorageKey =
async ({keys}, name) => {
// if we already have a key that works, return it
for (const keyId of Object.keys(keys)) {
if (ssssKeys[keyId]) {
return [keyId, ssssKeys[keyId]];
}
}
} else {
logger.log("Cross signing keys are present in secret storage");
// otherwise, prompt the user and cache it
const key = await appCallbacks.getSecretStorageKey({keys}, name);
if (key) {
const [keyId, keyData] = key;
ssssKeys[keyId] = keyData;
}
return key;
};
// create a new SSSS key and set it as default
const createSSSS = async (opts, privateKey) => {
opts = opts || {};
if (privateKey) {
opts.key = privateKey;
}
// Check if Secure Secret Storage has a default key. If we don't have one, create
// the default key (which will also be signed by the cross-signing master key).
if (setupNewSecretStorage || !await this.hasSecretStorageKey()) {
let newKeyId;
if (keyBackupInfo) {
logger.log("Secret storage default key not found, using key backup key");
const opts = {
pubkey: keyBackupInfo.auth_data.public_key,
};
const keyId = await this.addSecretStorageKey(
SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES, opts,
);
await this.setDefaultSecretStorageKeyId(keyId);
if (
keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_salt &&
keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_iterations
) {
opts.passphrase = {
algorithm: "m.pbkdf2",
iterations: keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_iterations,
salt: keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_salt,
};
}
if (privateKey) {
// cache the private key so that we can access it again
ssssKeys[keyId] = privateKey;
}
return keyId;
};
newKeyId = await this.addSecretStorageKey(
SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1, opts,
);
// reset the cross-signing keys
const resetCrossSigning = async () => {
this._baseApis._cryptoCallbacks.saveCrossSigningKeys =
keys => Object.assign(crossSigningPrivateKeys, keys);
this._baseApis._cryptoCallbacks.getCrossSigningKey =
name => crossSigningPrivateKeys[name];
await this.resetCrossSigningKeys(
CrossSigningLevel.MASTER,
{ authUploadDeviceSigningKeys },
);
};
// Add an entry for the backup key in SSSS as a 'passthrough' key
// (ie. the secret is the key itself).
this._secretStorage.storePassthrough('m.megolm_backup.v1', newKeyId);
const ensureCanCheckPassphrase = async (keyId, keyInfo) => {
if (!keyInfo.mac) {
const key = await this._baseApis._cryptoCallbacks.getSecretStorageKey(
{keys: {[keyId]: keyInfo}}, "",
);
if (key) {
const keyData = key[1];
ssssKeys[keyId] = keyData;
const {iv, mac} = await SecretStorage._calculateKeyCheck(keyData);
keyInfo.iv = iv;
keyInfo.mac = mac;
// if this key backup is trusted, sign it with the cross signing key
// so the key backup can be trusted via cross-signing.
const backupSigStatus = await this.checkKeyBackup(keyBackupInfo);
if (backupSigStatus.trustInfo.usable) {
console.log("Adding cross signing signature to key backup");
await this._crossSigningInfo.signObject(
keyBackupInfo.auth_data, "master",
);
await this._baseApis._http.authedRequest(
undefined, "PUT", "/room_keys/version/" + keyBackupInfo.version,
undefined, keyBackupInfo,
{prefix: httpApi.PREFIX_UNSTABLE},
);
} else {
console.log(
"Key backup is NOT TRUSTED: NOT adding cross signing signature",
);
}
} else {
logger.log("Secret storage default key not found, creating new key");
const keyOptions = await createSecretStorageKey();
newKeyId = await this.addSecretStorageKey(
SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1,
keyOptions,
await this._crossSigningInfo.signObject(keyInfo, 'master');
await this._baseApis.setAccountData(
`m.secret_storage.key.${keyId}`, keyInfo,
);
}
await this.setDefaultSecretStorageKeyId(newKeyId);
}
};
try {
const oldSSSSKey = await this.getSecretStorageKey();
const [oldKeyId, oldKeyInfo] = oldSSSSKey || [null, null];
const decryptionKeys =
await this._crossSigningInfo.isStoredInSecretStorage(this._secretStorage);
const inStorage = !setupNewSecretStorage && decryptionKeys;
if (!inStorage && !keyBackupInfo) {
// either we don't have anything, or we've been asked to restart
// from scratch
logger.log(
"Cross-signing private keys not found in secret storage, " +
"creating new keys",
);
await resetCrossSigning();
if (
setupNewSecretStorage ||
!oldKeyInfo ||
oldKeyInfo.algorithm !== SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES
) {
// if we already have a usable default SSSS key and aren't resetting SSSS just use it.
// otherwise, create a new one
// Note: we leave the old SSSS key in place: there could be other secrets using it, in theory.
// We could move them to the new key but a) that would mean we'd need to prompt for the old
// passphrase, and b) it's not clear that would be the right thing to do anyway.
const { keyInfo, privateKey } = await createSecretStorageKey();
newKeyId = await createSSSS(keyInfo, privateKey);
}
if (oldKeyInfo && oldKeyInfo.algorithm === SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES) {
await ensureCanCheckPassphrase(oldKeyId, oldKeyInfo);
}
} else if (!inStorage && keyBackupInfo) {
// we have an existing backup, but no SSSS
logger.log("Secret storage default key not found, using key backup key");
// if we have the backup key already cached, use it; otherwise use the
// callback to prompt for the key
const backupKey = await this.getSessionBackupPrivateKey() ||
await getKeyBackupPassphrase();
// create new cross-signing keys
await resetCrossSigning();
// create a new SSSS key and use the backup key as the new SSSS key
const opts = {};
if (
keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_salt &&
keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_iterations
) {
opts.passphrase = {
algorithm: "m.pbkdf2",
iterations: keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_iterations,
salt: keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_salt,
bits: 256,
};
}
newKeyId = await createSSSS(opts, backupKey);
// store the backup key in secret storage
await this.storeSecret(
"m.megolm_backup.v1", olmlib.encodeBase64(backupKey), [newKeyId],
);
// The backup is trusted because the user provided the private key.
// Sign the backup with the cross signing key so the key backup can
// be trusted via cross-signing.
logger.log("Adding cross signing signature to key backup");
await this._crossSigningInfo.signObject(
keyBackupInfo.auth_data, "master",
);
await this._baseApis._http.authedRequest(
undefined, "PUT", "/room_keys/version/" + keyBackupInfo.version,
undefined, keyBackupInfo,
{prefix: httpApi.PREFIX_UNSTABLE},
);
} else if (!(Object.values(decryptionKeys).some(
info => info.algorithm === SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES,
))) {
// we have an asymmetric SSSS
logger.log("Asymmetric SSSS found. Switching SSSS to symmetric");
const keys = {};
// fetch the cross-signing private keys (needed to sign the new
// SSSS key, and so that we can re-encrypt them with the new key).
// We store the cross-signing keys, and temporarily set a callback
// so that when the private keys are needed while setting things
// up, we can provide it.
this._baseApis._cryptoCallbacks.getCrossSigningKey =
name => crossSigningPrivateKeys[name];
for (const type of ["master", "self_signing", "user_signing"]) {
const secretName = `m.cross_signing.${type}`;
const secret = await this.getSecret(secretName);
keys[type] = secret;
crossSigningPrivateKeys[type]
= new Uint8Array(olmlib.decodeBase64(secret));
}
await this.checkOwnCrossSigningTrust();
const opts = {};
let oldKey = null;
for (const [keyId, keyInfo] of Object.entries(decryptionKeys)) {
// See if the old key was generated from a passphrase. If
// yes, use the same settings.
if (keyId in ssssKeys) {
oldKey = ssssKeys[keyId];
if (keyInfo.passphrase) {
opts.passphrase = keyInfo.passphrase;
}
break;
}
}
// create new symmetric SSSS key
newKeyId = await createSSSS(opts, oldKey);
logger.log("re-encrypting cross-signing keys");
// re-encrypt all the cross-signing keys with the new key
for (const type of ["master", "self_signing", "user_signing"]) {
const secretName = `m.cross_signing.${type}`;
await this.storeSecret(secretName, keys[type], [newKeyId]);
}
if (await this.isSecretStored("m.megolm_backup.v1", false)) {
// re-encrypt the backup key if we had one too
logger.log("re-encrypting backup key");
const backupKey = await this.getSecret("m.megolm_backup.v1");
await this.storeSecret(
"m.megolm_backup.v1", fixBackupKey(backupKey) || backupKey,
[newKeyId],
);
}
} else if (!this._crossSigningInfo.getId()) {
// we have SSSS, but we don't know if the server's cross-signing
// keys should be trusted
logger.log("Cross-signing private keys found in secret storage");
// fetch the private keys and set up our local copy of the keys for
// use
await this.checkOwnCrossSigningTrust();
if (oldKeyInfo && oldKeyInfo.algorithm === SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES) {
// make sure that the default key has the information needed to
// check the passphrase
await ensureCanCheckPassphrase(oldKeyId, oldKeyInfo);
}
} else {
logger.log("Have secret storage key");
// we have SSSS and we cross-signing is already set up
logger.log("Cross signing keys are present in secret storage");
if (oldKeyInfo && oldKeyInfo.algorithm === SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES) {
// make sure that the default key has the information needed to
// check the passphrase
await ensureCanCheckPassphrase(oldKeyId, oldKeyInfo);
}
}
// If cross-signing keys were reset, store them in Secure Secret Storage.
