diff --git a/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/MCPToolScopeMappings.ts b/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/MCPToolScopeMappings.ts
index 20932566e42..7e2b8da4823 100644
--- a/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/MCPToolScopeMappings.ts
+++ b/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/MCPToolScopeMappings.ts
@@ -4,36 +4,53 @@ import { McpMap } from '@/data/scoped-access-tokens/permission-scope-map-query'
 
 const { OAuthScope } = constants
 
-// Manually extracted from platform mcp controller code
-const MCPToolOAuthScopeMapping = {
-  apply_migration: [OAuthScope.DATABASE_WRITE],
-  create_branch: [OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_WRITE],
-  create_project: [OAuthScope.PROJECTS_WRITE],
-  delete_branch: [OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_WRITE],
-  deploy_edge_function: [OAuthScope.EDGE_FUNCTIONS_WRITE],
-  execute_sql: [OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ, OAuthScope.DATABASE_WRITE],
-  generate_typescript_types: [OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ],
-  get_security_advisors: [OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ],
-  get_performance_advisors: [OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ],
-  get_edge_function: [OAuthScope.EDGE_FUNCTIONS_READ],
-  get_logs: [OAuthScope.ANALYTICS_READ],
-  get_organization: [OAuthScope.ORGANIZATIONS_READ],
-  get_project: [OAuthScope.PROJECTS_READ],
-  get_project_url: [OAuthScope.PROJECTS_READ],
-  get_publishable_keys: [OAuthScope.SECRETS_READ],
-  get_storage_config: [OAuthScope.STORAGE_READ],
-  list_branches: [OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_READ],
-  list_edge_functions: [OAuthScope.EDGE_FUNCTIONS_READ],
-  list_migrations: [OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ],
-  list_organizations: [OAuthScope.ORGANIZATIONS_READ],
-  list_projects: [OAuthScope.PROJECTS_READ],
-  list_storage_buckets: [OAuthScope.STORAGE_READ],
-  merge_branch: [OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_WRITE],
-  pause_project: [OAuthScope.PROJECTS_WRITE],
-  rebase_branch: [OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_WRITE],
-  reset_branch: [OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_WRITE],
-  restore_project: [OAuthScope.PROJECTS_WRITE],
-  update_storage_config: [OAuthScope.STORAGE_WRITE],
+type OAuthScopeValue = (typeof OAuthScope)[keyof typeof OAuthScope]
+
+// Manually extracted from platform mcp controller code. Each tool maps to alternative OAuth-scope
+// groups with the same semantics as ScopeGroupAlternatives: a token can call the tool when it
+// holds ALL scopes of at least ONE group (OR between groups, AND within a group). Most tools
+// assert a single scope; execute_sql asserts database:read OR database:write depending on the
+// session's read_only mode (mcp.controller.ts), so it carries two alternatives.
+const MCPToolOAuthScopeMapping: Record<string, OAuthScopeValue[][]> = {
+  apply_migration: [[OAuthScope.DATABASE_WRITE]],
+  // Computes a local confirmation hash without calling the platform — no scope gates it.
+  confirm_cost: [[]],
+  create_branch: [[OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_WRITE]],
+  create_project: [[OAuthScope.PROJECTS_WRITE]],
+  delete_branch: [[OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_WRITE]],
+  deploy_edge_function: [[OAuthScope.EDGE_FUNCTIONS_WRITE]],
+  execute_sql: [[OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ], [OAuthScope.DATABASE_WRITE]],
+  generate_typescript_types: [[OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ]],
+  get_advisors: [[OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ]],
+  // Calls getOrganization + listProjects to price a project, so it needs both read scopes.
+  // (The type=branch path returns a constant with no platform call; gating on the project
+  // path's scopes fails closed for branch-only pricing, which is fine for advisory display.)
