mirror of
https://github.com/supabase/supabase.git
synced 2026-10-11 04:15:04 +03:00
## I have read the [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/supabase/supabase/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) file. YES ## What kind of change does this PR introduce? Refactor / security hardening — continues the analytics SQL provenance-tracking series (PR 8). ## What is the current behavior? - `generateRegexpWhere` (unsafe: interpolates user-controlled filter keys/values without escaping) still exists alongside `generateRegexpWhereSafe` and its tests only cover the old function. - `usePostgrestOverviewMetrics` builds a SQL query string with plain string interpolation and calls the analytics endpoint directly via `get()`. - `edge-functions-last-hour-stats-query` builds a SQL query with `functionIds` escaped via Postgres-only `quoteLiteral` and calls the analytics endpoint directly via `post()`. - `executeAnalyticsSql` has no way to pass a `key` query-string param for network-tool identification. - `rawSql('minute')` / `rawSql('hour')` / `rawSql('day')` and `rawSql(value ? 'true' : 'false')` are used for static strings that could be expressed with the `safeSql` template tag. ## What is the new behavior? - `generateRegexpWhere` is deleted; its tests are replaced with `generateRegexpWhereSafe` coverage including injection-attempt cases (`level OR id IS NOT NULL`, `request.method); DROP TABLE edge_logs; --`) that verify predicates are silently dropped rather than emitted. - `usePostgrestOverviewMetrics` returns `SafeLogSqlFragment` from its SQL builder and routes through `executeAnalyticsSql`. - `edge-functions-last-hour-stats-query` uses `analyticsLiteral` (BigQuery/ClickHouse-correct escaping) instead of `quoteLiteral` (Postgres-only) and routes through `executeAnalyticsSql`. - `executeAnalyticsSql` accepts an optional `key?: string` forwarded as a query-string param on both GET and POST requests; `key: 'last-hour-stats'` is restored on the edge-functions query. - Static `rawSql('...')` calls replaced with `safeSql\`...\`` template literals throughout. ## Additional context <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit ## Bug Fixes - Removed legacy unsafe SQL-filter utility from Reports ## Chores - Enhanced analytics SQL execution infrastructure with improved error handling - Added optional request identification parameter to analytics query execution - Refined SQL filtering mechanisms in reporting features <!-- review_stack_entry_start --> [](https://app.coderabbit.ai/change-stack/supabase/supabase/pull/46466?utm_source=github_walkthrough&utm_medium=github&utm_campaign=change_stack) <!-- review_stack_entry_end --> <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
159 lines
6.2 KiB
TypeScript
159 lines
6.2 KiB
TypeScript
// SECURITY MODEL — Proven authorship for analytics SQL
|
|
//
|
|
// Analytics queries (BigQuery for legacy cloud, ClickHouse for self-hosted OTEL)
|
|
// carry the same injection risk as Postgres queries: filter keys, values, and
|
|
// other fragments that originate from URL parameters, UI inputs, or LLM output
|
|
// can be spliced into SQL that is executed on behalf of the project. The pattern
|
|
// here mirrors the pg-meta safe-SQL model described in
|
|
// .claude/skills/safe-sql-execution/SKILL.md: every value that flows from an
|
|
// external source must pass through a sanitization helper before being
|
|
// interpolated, and the wire boundary (`executeAnalyticsSql`) refuses plain
|
|
// strings at compile time.
|
|
//
|
|
// pg-meta's `literal()` and `ident()` are Postgres-specific: `literal()` emits
|
|
// `E'…'` for backslash-bearing strings and `::jsonb` casts for objects;
|
|
// `ident()` quotes identifiers with double-quotes, which BigQuery rejects
|
|
// (double-quoted tokens are string literals there, not identifiers). We add
|
|
// analytics-engine-specific helpers here rather than extend pg-meta, which
|
|
// would cross-cut unrelated Postgres callers.
|
|
//
|
|
// The brand `SafeLogSqlFragment` is intentionally distinct from pg-meta's
|
|
// `SafeSqlFragment`: escaping that is safe for Postgres (`E'…'` strings,
|
|
// `::jsonb` casts, double-quoted identifiers) is not safe for BigQuery or
|
|
// ClickHouse, and vice versa. Keeping the brands disjoint prevents a
|
|
// Postgres-escaped fragment from being composed into an analytics query
|
|
// (or vice versa) and silently emitting unsafe SQL.
|
|
//
|
|
// String literals: ClickHouse and BigQuery share the same convention —
|
|
// double the single quote (`''`) and double the backslash (`\\`), inside
|
|
// plain `'…'` delimiters.
|
|
//
|
|
// Identifiers: BigQuery requires backticks. ClickHouse accepts both
|
|
// backticks and double-quotes; we use double-quotes (SQL-standard form).
|
|
// In both engines a backslash inside a quoted identifier is an escape
|
|
// character, so we reject any non-`[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*` input rather than
|
|
// try to escape it — column names never need special characters in practice.