@@ -511,6 +756,33 @@ Crypto.prototype.bootstrapSecretStorage = async function({
);
await this._baseApis.createKeyBackupVersion(info);
}
// Call `getCrossSigningKey` for side effect of caching private keys for
// future gossiping to other devices if enabled via app level callbacks.
if (this._crossSigningInfo._cacheCallbacks) {
for (const type of ["self_signing", "user_signing"]) {
logger.log(`Cache ${type} cross-signing private key locally`);
await this._crossSigningInfo.getCrossSigningKey(type);
}
}
// and likewise for the session backup key
const sessionBackupKey = await this.getSecret('m.megolm_backup.v1');
if (sessionBackupKey) {
logger.info("Got session backup key from secret storage: caching");
// fix up the backup key if it's in the wrong format, and replace
// in secret storage
const fixedBackupKey = fixBackupKey(sessionBackupKey);
if (fixedBackupKey) {
await this.storeSecret(
"m.megolm_backup.v1", fixedBackupKey, [newKeyId || oldKeyId],
);
}
const decodedBackupKey = new Uint8Array(olmlib.decodeBase64(
fixedBackupKey || sessionBackupKey,
));
await this.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(decodedBackupKey);
}
} finally {
// Restore the original callbacks. NB. we must do this by manipulating
// the same object since the CrossSigning class has a reference to the
@@ -526,6 +798,26 @@ Crypto.prototype.bootstrapSecretStorage = async function({
logger.log("Secure Secret Storage ready");
};
/**
* Fix up the backup key, that may be in the wrong format due to a bug in a
* migration step. Some backup keys were stored as a comma-separated list of
* integers, rather than a base64-encoded byte array. If this function is
* passed a string that looks like a list of integers rather than a base64
* string, it will attempt to convert it to the right format.
*
* @param {string} key the key to check
* @returns {null | string} If the key is in the wrong format, then the fixed
* key will be returned. Otherwise null will be returned.
*
*/
export function fixBackupKey(key) {
if (key.indexOf(",") < 0) {
return null;
}
const fixedKey = Uint8Array.from(key.split(","), x => parseInt(x));
return olmlib.encodeBase64(fixedKey);
}
Crypto.prototype.addSecretStorageKey = function(algorithm, opts, keyID) {
return this._secretStorage.addKey(algorithm, opts, keyID);
};
@@ -534,6 +826,14 @@ Crypto.prototype.hasSecretStorageKey = function(keyID) {
return this._secretStorage.hasKey(keyID);
};
Crypto.prototype.secretStorageKeyNeedsUpgrade = function(keyID) {
return this._secretStorage.keyNeedsUpgrade(keyID);
};
Crypto.prototype.getSecretStorageKey = function(keyID) {
return this._secretStorage.getKey(keyID);
};
Crypto.prototype.storeSecret = function(name, secret, keys) {
return this._secretStorage.store(name, secret, keys);
};
@@ -561,6 +861,10 @@ Crypto.prototype.setDefaultSecretStorageKeyId = function(k) {
return this._secretStorage.setDefaultKeyId(k);
};
Crypto.prototype.checkSecretStorageKey = function(key, info) {
return this._secretStorage.checkKey(key, info);
};
/**
* Checks that a given secret storage private key matches a given public key.
* This can be used by the getSecretStorageKey callback to verify that the
@@ -582,6 +886,51 @@ Crypto.prototype.checkSecretStoragePrivateKey = function(privateKey, expectedPub
}
};
/**
* Fetches the backup private key, if cached
* @returns {Promise} the key, if any, or null
*/
Crypto.prototype.getSessionBackupPrivateKey = async function() {
let key = await new Promise((resolve) => {
this._cryptoStore.doTxn(
'readonly',
[IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_ACCOUNT],
(txn) => {
this._cryptoStore.getSecretStorePrivateKey(
txn,
resolve,
"m.megolm_backup.v1",
);
},
);
});
// make sure we have a Uint8Array, rather than a string
if (key && typeof(key === "string")) {
key = new Uint8Array(olmlib.decodeBase64(fixBackupKey(key) || key));
await this.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(key);
}
return key;
};
/**
* Stores the session backup key to the cache
* @param {Uint8Array} key the private key
* @returns {Promise} so you can catch failures
*/
Crypto.prototype.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey = async function(key) {
if (!(key instanceof Uint8Array)) {
throw new Error(`storeSessionBackupPrivateKey expects Uint8Array, got ${key}`);
}
return this._cryptoStore.doTxn(
'readwrite',
[IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_ACCOUNT],
(txn) => {
this._cryptoStore.storeSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, "m.megolm_backup.v1", key);
},
);
};
/**
* Checks that a given cross-signing private key matches a given public key.
* This can be used by the getCrossSigningKey callback to verify that the
@@ -667,15 +1016,34 @@ Crypto.prototype._afterCrossSigningLocalKeyChange = async function() {
const device = this._deviceList.getStoredDevice(this._userId, this._deviceId);
const signedDevice = await this._crossSigningInfo.signDevice(this._userId, device);
logger.info(`Starting background key sig upload for ${this._deviceId}`);
this._baseApis.uploadKeySignatures({
[this._userId]: {
[this._deviceId]: signedDevice,
},
}).then(() => {
logger.info(`Finished background key sig upload for ${this._deviceId}`);
}).catch(e => {
logger.error(`Error during background key sig upload for ${this._deviceId}`, e);
});
const upload = ({ shouldEmit }) => {
return this._baseApis.uploadKeySignatures({
[this._userId]: {
[this._deviceId]: signedDevice,
},
}).then((response) => {
const { failures } = response || {};
if (Object.keys(failures || []).length > 0) {
if (shouldEmit) {
this._baseApis.emit(
"crypto.keySignatureUploadFailure",
failures,
"_afterCrossSigningLocalKeyChange",
upload, // continuation
);
}
throw new KeySignatureUploadError("Key upload failed", { failures });
}
logger.info(`Finished background key sig upload for ${this._deviceId}`);
}).catch(e => {
logger.error(
`Error during background key sig upload for ${this._deviceId}`,
e,
);
});
};
upload({ shouldEmit: true });
const shouldUpgradeCb = (
this._baseApis._cryptoCallbacks.shouldUpgradeDeviceVerifications
@@ -815,7 +1183,7 @@ Crypto.prototype.getStoredCrossSigningForUser = function(userId) {
Crypto.prototype.checkUserTrust = function(userId) {
const userCrossSigning = this._deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
if (!userCrossSigning) {
return new UserTrustLevel(false, false);
return new UserTrustLevel(false, false, false);
}
return this._crossSigningInfo.checkUserTrust(userCrossSigning);
};
@@ -846,11 +1214,14 @@ Crypto.prototype._checkDeviceInfoTrust = function(userId, device) {
const userCrossSigning = this._deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
if (device && userCrossSigning) {
// The _trustCrossSignedDevices only affects trust of other people's cross-signing
// signatures
const trustCrossSig = this._trustCrossSignedDevices || userId === this._userId;
return this._crossSigningInfo.checkDeviceTrust(
userCrossSigning, device, trustedLocally,
userCrossSigning, device, trustedLocally, trustCrossSig,
);
} else {
return new DeviceTrustLevel(false, false, trustedLocally);
return new DeviceTrustLevel(false, false, trustedLocally, false);
}
};
@@ -870,16 +1241,34 @@ Crypto.prototype._onDeviceListUserCrossSigningUpdated = async function(userId) {
// If it's not changed, just make sure everything is up to date
await this.checkOwnCrossSigningTrust();
} else {
this.emit("crossSigning.keysChanged", {});
// We'll now be in a state where cross-signing on the account is not trusted
// because our locally stored cross-signing keys will not match the ones
// on the server for our account. The app must call checkOwnCrossSigningTrust()
// to fix this.
// XXX: Do we need to do something to emit events saying every device has become
// untrusted?
// on the server for our account. So we clear our own stored cross-signing keys,
// effectively disabling cross-signing until the user gets verified by the device
// that reset the keys
this._storeTrustedSelfKeys(null);
// emit cross-signing has been disabled
this.emit("crossSigning.keysChanged", {});
// as the trust for our own user has changed,
// also emit an event for this
this.emit("userTrustStatusChanged",
this._userId, this.checkUserTrust(userId));
}
} else {
await this._checkDeviceVerifications(userId);
// Update verified before latch using the current state and save the new
// latch value in the device list store.
const crossSigning = this._deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
if (crossSigning) {
crossSigning.updateCrossSigningVerifiedBefore(
this.checkUserTrust(userId).isCrossSigningVerified(),
);
this._deviceList.setRawStoredCrossSigningForUser(
userId, crossSigning.toStorage(),
);
}
this.emit("userTrustStatusChanged", userId, this.checkUserTrust(userId));
}
};
@@ -952,19 +1341,52 @@ Crypto.prototype.checkOwnCrossSigningTrust = async function() {
}
if (masterChanged) {
await this._signObject(this._crossSigningInfo.keys.master);
keySignatures[this._crossSigningInfo.getId()]
= this._crossSigningInfo.keys.master;
const masterKey = this._crossSigningInfo.keys.master;
await this._signObject(masterKey);
const deviceSig = masterKey.signatures[this._userId]["ed25519:" + this._deviceId];
// Include only the _new_ device signature in the upload.