+  get_cost: [[OAuthScope.ORGANIZATIONS_READ, OAuthScope.PROJECTS_READ]],
+  get_edge_function: [[OAuthScope.EDGE_FUNCTIONS_READ]],
+  get_logs: [[OAuthScope.ANALYTICS_READ]],
+  get_organization: [[OAuthScope.ORGANIZATIONS_READ]],
+  get_project: [[OAuthScope.PROJECTS_READ]],
+  get_project_url: [[OAuthScope.PROJECTS_READ]],
+  get_publishable_keys: [[OAuthScope.SECRETS_READ]],
+  get_storage_config: [[OAuthScope.STORAGE_READ]],
+  list_branches: [[OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_READ]],
+  list_edge_functions: [[OAuthScope.EDGE_FUNCTIONS_READ]],
+  // Runs through executeSql with read_only forced true.
+  list_extensions: [[OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ]],
+  list_migrations: [[OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ]],
+  list_organizations: [[OAuthScope.ORGANIZATIONS_READ]],
+  list_projects: [[OAuthScope.PROJECTS_READ]],
+  list_storage_buckets: [[OAuthScope.STORAGE_READ]],
+  // Runs through executeSql with read_only forced true.
+  list_tables: [[OAuthScope.DATABASE_READ]],
+  merge_branch: [[OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_WRITE]],
+  pause_project: [[OAuthScope.PROJECTS_WRITE]],
+  rebase_branch: [[OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_WRITE]],
+  reset_branch: [[OAuthScope.ENVIRONMENT_WRITE]],
+  restore_project: [[OAuthScope.PROJECTS_WRITE]],
+  // Queries the public content API — no scope gates it.
+  search_docs: [[]],
+  update_storage_config: [[OAuthScope.STORAGE_WRITE]],
 }
 
 type ExtractIds<T> = {
@@ -157,17 +174,30 @@ export const legacyOauthScopeToFgaPermissionMap: Record<string, string[]> = {
 }
 
 /*
- * Build a map of MCP tools/FGA permissions by mapping their OAuth Scopes to the FGA permissions:
+ * Build a map of MCP tools/FGA permissions by expanding each OAuth-scope group to the FGA
+ * permissions it implies:
  * {
- *    apply_migration: ["project_admin_write", ...]
+ *    execute_sql: [["snippets_read", "database_read", ...], ["project_admin_write", ...]]
  * }
+ * Groups are expanded independently, preserving the OR-of-AND structure. A group is an AND, so it
+ * is kept only when every one of its scopes maps to at least one FGA permission — a partial
+ * expansion would weaken the requirement (e.g. [ORGANIZATIONS_READ, PROJECTS_READ] shrinking to
+ * projects_read alone). A group with any unmapped scope is dropped whole, so the tool stays gated
+ * rather than becoming ungated; an explicitly empty group ([]) is the deliberate ungated marker
+ * and is vacuously kept.
  * The code is duplicated from platform until we find a better way to share those mappings
  */
+export const expandOAuthScopeGroups = (
+  oAuthScopeGroups: string[][],
+  fgaPermissionMap: Record<string, string[]>
+): string[][] =>
+  oAuthScopeGroups
+    .filter((group) => group.every((oAuthScope) => (fgaPermissionMap[oAuthScope] ?? []).length > 0))
+    .map((group) => group.flatMap((oAuthScope) => fgaPermissionMap[oAuthScope] ?? []))
+
 export const MCPToolScopeMappings = Object.entries(MCPToolOAuthScopeMapping).reduce(
-  (acc, [mcpTool, oAuthScopes]) => {
-    acc[mcpTool] = oAuthScopes.flatMap(
-      (oAuthScope) => legacyOauthScopeToFgaPermissionMap[oAuthScope]
-    )
+  (acc, [mcpTool, oAuthScopeGroups]) => {
+    acc[mcpTool] = expandOAuthScopeGroups(oAuthScopeGroups, legacyOauthScopeToFgaPermissionMap)
     return acc
   },
   {} as McpMap
diff --git a/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/buildAPIPermissionScopeMap.test.ts b/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/buildAPIPermissionScopeMap.test.ts
index 367d6b3917f..d59a83bbd63 100644
--- a/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/buildAPIPermissionScopeMap.test.ts
+++ b/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/buildAPIPermissionScopeMap.test.ts