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* A branded string type representing a SQL fragment that is safe to compose
|
|
* into BigQuery or ClickHouse queries. Intentionally distinct from pg-meta's
|
|
* `SafeSqlFragment` (Postgres-only).
|
|
*
|
|
* Values of this type are either:
|
|
* - Static strings in source code (no interpolation) via `rawSql`
|
|
* - Outputs of `analyticsLiteral` or `quotedIdent`
|
|
* - Compositions via the `safeSql` template tag (which only accepts
|
|
* `SafeLogSqlFragment` interpolations)
|
|
* - Compositions via `joinSqlFragments`
|
|
*
|
|
* Never cast arbitrary strings to this type.
|
|
*/
|
|
export type SafeLogSqlFragment = string & { readonly __safeLogSqlFragmentBrand: never }
|
|
|
|
export type LogSqlFragmentSeparator =
|
|
| ','
|
|
| ', '
|
|
| ';\n'
|
|
| ' and '
|
|
| ' AND '
|
|
| ' or '
|
|
| ' OR '
|
|
| ' union all '
|
|
| ' union '
|
|
| ' UNION ALL '
|
|
| ' UNION '
|
|
| '\n'
|
|
| '\n\n'
|
|
| ' '
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Tagged template literal for composing log-SQL fragments safely.
|
|
* Only accepts `SafeLogSqlFragment` interpolations — plain strings and
|
|
* Postgres-branded `SafeSqlFragment` values are rejected at compile time.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function safeSql(
|
|
strings: TemplateStringsArray,
|
|
...interpolated: Array<SafeLogSqlFragment>
|
|
): SafeLogSqlFragment {
|
|
return strings.reduce(
|
|
(result, string, i) => result + string + (interpolated[i] ?? ''),
|
|
''
|
|
) as SafeLogSqlFragment
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Marks a hand-written log-SQL string as a `SafeLogSqlFragment`. Use only
|
|
* for static SQL authored in source code; never call with arbitrary input.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function rawSql(sql: string): SafeLogSqlFragment {
|
|
return sql as SafeLogSqlFragment
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Joins already-safe log-SQL fragments with a fixed structural separator. */
|
|
export function joinSqlFragments(
|
|
fragments: Array<SafeLogSqlFragment>,
|
|
separator: LogSqlFragmentSeparator
|
|
): SafeLogSqlFragment {
|
|
return fragments.join(separator) as SafeLogSqlFragment
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function analyticsLiteral(value: string | number | boolean): SafeLogSqlFragment {
|
|
if (typeof value === 'number') {
|
|
if (!Number.isFinite(value)) {
|
|
throw new Error('analyticsLiteral: non-finite numbers are not supported')
|
|
}
|
|
return rawSql(String(value))
|
|
}
|
|
if (typeof value === 'boolean') {
|
|
return value ? safeSql`true` : safeSql`false`
|
|
}
|
|
if (typeof value !== 'string') {
|
|
throw new Error('analyticsLiteral: only string, number, or boolean inputs are supported')
|
|
}
|
|
let escaped = ''
|
|
for (const c of value) {
|
|
if (c === "'") escaped += "''"
|
|
else if (c === '\\') escaped += '\\\\'
|
|
else escaped += c
|
|
}
|
|
return rawSql(`'${escaped}'`)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const SAFE_IDENT_RE = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Validates `value` against an allow-list of pre-branded fragments and returns
|
|
* the matching fragment. Use for SQL operators or keywords where the permitted
|
|
* set is known at compile time (e.g. `keyword(op, [safeSql`AND`, safeSql`OR`])`).
|
|
* Matching is case-insensitive (SQL keywords are case-insensitive by convention);
|
|
* the returned value is always the allow-listed fragment, never the raw input.
|
|
* Throws if `value` does not match any fragment in `allowed`.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function keyword(value: string, allowed: readonly SafeLogSqlFragment[]): SafeLogSqlFragment {
|
|
const lower = value.toLowerCase()
|
|
const match = allowed.find((frag) => frag.toLowerCase() === lower)
|
|
if (match === undefined) {
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
`keyword: "${value}" is not in the allowed list [${allowed.map((s) => `"${s}"`).join(', ')}]`
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
return match
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Backtick-quotes each segment of a dotted identifier path, validating each against
|
|
* `[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*`. Accepts `a`, `a.b`, or `a.b.c`.
|
|
* Example: `quotedIdent('request.method')` → `` `request`.`method` ``
|
|
*
|
|
* Backticks are accepted by both BigQuery and ClickHouse, so this function serves
|
|
* both engines. Per-segment quoting handles reserved-word segments (e.g. `` `type` ``)
|
|
* and works for table path references and UNNEST alias field accesses alike.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function quotedIdent(value: string): SafeLogSqlFragment {
|
|
const segments = value.split('.')
|
|
if (segments.length === 0 || segments.some((s) => !SAFE_IDENT_RE.test(s))) {
|
|
throw new Error(`quotedIdent: invalid identifier "${value}"`)
|
|
}
|
|
return rawSql(segments.map((s) => '`' + s + '`').join('.'))
|
|
}
|