// We may have existing signatures from deleted devices, which will cause
// the entire upload to fail.
keySignatures[this._crossSigningInfo.getId()] = Object.assign(
{},
masterKey,
{
signatures: {
[this._userId]: {
["ed25519:" + this._deviceId]: deviceSig,
},
},
},
);
}
const keysToUpload = Object.keys(keySignatures);
if (keysToUpload.length) {
logger.info(`Starting background key sig upload for ${keysToUpload}`);
this._baseApis.uploadKeySignatures({ [this._userId]: keySignatures }).then(() => {
logger.info(`Finished background key sig upload for ${keysToUpload}`);
}).catch(e => {
logger.error(`Error during background key sig upload for ${keysToUpload}`, e);
});
const upload = ({ shouldEmit }) => {
logger.info(`Starting background key sig upload for ${keysToUpload}`);
return this._baseApis.uploadKeySignatures({ [this._userId]: keySignatures })
.then((response) => {
const { failures } = response || {};
logger.info(`Finished background key sig upload for ${keysToUpload}`);
if (Object.keys(failures || []).length > 0) {
if (shouldEmit) {
this._baseApis.emit(
"crypto.keySignatureUploadFailure",
failures,
"checkOwnCrossSigningTrust",
upload,
);
}
throw new KeySignatureUploadError("Key upload failed", { failures });
}
}).catch(e => {
logger.error(
`Error during background key sig upload for ${keysToUpload}`,
e,
);
});
};
upload({ shouldEmit: true });
}
this.emit("userTrustStatusChanged", userId, this.checkUserTrust(userId));
@@ -986,7 +1408,11 @@ Crypto.prototype.checkOwnCrossSigningTrust = async function() {
* @param {object} keys The new trusted set of keys
*/
Crypto.prototype._storeTrustedSelfKeys = async function(keys) {
this._crossSigningInfo.setKeys(keys);
if (keys) {
this._crossSigningInfo.setKeys(keys);
} else {
this._crossSigningInfo.clearKeys();
}
await this._cryptoStore.doTxn(
'readwrite', [IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_ACCOUNT],
(txn) => {
@@ -1605,12 +2031,33 @@ Crypto.prototype.setDeviceVerification = async function(
);
const device = await this._crossSigningInfo.signUser(xsk);
if (device) {
logger.info("Uploading signature for " + userId + "...");
await this._baseApis.uploadKeySignatures({
[userId]: {
[deviceId]: device,
},
});
const upload = async ({ shouldEmit }) => {
logger.info("Uploading signature for " + userId + "...");
const response = await this._baseApis.uploadKeySignatures({
[userId]: {
[deviceId]: device,
},
});
const { failures } = response || {};
if (Object.keys(failures || []).length > 0) {
if (shouldEmit) {
this._baseApis.emit(
"crypto.keySignatureUploadFailure",
failures,
"setDeviceVerification",
upload,
);
}
/* Throwing here causes the process to be cancelled and the other
* user to be notified */
throw new KeySignatureUploadError(
"Key upload failed",
{ failures },
);
}
};
await upload({ shouldEmit: true });
// This will emit events when it comes back down the sync
// (we could do local echo to speed things up)
}
@@ -1659,12 +2106,27 @@ Crypto.prototype.setDeviceVerification = async function(
userId, DeviceInfo.fromStorage(dev, deviceId),
);
if (device) {
logger.info("Uploading signature for " + deviceId);
await this._baseApis.uploadKeySignatures({
[userId]: {
[deviceId]: device,
},
});
const upload = async ({shouldEmit}) => {
logger.info("Uploading signature for " + deviceId);
const response = await this._baseApis.uploadKeySignatures({
[userId]: {
[deviceId]: device,
},
});
const { failures } = response || {};
if (Object.keys(failures || []).length > 0) {
if (shouldEmit) {
this._baseApis.emit(
"crypto.keySignatureUploadFailure",
failures,
"setDeviceVerification",
upload, // continuation
);
}
throw new KeySignatureUploadError("Key upload failed", { failures });
}
};
await upload({shouldEmit: true});
// XXX: we'll need to wait for the device list to be updated
}
}
@@ -1701,7 +2163,8 @@ Crypto.prototype.requestVerification = function(userId, devices) {
if (existingRequest) {
return Promise.resolve(existingRequest);
}
const channel = new ToDeviceChannel(this._baseApis, userId, devices);
const channel = new ToDeviceChannel(this._baseApis, userId, devices,
ToDeviceChannel.makeTransactionId());
return this._requestVerificationWithChannel(
userId,
channel,
@@ -1714,6 +2177,10 @@ Crypto.prototype._requestVerificationWithChannel = async function(
) {
let request = new VerificationRequest(
channel, this._verificationMethods, this._baseApis);
// if transaction id is already known, add request
if (channel.transactionId) {
requestsMap.setRequestByChannel(channel, request);
}
await request.sendRequest();
// don't replace the request created by a racing remote echo
const racingRequest = requestsMap.getRequestByChannel(channel);
@@ -1751,6 +2218,27 @@ Crypto.prototype.beginKeyVerification = function(
return request.beginKeyVerification(method, {userId, deviceId});
};
Crypto.prototype.legacyDeviceVerification = async function(
userId, deviceId, method,
) {
const transactionId = ToDeviceChannel.makeTransactionId();
const channel = new ToDeviceChannel(
this._baseApis, userId, [deviceId], transactionId, deviceId);
const request = new VerificationRequest(
channel, this._verificationMethods, this._baseApis);
this._toDeviceVerificationRequests.setRequestBySenderAndTxnId(
userId, transactionId, request);
const verifier = request.beginKeyVerification(method, {userId, deviceId});
// either reject by an error from verify() while sending .start
// or resolve when the request receives the
// local (fake remote) echo for sending the .start event
await Promise.race([
verifier.verify(),
request.waitFor(r => r.started),
]);
return request;
};
/**
* Get information on the active olm sessions with a user
@@ -2252,6 +2740,20 @@ Crypto.prototype.flagAllGroupSessionsForBackup = async function() {
return remaining;
};
/**
* Perform any background tasks that can be done before a message is ready to
* send, in order to speed up sending of the message.
*
* @param {module:models/room} room the room the event is in
*/
Crypto.prototype.prepareToEncrypt = function(room) {
const roomId = room.roomId;
const alg = this._roomEncryptors[roomId];
if (alg) {
alg.prepareToEncrypt(room);
}
};
/* eslint-disable valid-jsdoc */ //https://github.com/eslint/eslint/issues/7307
/**
* Encrypt an event according to the configuration of the room.
@@ -2395,6 +2897,14 @@ Crypto.prototype.cancelRoomKeyRequest = function(requestBody) {
});
};
/**
* Re-send any outgoing key requests, eg after verification
* @returns {Promise}
*/
Crypto.prototype.cancelAndResendAllOutgoingKeyRequests = function() {
return this._outgoingRoomKeyRequestManager.cancelAndResendAllOutgoingRequests();
};
/**
* handle an m.room.encryption event
*
+6 -3
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ import {randomString} from '../randomstring';
const DEFAULT_ITERATIONS = 500000;
const DEFAULT_BITSIZE = 256;
export async function keyFromAuthData(authData, password) {
if (!global.Olm) {
throw new Error("Olm is not available");
@@ -34,6 +36,7 @@ export async function keyFromAuthData(authData, password) {
return await deriveKey(
password, authData.private_key_salt,
authData.private_key_iterations,
authData.private_key_bits || DEFAULT_BITSIZE,
);
}
@@ -44,12 +47,12 @@ export async function keyFromPassphrase(password) {
const salt = randomString(32);
const key = await deriveKey(password, salt, DEFAULT_ITERATIONS);
const key = await deriveKey(password, salt, DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, DEFAULT_BITSIZE);
return { key, salt, iterations: DEFAULT_ITERATIONS };
}
export async function deriveKey(password, salt, iterations) {
export async function deriveKey(password, salt, iterations, numBits = DEFAULT_BITSIZE) {
const subtleCrypto = global.crypto.subtle;
const TextEncoder = global.TextEncoder;
if (!subtleCrypto || !TextEncoder) {
@@ -73,7 +76,7 @@ export async function deriveKey(password, salt, iterations) {
hash: 'SHA-512',
},
key,
global.Olm.PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH * 8,
numBits,
);
return new Uint8Array(keybits);
+9 -1
View File
@@ -180,14 +180,18 @@ export async function getExistingOlmSessions(
* @param {Number} [otkTimeout] The timeout in milliseconds when requesting
* one-time keys for establishing new olm sessions.
*
* @param {Array} [failedServers] An array to fill with remote servers that
* failed to respond to one-time-key requests.