@@ -1,8 +1,16 @@
+import { http, HttpResponse } from 'msw'
 import { describe, expect, test } from 'vitest'
 
-import { getEndpointsAndMCPToolsForAPI } from './buildAPIPermissionScopeMap'
+import {
+  addMCPToolsToScopes,
+  buildAPIPermissionScopeMap,
+  getScopesAndEndpointsForAPI,
+} from './buildAPIPermissionScopeMap'
+import { expandOAuthScopeGroups, MCPToolScopeMappings } from './MCPToolScopeMappings'
+import { type ScopeMap } from '@/data/scoped-access-tokens/permission-scope-map-query'
+import { mswServer } from '@/tests/lib/msw'
 
-describe('getEndpointsAndMCPToolsForAPI', () => {
+describe('getScopesAndEndpointsForAPI', () => {
   const openAPISpecs = {
     paths: {
       '/v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations': {
@@ -18,36 +26,285 @@ describe('getEndpointsAndMCPToolsForAPI', () => {
           'x-fga-permissions': [['database_migrations_write']],
         },
       },
+      // Alternative groups: development OR production (real shape of the branching endpoints)
+      '/v1/projects/{ref}/branches': {
+        get: {
+          'x-fga-permissions': [['branching_development_read'], ['branching_production_read']],
+        },
+      },
+      // No annotation -> not part of the map
+      '/v1/projects/available-regions': {
+        get: {},
+      },
     },
   }
 
-  const mcp_tools = {
-    list_migrations: ['database_migrations_read'],
-    apply_migration: ['database_migrations_write', 'database_write'],
-  }
-
-  test('returns an object with permissions as keys and endpoints and mcp_tools as values', () => {
-    const permissionScopeMap = getEndpointsAndMCPToolsForAPI(openAPISpecs, mcp_tools)
+  test('indexes scopes and endpoints, preserving alternative permission groups', () => {
+    const permissionScopeMap = getScopesAndEndpointsForAPI(openAPISpecs)
 
     expect(permissionScopeMap).toEqual({
       scopes: {
         database_migrations_read: {
           endpoints: ['GET /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations'],
-          mcp_tools: ['list_migrations'],
+          mcp_tools: [],
         },
         database_migrations_write: {
           endpoints: [
             'POST /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations',
             'PATCH /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations/{version}',
           ],
-          mcp_tools: ['apply_migration'],
+          mcp_tools: [],
+        },
+        branching_development_read: {
+          endpoints: ['GET /v1/projects/{ref}/branches'],
+          mcp_tools: [],
+        },
+        branching_production_read: {
+          endpoints: ['GET /v1/projects/{ref}/branches'],
+          mcp_tools: [],
         },
       },
       endpoints: {
-        'GET /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations': ['database_migrations_read'],
-        'POST /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations': ['database_migrations_write'],
-        'PATCH /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations/{version}': ['database_migrations_write'],
+        'GET /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations': [['database_migrations_read']],
+        'POST /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations': [['database_migrations_write']],
+        'PATCH /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations/{version}': [['database_migrations_write']],
+        'GET /v1/projects/{ref}/branches': [
+          ['branching_development_read'],
+          ['branching_production_read'],
+        ],
       },
     })
   })
+
+  // An endpoint recorded with zero groups would read as ungated and be reported callable by every
+  // token, so unusable annotations must drop the endpoint instead.