*
* @return {Promise} resolves once the sessions are complete, to
* an Object mapping from userId to deviceId to
* {@link module:crypto~OlmSessionResult}
*/
export async function ensureOlmSessionsForDevices(
olmDevice, baseApis, devicesByUser, force, otkTimeout,
olmDevice, baseApis, devicesByUser, force, otkTimeout, failedServers,
) {
if (typeof force === "number") {
failedServers = otkTimeout;
otkTimeout = force;
force = false;
}
@@ -261,6 +265,10 @@ export async function ensureOlmSessionsForDevices(
throw e;
}
if (failedServers && "failures" in res) {
failedServers.push(...Object.keys(res.failures));
}
const otk_res = res.one_time_keys || {};
const promises = [];
for (const [userId, devices] of Object.entries(devicesByUser)) {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ export function decodeRecoveryKey(recoverykey) {
throw new Error("Incorrect length");
}
return result.slice(
return Uint8Array.from(result.slice(
OLM_RECOVERY_KEY_PREFIX.length,
OLM_RECOVERY_KEY_PREFIX.length + global.Olm.PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH,
);
));
}
@@ -203,6 +203,23 @@ export class Backend {
return promiseifyTxn(txn).then(() => result);
}
/**
*
* @param {Number} wantedState
* @return {Promise<Array<*>>} All elements in a given state
*/
getAllOutgoingRoomKeyRequestsByState(wantedState) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const txn = this._db.transaction("outgoingRoomKeyRequests", "readonly");
const store = txn.objectStore("outgoingRoomKeyRequests");
const index = store.index("state");
const request = index.getAll(wantedState);
request.onsuccess = (ev) => resolve(ev.target.result);
request.onerror = (ev) => reject(ev.target.error);
});
}
getOutgoingRoomKeyRequestsByTarget(userId, deviceId, wantedStates) {
let stateIndex = 0;
const results = [];
@@ -341,7 +358,7 @@ export class Backend {
};
}
getCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, func, type) {
getSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, func, type) {
const objectStore = txn.objectStore("account");
const getReq = objectStore.get(`ssss_cache:${type}`);
getReq.onsuccess = function() {
@@ -358,7 +375,7 @@ export class Backend {
objectStore.put(keys, "crossSigningKeys");
}
storeCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, type, key) {
storeSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, type, key) {
const objectStore = txn.objectStore("account");
objectStore.put(key, `ssss_cache:${type}`);
}
+15 -4
View File
@@ -225,6 +225,17 @@ export class IndexedDBCryptoStore {
return this._backend.getOutgoingRoomKeyRequestByState(wantedStates);
}
/**
* Look for room key requests by state
* unlike above, return a list of all entries in one state.
*
* @param {Number} wantedState
* @return {Promise<Array<*>>} Returns an array of requests in the given state
*/
getAllOutgoingRoomKeyRequestsByState(wantedState) {
return this._backend.getAllOutgoingRoomKeyRequestsByState(wantedState);
}
/**
* Look for room key requests by target device and state
*
@@ -313,8 +324,8 @@ export class IndexedDBCryptoStore {
* @param {function(string)} func Called with the private key
* @param {string} type A key type
*/
getCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, func, type) {
this._backend.getCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, func, type);
getSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, func, type) {
this._backend.getSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, func, type);
}
/**
@@ -334,8 +345,8 @@ export class IndexedDBCryptoStore {
* @param {string} type The type of cross-signing private key to store
* @param {string} key keys object as getCrossSigningKeys()
*/
storeCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, type, key) {
this._backend.storeCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, type, key);
storeSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, type, key) {
this._backend.storeSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, type, key);
}
// Olm sessions
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ export class LocalStorageCryptoStore extends MemoryCryptoStore {
func(keys);
}
getCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, func, type) {
getSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, func, type) {
const key = getJsonItem(this.store, E2E_PREFIX + `ssss_cache.${type}`);
func(key ? Uint8Array.from(key) : key);
}
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ export class LocalStorageCryptoStore extends MemoryCryptoStore {
);
}
storeCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, type, key) {
storeSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, type, key) {
setJsonItem(
this.store, E2E_PREFIX + `ssss_cache.${type}`, Array.from(key),
);
+16 -2
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ export class MemoryCryptoStore {
this._account = null;
this._crossSigningKeys = null;
this._privateKeys = {};
this._backupKeys = {};
// Map of {devicekey -> {sessionId -> session pickle}}
this._sessions = {};
@@ -165,6 +166,19 @@ export class MemoryCryptoStore {
return Promise.resolve(null);
}
/**
*
* @param {Number} wantedState
* @return {Promise<Array<*>>} All OutgoingRoomKeyRequests in state
*/
getAllOutgoingRoomKeyRequestsByState(wantedState) {
return Promise.resolve(
this._outgoingRoomKeyRequests.filter(
(r) => r.state == wantedState,
),
);
}
getOutgoingRoomKeyRequestsByTarget(userId, deviceId, wantedStates) {
const results = [];
@@ -256,7 +270,7 @@ export class MemoryCryptoStore {
func(this._crossSigningKeys);
}
getCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, func, type) {
getSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, func, type) {
const result = this._privateKeys[type];
return func(result || null);
}
@@ -265,7 +279,7 @@ export class MemoryCryptoStore {
this._crossSigningKeys = keys;
}
storeCrossSigningPrivateKey(txn, type, key) {
storeSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, type, key) {
this._privateKeys[type] = key;
}
+41 -4
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/*
Copyright 2018 New Vector Ltd
Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -121,6 +122,11 @@ export class VerificationBase extends EventEmitter {
if (this._done) {
return Promise.reject(new Error("Verification is already done"));
}
const existingEvent = this.request.getEventFromOtherParty(type);
if (existingEvent) {
return Promise.resolve(existingEvent);
}
this._expectedEvent = type;
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
this._resolveEvent = resolve;
@@ -198,13 +204,14 @@ export class VerificationBase extends EventEmitter {
if (this._baseApis.getUserId() !== this.userId) {
return;
}
// FIXME: This is a lot of logic that isn't anything to do with verification
// and probably ought to be somewhere else.
console.log("VerificationBase.done: Self-verification done; requesting keys");
/* This happens asynchronously, and we're not concerned about
* waiting for it. We return here in order to test. */
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const client = this._baseApis;
const original = client._crypto._crossSigningInfo;
const storage = client._crypto._secretStorage;
/* We already have all of the infrastructure we need to validate and
* cache cross-signing keys, so instead of replicating that, here we
@@ -215,8 +222,9 @@ export class VerificationBase extends EventEmitter {
{ getCrossSigningKey: async (type) => {
console.debug("VerificationBase.done: requesting secret",
type, this.deviceId);
const { promise } =
storage.request(`m.cross_signing.${type}`, [this.deviceId]);
const { promise } = client.requestSecret(
`m.cross_signing.${type}`, [this.deviceId],
);
const result = await promise;
const decoded = decodeBase64(result);
return Uint8Array.from(decoded);
@@ -237,11 +245,39 @@ export class VerificationBase extends EventEmitter {
);
});
// also request and cache the key backup key
const backupKeyPromise = new Promise(async resolve => {
const cachedKey = await client._crypto.getSessionBackupPrivateKey();
if (!cachedKey) {
logger.info("No cached backup key found. Requesting...");
const secretReq = client.requestSecret(
'm.megolm_backup.v1', [this.deviceId],
);
const base64Key = await secretReq.promise;
logger.info("Got key backup key, decoding...");
const decodedKey = decodeBase64(base64Key);
logger.info("Decoded backup key, storing...");
client._crypto.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(
Uint8Array.from(decodedKey),
);
logger.info("Backup key stored. Starting backup restore...");
const backupInfo = await client.getKeyBackupVersion();
// no need to await for this - just let it go in the bg
client.restoreKeyBackupWithCache(
undefined, undefined, backupInfo,
).then(() => {
logger.info("Backup restored.");
});
}
resolve();
});
/* We call getCrossSigningKey() for its side-effects */
return Promise.race([
Promise.all([
crossSigning.getCrossSigningKey("self_signing"),
crossSigning.getCrossSigningKey("user_signing"),
backupKeyPromise,
]),
timeout,
]).then(resolve, reject);
@@ -256,6 +292,7 @@ export class VerificationBase extends EventEmitter {
this._endTimer(); // always kill the activity timer
if (!this._done) {
this.cancelled = true;
this.request.onVerifierCancelled();
if (this.userId && this.deviceId) {
// send a cancellation to the other user (if it wasn't
// cancelled by the other user)
@@ -338,7 +375,7 @@ export class VerificationBase extends EventEmitter {
for (const [keyId, keyInfo] of Object.entries(keys)) {
const deviceId = keyId.split(':', 2)[1];
const device = await this._baseApis.getStoredDevice(userId, deviceId);
const device = this._baseApis.getStoredDevice(userId, deviceId);
if (device) {
await verifier(keyId, device, keyInfo);
verifiedDevices.push(deviceId);
+228 -36
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,9 @@ limitations under the License.