+  test('drops endpoints with empty or unusable permission groups rather than marking them ungated', () => {
+    const { endpoints, scopes } = getScopesAndEndpointsForAPI({
+      paths: {
+        '/v1/empty-groups': { get: { 'x-fga-permissions': [[], undefined] } },
+        '/v1/unannotated': { get: {} },
+      },
+    })
+
+    expect(endpoints).toEqual({})
+    expect(scopes).toEqual({})
+  })
+})
+
+describe('addMCPToolsToScopes', () => {
+  test('assigns tools to every scope in any of their groups, without duplicates', () => {
+    const scopes: ScopeMap = {
+      database_migrations_read: {
+        endpoints: ['GET /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations'],
+        mcp_tools: [],
+      },
+      database_migrations_write: { endpoints: [], mcp_tools: ['apply_migration'] },
+    }
+
+    addMCPToolsToScopes(scopes, {
+      list_migrations: [['database_migrations_read']],
+      apply_migration: [['database_migrations_write'], ['database_migrations_read']],
+    })
+
+    expect(scopes).toEqual({
+      database_migrations_read: {
+        endpoints: ['GET /v1/projects/{ref}/database/migrations'],
+        mcp_tools: ['list_migrations', 'apply_migration'],
+      },
+      database_migrations_write: { endpoints: [], mcp_tools: ['apply_migration'] },
+    })
+  })
+
+  test('initializes scopes that only MCP tools reference', () => {
+    const scopes: ScopeMap = {}
+
+    addMCPToolsToScopes(scopes, { update_storage_config: [['storage_config_write']] })
+
+    expect(scopes.storage_config_write).toEqual({
+      endpoints: [],
+      mcp_tools: ['update_storage_config'],
+    })
+  })
+
+  test('leaves ungated tools out of the scope index', () => {
+    const scopes: ScopeMap = {}
+
+    addMCPToolsToScopes(scopes, { search_docs: [[]] })
+
+    expect(scopes).toEqual({})
+  })
+})
+
+describe('MCPToolScopeMappings', () => {
+  // Platform gates execute_sql on database:read OR database:write depending on the MCP session's
+  // read_only mode (mcp.controller.ts), so the derived requirement must be two alternatives — a
+  // single conjunctive group would hide the tool from read-only tokens the platform accepts.
+  test('execute_sql derives the database:read bundle OR the database:write bundle', () => {
+    expect(MCPToolScopeMappings.execute_sql).toHaveLength(2)
+    const [readGroup, writeGroup] = MCPToolScopeMappings.execute_sql
+    expect(readGroup).toContain('database_read')
+    expect(readGroup).not.toContain('database_write')
+    expect(writeGroup).toContain('database_write')
+  })
+
+  test('single-scope tools derive a single conjunctive group', () => {
+    expect(MCPToolScopeMappings.apply_migration).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(MCPToolScopeMappings.apply_migration[0]).toContain('database_write')
+  })
+
+  test('tools without a platform scope gate stay ungated ([[]]), not disabled ([])', () => {
+    expect(MCPToolScopeMappings.confirm_cost).toEqual([[]])
+    expect(MCPToolScopeMappings.search_docs).toEqual([[]])
+  })
+
+  // A group is an AND: expanding only its mapped scopes would weaken the requirement (e.g.
+  // [organizations:read, projects:read] shrinking to projects_read alone) and report the tool
+  // enabled for an incomplete grant.
+  test('a group with any unmapped scope is dropped whole, not partially expanded', () => {
+    const map = { 'projects:read': ['projects_read'] }
+
+    expect(expandOAuthScopeGroups([['organizations:read', 'projects:read']], map)).toEqual([])
+    // Other alternatives and the ungated marker survive the drop untouched.
+    expect(expandOAuthScopeGroups([['organizations:read'], ['projects:read'], []], map)).toEqual([
+      ['projects_read'],
+      [],
+    ])
+  })
+
+  // Guards the OAuth-scope -> legacy-map join: a scope key drifting out of the legacy map must
+  // not inject undefined into the payload (flatMap doesn't flatten it) or silently disable a
+  // gated tool by dropping all its groups.