import {VerificationBase as Base} from "./Base";
import {
newKeyMismatchError,
newUserMismatchError,
newUserCancelledError,
} from './Error';
import {encodeUnpaddedBase64, decodeBase64} from "../olmlib";
export const SHOW_QR_CODE_METHOD = "m.qr_code.show.v1";
export const SCAN_QR_CODE_METHOD = "m.qr_code.scan.v1";
@@ -49,47 +50,46 @@ export class ReciprocateQRCode extends Base {
"with this method yet.");
}
const targetUserId = this.startEvent.getSender();
if (!this.userId) {
console.log("Asking to confirm user ID");
this.userId = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
this.emit("confirm_user_id", {
userId: targetUserId,
confirm: resolve, // takes a userId
cancel: () => reject(newUserMismatchError()),
});
});
} else if (targetUserId !== this.userId) {
throw newUserMismatchError({
expected: this.userId,
actual: targetUserId,
});
}
if (this.startEvent.getContent()['secret'] !== this.request.encodedSharedSecret) {
const {qrCodeData} = this.request;
// 1. check the secret
if (this.startEvent.getContent()['secret'] !== qrCodeData.encodedSharedSecret) {
throw newKeyMismatchError();
}
// If we've gotten this far, verify the user's master cross signing key
const xsignInfo = this._baseApis.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(this.userId);
if (!xsignInfo) throw new Error("Missing cross signing info");
const masterKey = xsignInfo.getId("master");
const masterKeyId = `ed25519:${masterKey}`;
const keys = {[masterKeyId]: masterKey};
const devices = (await this._baseApis.getStoredDevicesForUser(this.userId)) || [];
const targetDevice = devices.find(d => {
return d.deviceId === this.request.targetDevice.deviceId;
// 2. ask if other user shows shield as well
await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
this.reciprocateQREvent = {
confirm: resolve,
cancel: () => reject(newUserCancelledError()),
};
this.emit("show_reciprocate_qr", this.reciprocateQREvent);
});
if (!targetDevice) throw new Error("Device not found, somehow");
keys[`ed25519:${targetDevice.deviceId}`] = targetDevice.getFingerprint();
if (this.request.requestingUserId === this.request.receivingUserId) {
delete keys[masterKeyId];
// 3. determine key to sign / mark as trusted
const keys = {};
switch (qrCodeData.mode) {
case MODE_VERIFY_OTHER_USER: {
// add master key to keys to be signed, only if we're not doing self-verification
const masterKey = qrCodeData.otherUserMasterKey;
keys[`ed25519:${masterKey}`] = masterKey;
break;
}
case MODE_VERIFY_SELF_TRUSTED: {
const deviceId = this.request.targetDevice.deviceId;
keys[`ed25519:${deviceId}`] = qrCodeData.otherDeviceKey;
break;
}
case MODE_VERIFY_SELF_UNTRUSTED: {
const masterKey = qrCodeData.myMasterKey;
keys[`ed25519:${masterKey}`] = masterKey;
break;
}
}
// 4. sign the key (or mark own MSK as verified in case of MODE_VERIFY_SELF_TRUSTED)
await this._verifyKeys(this.userId, keys, (keyId, device, keyInfo) => {
// make sure the device has the expected keys
const targetKey = keys[keyId];
if (!targetKey) throw newKeyMismatchError();
@@ -106,8 +106,200 @@ export class ReciprocateQRCode extends Base {
throw newKeyMismatchError();
}
}
// Otherwise it is probably fine
});
}
}
const CODE_VERSION = 0x02; // the version of binary QR codes we support
const BINARY_PREFIX = "MATRIX"; // ASCII, used to prefix the binary format
const MODE_VERIFY_OTHER_USER = 0x00; // Verifying someone who isn't us
const MODE_VERIFY_SELF_TRUSTED = 0x01; // We trust the master key
const MODE_VERIFY_SELF_UNTRUSTED = 0x02; // We do not trust the master key
export class QRCodeData {
constructor(
mode, sharedSecret, otherUserMasterKey,
otherDeviceKey, myMasterKey, buffer,
) {
this._sharedSecret = sharedSecret;
this._mode = mode;
this._otherUserMasterKey = otherUserMasterKey;
this._otherDeviceKey = otherDeviceKey;
this._myMasterKey = myMasterKey;
this._buffer = buffer;
}
static async create(request, client) {
const sharedSecret = QRCodeData._generateSharedSecret();
const mode = QRCodeData._determineMode(request, client);
let otherUserMasterKey = null;
let otherDeviceKey = null;
let myMasterKey = null;
if (mode === MODE_VERIFY_OTHER_USER) {
const otherUserCrossSigningInfo =
client.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(request.otherUserId);
otherUserMasterKey = otherUserCrossSigningInfo.getId("master");
} else if (mode === MODE_VERIFY_SELF_TRUSTED) {
otherDeviceKey = await QRCodeData._getOtherDeviceKey(request, client);
} else if (mode === MODE_VERIFY_SELF_UNTRUSTED) {
const myUserId = client.getUserId();
const myCrossSigningInfo = client.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(myUserId);
myMasterKey = myCrossSigningInfo.getId("master");
}
const qrData = QRCodeData._generateQrData(
request, client, mode,
sharedSecret,
otherUserMasterKey,
otherDeviceKey,
myMasterKey,
);
const buffer = QRCodeData._generateBuffer(qrData);
return new QRCodeData(mode, sharedSecret,
otherUserMasterKey, otherDeviceKey, myMasterKey, buffer);
}
get buffer() {
return this._buffer;
}
get mode() {
return this._mode;
}
/**
* only set when mode is MODE_VERIFY_SELF_TRUSTED
* @return {string} device key of other party at time of generating QR code
*/
get otherDeviceKey() {
return this._otherDeviceKey;
}
/**
* only set when mode is MODE_VERIFY_OTHER_USER
* @return {string} master key of other party at time of generating QR code
*/
get otherUserMasterKey() {
return this._otherUserMasterKey;
}
/**
* only set when mode is MODE_VERIFY_SELF_UNTRUSTED
* @return {string} own master key at time of generating QR code
*/
get myMasterKey() {
return this._myMasterKey;
}
/**
* The unpadded base64 encoded shared secret.
*/
get encodedSharedSecret() {
return this._sharedSecret;
}
static _generateSharedSecret() {
const secretBytes = new Uint8Array(11);
global.crypto.getRandomValues(secretBytes);
return encodeUnpaddedBase64(secretBytes);
}
static async _getOtherDeviceKey(request, client) {
const myUserId = client.getUserId();
const otherDevice = request.targetDevice;
const otherDeviceId = otherDevice ? otherDevice.deviceId : null;
const device = client.getStoredDevice(myUserId, otherDeviceId);
if (!device) {
throw new Error("could not find device " + otherDeviceId);
}
const key = device.getFingerprint();
return key;
}
static _determineMode(request, client) {
const myUserId = client.getUserId();
const otherUserId = request.otherUserId;
let mode = MODE_VERIFY_OTHER_USER;
if (myUserId === otherUserId) {
// Mode changes depending on whether or not we trust the master cross signing key
const myTrust = client.checkUserTrust(myUserId);
if (myTrust.isCrossSigningVerified()) {
mode = MODE_VERIFY_SELF_TRUSTED;
} else {
mode = MODE_VERIFY_SELF_UNTRUSTED;
}
}
return mode;
}
static _generateQrData(request, client, mode,
encodedSharedSecret, otherUserMasterKey,
otherDeviceKey, myMasterKey,
) {
const myUserId = client.getUserId();
const transactionId = request.channel.transactionId;
const qrData = {
prefix: BINARY_PREFIX,
version: CODE_VERSION,
mode,
transactionId,
firstKeyB64: '', // worked out shortly
secondKeyB64: '', // worked out shortly
secretB64: encodedSharedSecret,
};
const myCrossSigningInfo = client.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(myUserId);
if (mode === MODE_VERIFY_OTHER_USER) {
// First key is our master cross signing key
qrData.firstKeyB64 = myCrossSigningInfo.getId("master");
// Second key is the other user's master cross signing key
qrData.secondKeyB64 = otherUserMasterKey;
} else if (mode === MODE_VERIFY_SELF_TRUSTED) {
// First key is our master cross signing key
qrData.firstKeyB64 = myCrossSigningInfo.getId("master");
qrData.secondKeyB64 = otherDeviceKey;
} else if (mode === MODE_VERIFY_SELF_UNTRUSTED) {
// First key is our device's key
qrData.firstKeyB64 = client.getDeviceEd25519Key();
// Second key is what we think our master cross signing key is
qrData.secondKeyB64 = myMasterKey;
}
return qrData;
}
static _generateBuffer(qrData) {
let buf = Buffer.alloc(0); // we'll concat our way through life
const appendByte = (b) => {
const tmpBuf = Buffer.from([b]);
buf = Buffer.concat([buf, tmpBuf]);
};
const appendInt = (i) => {
const tmpBuf = Buffer.alloc(2);
tmpBuf.writeInt16BE(i, 0);
buf = Buffer.concat([buf, tmpBuf]);
};
const appendStr = (s, enc, withLengthPrefix = true) => {
const tmpBuf = Buffer.from(s, enc);
if (withLengthPrefix) appendInt(tmpBuf.byteLength);
buf = Buffer.concat([buf, tmpBuf]);
};
const appendEncBase64 = (b64) => {
const b = decodeBase64(b64);
const tmpBuf = Buffer.from(b);
buf = Buffer.concat([buf, tmpBuf]);
};
// Actually build the buffer for the QR code
appendStr(qrData.prefix, "ascii", false);
appendByte(qrData.version);
appendByte(qrData.mode);
appendStr(qrData.transactionId, "utf-8");
appendEncBase64(qrData.firstKeyB64);
appendEncBase64(qrData.secondKeyB64);
appendEncBase64(qrData.secretB64);
return buf;
}
}
+18 -10
View File
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ export class SAS extends Base {
const hashCommitment = content.commitment;
const olmSAS = new global.Olm.SAS();
try {
this._send("m.key.verification.key", {
await this._send("m.key.verification.key", {
key: olmSAS.get_pubkey(),
});
@@ -318,9 +318,13 @@ export class SAS extends Base {
const verifySAS = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
this.sasEvent = {
sas: generateSas(sasBytes, sasMethods),
confirm: () => {
this._sendMAC(olmSAS, macMethod);
resolve();
confirm: async () => {
try {
await this._sendMAC(olmSAS, macMethod);
resolve();
} catch (err) {
reject(err);
}
},
cancel: () => reject(newUserCancelledError()),
mismatch: () => reject(newMismatchedSASError()),
@@ -377,7 +381,7 @@ export class SAS extends Base {
const olmSAS = new global.Olm.SAS();
try {
const commitmentStr = olmSAS.get_pubkey() + anotherjson.stringify(content);
this._send("m.key.verification.accept", {
await this._send("m.key.verification.accept", {
key_agreement_protocol: keyAgreement,
hash: hashMethod,
message_authentication_code: macMethod,
@@ -391,7 +395,7 @@ export class SAS extends Base {
// FIXME: make sure event is properly formed
content = e.getContent();
olmSAS.set_their_key(content.key);
this._send("m.key.verification.key", {
await this._send("m.key.verification.key", {
key: olmSAS.get_pubkey(),
});
@@ -403,9 +407,13 @@ export class SAS extends Base {
const verifySAS = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
this.sasEvent = {
sas: generateSas(sasBytes, sasMethods),
confirm: () => {
this._sendMAC(olmSAS, macMethod);
resolve();
confirm: async () => {
try {
await this._sendMAC(olmSAS, macMethod);
resolve();
} catch(err) {
reject(err);
}
},
cancel: () => reject(newUserCancelledError()),
mismatch: () => reject(newMismatchedSASError()),
@@ -461,7 +469,7 @@ export class SAS extends Base {
keyList.sort().join(","),
baseInfo + "KEY_IDS",
);
this._send("m.key.verification.mac", { mac, keys });
return this._send("m.key.verification.mac", { mac, keys });
}
async _checkMAC(olmSAS, content, method) {
@@ -44,11 +44,6 @@ export class InRoomChannel {
this._requestEventId = null;
}
/** Whether this channel needs m.key.verification.done messages to be sent after a successful verification */
get needsDoneMessage() {
return true;
}
get receiveStartFromOtherDevices() {
return true;
}
@@ -183,6 +178,11 @@ export class InRoomChannel {
* @returns {Promise} a promise that resolves when any requests as an anwser to the passed-in event are sent.
*/
async handleEvent(event, request, isLiveEvent) {
// prevent processing the same event multiple times, as under
// some circumstances Room.timeline can get emitted twice for the same event
if (request.hasEventId(event.getId())) {
return;
}
const type = InRoomChannel.getEventType(event);
// do validations that need state (roomId, userId),
// ignore if invalid
@@ -61,10 +61,6 @@ export class ToDeviceChannel {
return this._deviceId;
}
get needsDoneMessage() {
return false;
}
static getEventType(event) {
return event.getType();
}
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import {
newUnexpectedMessageError,
newUnknownMethodError,
} from "../Error";
import * as olmlib from "../../olmlib";
import {QRCodeData, SCAN_QR_CODE_METHOD} from "../QRCode";
// the recommended amount of time before a verification request
// should be (automatically) cancelled without user interaction
@@ -70,10 +70,16 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
this._eventsByThem = new Map();
this._observeOnly = false;
this._timeoutTimer = null;
this._sharedSecret = null; // used for QR codes
this._accepting = false;
this._declining = false;
this._verifierHasFinished = false;
this._cancelled = false;
this._chosenMethod = null;
// we keep a copy of the QR Code data (including other user master key) around
// for QR reciprocate verification, to protect against
// cross-signing identity reset between the .ready and .start event
// and signing the wrong key after .start
this._qrCodeData = null;
}
/**
@@ -154,6 +160,11 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
return this._commonMethods;
}
/** the method picked in the .start event */
get chosenMethod() {
return this._chosenMethod;
}
/** The current remaining amount of ms before the request should be automatically cancelled */
get timeout() {
const requestEvent = this._getEventByEither(REQUEST_TYPE);
@@ -201,19 +212,34 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
this._phase !== PHASE_CANCELLED;
}
/** Only set after a .ready if the other party can scan a QR code */
get qrCodeData() {
return this._qrCodeData;
}
/** Checks whether the other party supports a given verification method.
* This is useful when setting up the QR code UI, as it is somewhat asymmetrical:
* if the other party supports SCAN_QR, we should show a QR code in the UI, and vice versa.
* For methods that need to be supported by both ends, use the `methods` property.
* @param {string} method the method to check
* @param {boolean} force to check even if the phase is not ready or started yet, internal usage
* @return {bool} whether or not the other party said the supported the method */
otherPartySupportsMethod(method) {
if (!this.ready && !this.started) {
otherPartySupportsMethod(method, force = false) {
if (!force && !this.ready && !this.started) {
return false;
}
const theirMethodEvent = this._eventsByThem.get(REQUEST_TYPE) ||
this._eventsByThem.get(READY_TYPE);
if (!theirMethodEvent) {
// if we started straight away with .start event,
// we are assuming that the other side will support the
// chosen method, so return true for that.
if (this.started && this.initiatedByMe) {
const myStartEvent = this._eventsByUs.get(START_TYPE);
const content = myStartEvent && myStartEvent.getContent();
const myStartMethod = content && content.method;
return method == myStartMethod;
}
return false;
}
const content = theirMethodEvent.getContent();
@@ -277,6 +303,10 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
return this.channel.userId;
}
get isSelfVerification() {
return this._client.getUserId() === this.otherUserId;
}
/**
* The id of the user that cancelled the request,
* only defined when phase is PHASE_CANCELLED
@@ -306,14 +336,6 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
return this._observeOnly;
}
/**
* The unpadded base64 encoded shared secret. Primarily used for QR code
* verification.
*/
get encodedSharedSecret() {
if (!this._sharedSecret) this._generateSharedSecret();
return this._sharedSecret;
}
/**
* Gets which device the verification should be started with
@@ -360,6 +382,7 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
if (!this._verifier) {
throw newUnknownMethodError();
}
this._chosenMethod = method;
}
}
return this._verifier;
@@ -373,7 +396,6 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
if (!this.observeOnly && this._phase === PHASE_UNSENT) {
const methods = [...this._verificationMethods.keys()];
await this.channel.send(REQUEST_TYPE, {methods});
this._generateSharedSecret();
}
}
@@ -406,16 +428,9 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
this._accepting = true;
this.emit("change");
await this.channel.send(READY_TYPE, {methods});
this._generateSharedSecret();
}
}
_generateSharedSecret() {
const secretBytes = new Uint8Array(8);
global.crypto.getRandomValues(secretBytes);
this._sharedSecret = olmlib.encodeUnpaddedBase64(secretBytes);
}
/**
* Can be used to listen for state changes until the callback returns true.
* @param {Function} fn callback to evaluate whether the request is in the desired state.
@@ -511,7 +526,7 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
}
const cancelEvent = this._getEventByEither(CANCEL_TYPE);
if (cancelEvent && phase() !== PHASE_DONE) {
if ((this._cancelled || cancelEvent) && phase() !== PHASE_DONE) {
transitions.push({phase: PHASE_CANCELLED, event: cancelEvent});
return transitions;
}
@@ -550,6 +565,14 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
const {method} = event.getContent();
if (!this._verifier && !this.observeOnly) {
this._verifier = this._createVerifier(method, event);
if (!this._verifier) {
this.cancel({
code: "m.unknown_method",
reason: `Unknown method: ${method}`,
});
} else {
this._chosenMethod = method;
}
}
}
}
@@ -566,6 +589,56 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
return newTransitions;
}
_isWinningStartRace(newEvent) {
if (newEvent.getType() !== START_TYPE) {
return false;
}
const oldEvent = this._verifier.startEvent;
let oldRaceIdentifier;
if (this.isSelfVerification) {
// if the verifier does not have a startEvent,
// it is because it's still sending and we are on the initator side
// we know we are sending a .start event because we already
// have a verifier (checked in calling method)
if (oldEvent) {
const oldContent = oldEvent.getContent();
oldRaceIdentifier = oldContent && oldContent.from_device;
} else {
oldRaceIdentifier = this._client.getDeviceId();
}
} else {
if (oldEvent) {
oldRaceIdentifier = oldEvent.getSender();
} else {
oldRaceIdentifier = this._client.getUserId();
}
}
let newRaceIdentifier;
if (this.isSelfVerification) {
const newContent = newEvent.getContent();
newRaceIdentifier = newContent && newContent.from_device;
} else {
newRaceIdentifier = newEvent.getSender();
}
return newRaceIdentifier < oldRaceIdentifier;
}
hasEventId(eventId) {
for (const event of this._eventsByUs.values()) {
if (event.getId() === eventId) {
return true;
}
}
for (const event of this._eventsByThem.values()) {
if (event.getId() === eventId) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Changes the state of the request and verifier in response to a key verification event.
* @param {string} type the "symbolic" event type, as returned by the `getEventType` function on the channel.
@@ -591,6 +664,18 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
}
}
// This assumes verification won't need to send an event with
// the same type for the same party twice.
// This is true for QR and SAS verification, and was
// added here to prevent verification getting cancelled
// when the server duplicates an event (https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/issues/3365)
const isDuplicateEvent = isSentByUs ?
this._eventsByUs.has(type) :
this._eventsByThem.has(type);
if (isDuplicateEvent) {
return;
}
const oldPhase = this.phase;
this._addEvent(type, event, isSentByUs);
@@ -600,16 +685,11 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
// only pass events from the other side to the verifier,
// no remote echos of our own events
if (this._verifier && !this.observeOnly) {
const oldEvent = this._verifier.startEvent;
// if the verifier does not have a startEvent, it is because it's still sending and we are on the initator side
const oldSender = oldEvent ?
oldEvent.getSender() :
this._client.getUserId();
const newEventWinsRace = event.getSender() < oldSender;
const newEventWinsRace = this._isWinningStartRace(event);
if (this._verifier.canSwitchStartEvent(event) && newEventWinsRace) {
this._verifier.switchStartEvent(event);
} else if (!isRemoteEcho) {
if (type === CANCEL_TYPE || (this._verifier.events
if (type === CANCEL_TYPE || (this._verifier.events
&& this._verifier.events.includes(type))) {
this._verifier.handleEvent(event);
}
@@ -617,6 +697,20 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
}
if (newTransitions.length) {
// create QRCodeData if the other side can scan
// important this happens before emitting a phase change,
// so listeners can rely on it being there already
// We only do this for live events because it is important that
// we sign the keys that were in the QR code, and not the keys
// we happen to have at some later point in time.
if (isLiveEvent && newTransitions.some(t => t.phase === PHASE_READY)) {
const shouldGenerateQrCode =
this.otherPartySupportsMethod(SCAN_QR_CODE_METHOD, true);
if (shouldGenerateQrCode) {
this._qrCodeData = await QRCodeData.create(this, this._client);
}
}
const lastTransition = newTransitions[newTransitions.length - 1];
const {phase} = lastTransition;
@@ -765,15 +859,26 @@ export class VerificationRequest extends EventEmitter {
return true;
}
onVerifierFinished() {
if (this.channel.needsDoneMessage) {
// verification in DM requires a done message
this.channel.send("m.key.verification.done", {});
}
this._verifierHasFinished = true;
onVerifierCancelled() {
this._cancelled = true;
// move to cancelled phase
const newTransitions = this._applyPhaseTransitions();
if (newTransitions.length) {
this._setPhase(newTransitions[newTransitions.length - 1].phase);
}
}
onVerifierFinished() {
this.channel.send("m.key.verification.done", {});
this._verifierHasFinished = true;
// move to .done phase
const newTransitions = this._applyPhaseTransitions();
if (newTransitions.length) {
this._setPhase(newTransitions[newTransitions.length - 1].phase);
}
}
getEventFromOtherParty(type) {
return this._eventsByThem.get(type);
}
}
+7
View File
@@ -44,3 +44,10 @@ InvalidCryptoStoreError.prototype = Object.create(Error.prototype, {
},
});
Reflect.setPrototypeOf(InvalidCryptoStoreError, Error);
export class KeySignatureUploadError extends Error {
constructor(message, value) {
super(message);
this.value = value;
}
}
+5 -7
View File
@@ -56,13 +56,6 @@ Filter.LAZY_LOADING_MESSAGES_FILTER = {
lazy_load_members: true,
};
Filter.LAZY_LOADING_SYNC_FILTER = {
room: {
state: Filter.LAZY_LOADING_MESSAGES_FILTER,
},
};
/**
* Get the ID of this filter on your homeserver (if known)
* @return {?Number} The filter ID
@@ -96,6 +89,7 @@ Filter.prototype.setDefinition = function(definition) {
// "state": {
// "types": ["m.room.*"],
// "not_rooms": ["!726s6s6q:example.com"],
// "lazy_load_members": true,
// },
// "timeline": {
// "limit": 10,
@@ -177,6 +171,10 @@ Filter.prototype.setTimelineLimit = function(limit) {
setProp(this.definition, "room.timeline.limit", limit);
};
Filter.prototype.setLazyLoadMembers = function(enabled) {
setProp(this.definition, "room.state.lazy_load_members", !!enabled);
};
/**
* Control whether left rooms should be included in responses.
* @param {boolean} includeLeave True to make rooms the user has left appear
+86 -8
View File
@@ -276,6 +276,9 @@ MatrixHttpApi.prototype = {
callbacks.clearTimeout(xhr.timeout_timer);
var resp;
try {
if (xhr.status === 0) {
throw new AbortError();
}
if (!xhr.responseText) {
throw new Error('No response body.');
}
@@ -789,6 +792,17 @@ const requestCallback = function(
userDefinedCallback = userDefinedCallback || function() {};
return function(err, response, body) {
if (err) {
// the unit tests use matrix-mock-request, which throw the string "aborted" when aborting a request.
// See https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-mock-request/blob/3276d0263a561b5b8326b47bae720578a2c7473a/src/index.js#L48
const aborted = err.name === "AbortError" || err === "aborted";
if (!aborted && !(err instanceof MatrixError)) {
// browser-request just throws normal Error objects,
// not `TypeError`s like fetch does. So just assume any
// error is due to the connection.
err = new ConnectionError("request failed", err);
}
}
if (!err) {
try {
if (response.statusCode >= 400) {
@@ -892,12 +906,76 @@ function getResponseContentType(response) {
* @prop {Object} data The raw Matrix error JSON used to construct this object.
* @prop {integer} httpStatus The numeric HTTP status code given
*/
export function MatrixError(errorJson) {
errorJson = errorJson || {};
this.errcode = errorJson.errcode;
this.name = errorJson.errcode || "Unknown error code";
this.message = errorJson.error || "Unknown message";
this.data = errorJson;
export class MatrixError extends Error {
constructor(errorJson) {
errorJson = errorJson || {};
super(`MatrixError: ${errorJson.errcode}`);
this.errcode = errorJson.errcode;
this.name = errorJson.errcode || "Unknown error code";
this.message = errorJson.error || "Unknown message";
this.data = errorJson;
}
}
/**
* Construct a ConnectionError. This is a JavaScript Error indicating
* that a request failed because of some error with the connection, either
* CORS was not correctly configured on the server, the server didn't response,
* the request timed out, or the internet connection on the client side went down.
* @constructor
*/
export class ConnectionError extends Error {
constructor(message, cause = undefined) {
super(message + (cause ? `: ${cause.message}` : ""));
this._cause = cause;
}
get name() {
return "ConnectionError";
}
get cause() {
return this._cause;
}
}
export class AbortError extends Error {
constructor() {
super("Operation aborted");
}
get name() {
return "AbortError";
}
}
/**
* Retries a network operation run in a callback.
* @param {number} maxAttempts maximum attempts to try
* @param {Function} callback callback that returns a promise of the network operation. If rejected with ConnectionError, it will be retried by calling the callback again.
* @return {any} the result of the network operation
* @throws {ConnectionError} If after maxAttempts the callback still throws ConnectionError
*/
export async function retryNetworkOperation(maxAttempts, callback) {
let attempts = 0;
let lastConnectionError = null;
while (attempts < maxAttempts) {
try {
if (attempts > 0) {
const timeout = 1000 * Math.pow(2, attempts);
console.log(`network operation failed ${attempts} times,` +
` retrying in ${timeout}ms...`);
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, timeout));
}
return await callback();
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof ConnectionError) {
attempts += 1;
lastConnectionError = err;
} else {
throw err;
}
}
}
throw lastConnectionError;
}
MatrixError.prototype = Object.create(Error.prototype);
MatrixError.prototype.constructor = MatrixError;
+7
View File
@@ -21,5 +21,12 @@ import request from "request";
matrixcs.request(request);
utils.runPolyfills();
try {
const crypto = require('crypto');
utils.setCrypto(crypto);
} catch (err) {
console.log('nodejs was compiled without crypto support');
}
export * from "./matrix";
export default matrixcs;
+14 -2
View File
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ InteractiveAuth.prototype = {
*/
poll: async function() {
if (!this._data.session) return;
// likewise don't poll if there is no auth session in progress
if (!this._resolveFunc) return;
// if we currently have a request in flight, there's no point making
// another just to check what the status is
if (this._submitPromise) return;
@@ -318,6 +320,8 @@ InteractiveAuth.prototype = {
try {
const result = await this._requestCallback(auth, background);
this._resolveFunc(result);
this._resolveFunc = null;
this._rejectFunc = null;
} catch (error) {
// sometimes UI auth errors don't come with flows
const errorFlows = error.data ? error.data.flows : null;
@@ -347,7 +351,13 @@ InteractiveAuth.prototype = {
error.data.session = this._data.session;
}
this._data = error.data;
this._startNextAuthStage();
try {
this._startNextAuthStage();
} catch (e) {
this._rejectFunc(e);
this._resolveFunc = null;
this._rejectFunc = null;
}
if (
!this._emailSid &&
@@ -379,8 +389,10 @@ InteractiveAuth.prototype = {
// (or not being registered, depending on what we're trying
// to do) or it could be a network failure. Either way, pass
// the failure up as the user can't complete auth if we can't
// send the email, foe whatever reason.
// send the email, for whatever reason.
this._rejectFunc(e);
this._resolveFunc = null;
this._rejectFunc = null;
} finally {
this._requestingEmailToken = false;
}
+10 -2
View File
@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ Room.prototype.hasUnverifiedDevices = async function() {
}
const e2eMembers = await this.getEncryptionTargetMembers();
for (const member of e2eMembers) {
const devices = await this._client.getStoredDevicesForUser(member.userId);
const devices = this._client.getStoredDevicesForUser(member.userId);
if (devices.some((device) => device.isUnverified())) {
return true;
}
@@ -1278,6 +1278,11 @@ Room.prototype._handleRemoteEcho = function(remoteEvent, localEvent) {
const newEventId = remoteEvent.getId();
const oldStatus = localEvent.status;
logger.debug(
`Got remote echo for event ${oldEventId} -> ${newEventId} ` +
`old status ${oldStatus}`,
);
// no longer pending
delete this._txnToEvent[remoteEvent.getUnsigned().transaction_id];
@@ -1347,7 +1352,10 @@ ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS[EventStatus.CANCELLED] =
* @fires module:client~MatrixClient#event:"Room.localEchoUpdated"
*/
Room.prototype.updatePendingEvent = function(event, newStatus, newEventId) {
logger.log(`setting pendingEvent status to ${newStatus} in ${event.getRoomId()}`);
logger.log(
`setting pendingEvent status to ${newStatus} in ${event.getRoomId()} ` +
`event ID ${event.getId()} -> ${newEventId}`,
);
// if the message was sent, we expect an event id
if (newStatus == EventStatus.SENT && !newEventId) {
+25 -2
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,15 @@ limitations under the License.
import {User} from "../models/user";
import * as utils from "../utils";
function isValidFilterId(filterId) {
const isValidStr = typeof filterId === "string" &&
!!filterId &&
filterId !== "undefined" && // exclude these as we've serialized undefined in localStorage before
filterId !== "null";
return isValidStr || typeof filterId === "number";
}
/**
* Construct a new in-memory data store for the Matrix Client.
* @constructor
@@ -273,8 +282,17 @@ MemoryStore.prototype = {
if (!this.localStorage) {
return null;
}
const key = "mxjssdk_memory_filter_" + filterName;
// XXX Storage.getItem doesn't throw ...
// or are we using something different
// than window.localStorage in some cases
// that does throw?
// that would be very naughty
try {
return this.localStorage.getItem("mxjssdk_memory_filter_" + filterName);
const value = this.localStorage.getItem(key);
if (isValidFilterId(value)) {
return value;
}
} catch (e) {}
return null;
},
@@ -288,8 +306,13 @@ MemoryStore.prototype = {
if (!this.localStorage) {
return;
}
const key = "mxjssdk_memory_filter_" + filterName;
try {
this.localStorage.setItem("mxjssdk_memory_filter_" + filterName, filterId);
if (isValidFilterId(filterId)) {
this.localStorage.setItem(key, filterId);
} else {
this.localStorage.removeItem(key);
}
} catch (e) {}
},
+11 -14
View File
@@ -511,6 +511,12 @@ SyncApi.prototype.sync = function() {
checkLazyLoadStatus(); // advance to the next stage
}
function buildDefaultFilter() {
const filter = new Filter(client.credentials.userId);
filter.setTimelineLimit(self.opts.initialSyncLimit);
return filter;
}
const checkLazyLoadStatus = async () => {
debuglog("Checking lazy load status...");
if (this.opts.lazyLoadMembers && client.isGuest()) {
@@ -520,19 +526,11 @@ SyncApi.prototype.sync = function() {
debuglog("Checking server lazy load support...");
const supported = await client.doesServerSupportLazyLoading();
if (supported) {
try {
debuglog("Creating and storing lazy load sync filter...");
this.opts.filter = await client.createFilter(
Filter.LAZY_LOADING_SYNC_FILTER,
);
debuglog("Created and stored lazy load sync filter");
} catch (err) {
logger.error(
"Creating and storing lazy load sync filter failed",
err,
);
throw err;
debuglog("Enabling lazy load on sync filter...");
if (!this.opts.filter) {
this.opts.filter = buildDefaultFilter();
}
this.opts.filter.setLazyLoadMembers(true);
} else {
debuglog("LL: lazy loading requested but not supported " +
"by server, so disabling");
@@ -575,8 +573,7 @@ SyncApi.prototype.sync = function() {
if (self.opts.filter) {
filter = self.opts.filter;
} else {
filter = new Filter(client.credentials.userId);
filter.setTimelineLimit(self.opts.initialSyncLimit);
filter = buildDefaultFilter();
}
let filterId;
+15
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ limitations under the License.
*/
import unhomoglyph from 'unhomoglyph';
import {ConnectionError} from "./http-api";
/**
* Encode a dictionary of query parameters.
@@ -734,3 +735,17 @@ export async function promiseMapSeries<T>(
export function promiseTry<T>(fn: () => T): Promise<T> {
return new Promise((resolve) => resolve(fn()));
}
// We need to be able to access the Node.js crypto library from within the
// Matrix SDK without needing to `require("crypto")`, which will fail in
// browsers. So `index.ts` will call `setCrypto` to store it, and when we need
// it, we can call `getCrypto`.
let crypto: Object;
export function setCrypto(c: Object) {
crypto = c;
}
export function getCrypto(): Object {
return crypto;
}
+14 -34
View File
@@ -165,29 +165,26 @@ MatrixCall.prototype.placeVideoCall = function(remoteVideoElement, localVideoEle
* @throws If you have not specified a listener for 'error' events.
*/
MatrixCall.prototype.placeScreenSharingCall =
function(remoteVideoElement, localVideoElement) {
async function(remoteVideoElement, localVideoElement) {
debuglog("placeScreenSharingCall");
checkForErrorListener(this);
const screenConstraints = _getScreenSharingConstraints(this);
if (!screenConstraints) {
return;
}
this.localVideoElement = localVideoElement;
this.remoteVideoElement = remoteVideoElement;
const self = this;
this.webRtc.getUserMedia(screenConstraints, function(stream) {
self.screenSharingStream = stream;
try {
self.screenSharingStream = await this.webRtc.getDisplayMedia({'audio': false});
debuglog("Got screen stream, requesting audio stream...");
const audioConstraints = _getUserMediaVideoContraints('voice');
_placeCallWithConstraints(self, audioConstraints);
}, function(err) {
} catch(err) {
self.emit("error",
callError(
MatrixCall.ERR_NO_USER_MEDIA,
"Failed to get screen-sharing stream: " + err,
),
);
});
}
this.type = 'video';
_tryPlayRemoteStream(this);
};
@@ -1231,31 +1228,6 @@ const _createPeerConnection = function(self) {
return pc;
};
const _getScreenSharingConstraints = function(call) {
const screen = global.screen;
if (!screen) {
call.emit("error", callError(
MatrixCall.ERR_NO_USER_MEDIA,
"Couldn't determine screen sharing constaints.",
));
return;
}
return {
video: {
mediaSource: 'screen',
mandatory: {
chromeMediaSource: "screen",
chromeMediaSourceId: "" + Date.now(),
maxWidth: screen.width,
maxHeight: screen.height,
minFrameRate: 1,
maxFrameRate: 10,
},
},
};
};
const _getUserMediaVideoContraints = function(callType) {
const isWebkit = !!global.window.navigator.webkitGetUserMedia;
@@ -1371,6 +1343,14 @@ export function createNewMatrixCall(client, roomId, options) {
};
}
const getDisplayMedia = (
w.navigator.mediaDevices && w.navigator.mediaDevices.getDisplayMedia ||
w.navigator.getDisplayMedia
);
if (getDisplayMedia) {
webRtc.getDisplayMedia = getDisplayMedia.bind(w.navigator.mediaDevices);
}
// Firefox throws on so little as accessing the RTCPeerConnection when operating in
// a secure mode. There's some information at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1542616
// though the concern is that the browser throwing a SecurityError will brick the
+528 -443
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