+  test('every derived group is non-empty strings, and only the ungated tools lack scopes', () => {
+    const ungated = ['confirm_cost', 'search_docs']
+    for (const [tool, groups] of Object.entries(MCPToolScopeMappings)) {
+      expect(groups.length, `${tool} lost all its alternatives`).toBeGreaterThan(0)
+      for (const group of groups) {
+        if (!ungated.includes(tool))
+          expect(group.length, `${tool} has an empty group`).toBeGreaterThan(0)
+        for (const scope of group)
+          expect(typeof scope, `${tool} leaked a non-string scope`).toBe('string')
+      }
+    }
+  })
+
+  test('get_cost requires both organization and project read bundles together', () => {
+    expect(MCPToolScopeMappings.get_cost).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(MCPToolScopeMappings.get_cost[0]).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining(['organizations_read', 'projects_read'])
+    )
+  })
+
+  // Drift guard: the exact tool registry of @supabase/mcp-server-supabase@0.8.1, the version the
+  // platform pins. When the platform bumps the MCP server, this list (and the mapping) must be
+  // re-derived from the controller's assertMcpOAuthScope calls.
+  test('covers exactly the tool registry of the deployed MCP server', () => {
+    expect(Object.keys(MCPToolScopeMappings).sort()).toEqual([
+      'apply_migration',
+      'confirm_cost',
+      'create_branch',
+      'create_project',
+      'delete_branch',
+      'deploy_edge_function',
+      'execute_sql',
+      'generate_typescript_types',
+      'get_advisors',
+      'get_cost',
+      'get_edge_function',
+      'get_logs',
+      'get_organization',
+      'get_project',
+      'get_project_url',
+      'get_publishable_keys',
+      'get_storage_config',
+      'list_branches',
+      'list_edge_functions',
+      'list_extensions',
+      'list_migrations',
+      'list_organizations',
+      'list_projects',
+      'list_storage_buckets',
+      'list_tables',
+      'merge_branch',
+      'pause_project',
+      'rebase_branch',
+      'reset_branch',
+      'restore_project',
+      'search_docs',
+      'update_storage_config',
+    ])
+  })
+})
+
+describe('buildAPIPermissionScopeMap', () => {
+  // vitestSetup starts mswServer with `onUnhandledRequest: 'error'` and resets handlers between
+  // tests, so mocking here keeps that guard instead of replacing global fetch.
+  const stubSpecs = (v1: Record<string, unknown>, v2: Record<string, unknown>) => {
+    mswServer.use(
+      http.get('*/api/v1-json', () => HttpResponse.json(v1)),
+      http.get('*/api/v2-json', () => HttpResponse.json(v2))
+    )
+  }
+
+  test('merges both specs, attaching each MCP tool to a shared scope exactly once', async () => {
+    stubSpecs(
+      {
+        paths: {
+          '/v1/projects/{ref}/database/query': {
+            post: { 'x-fga-permissions': [['database_read']] },
+          },
+        },
+      },
+      {
+        paths: {
+          '/v2/projects/{ref}/inspect': { get: { 'x-fga-permissions': [['database_read']] } },
+        },
+      }
+    )
+
+    const map = await buildAPIPermissionScopeMap()
+
+    // Both specs contribute an endpoint to the same scope, and neither is duplicated
+    expect(map.scopes.database_read.endpoints).toEqual([
+      'POST /v1/projects/{ref}/database/query',
+      'GET /v2/projects/{ref}/inspect',
+    ])
+    // The tools were attached after the merge, so a scope shared by both specs lists each once
+    const tools = map.scopes.database_read.mcp_tools
+    expect(new Set(tools).size).toBe(tools.length)
+    expect(tools).toContain('execute_sql')
+  })
+
+  // Path items may legally carry non-operation members; the specs are fetched live, so a benign
+  // upstream swagger change must not start 500ing this route.
+  test('tolerates path items with non-method OpenAPI members', async () => {
+    stubSpecs(
+      {
+        paths: {
+          '/v1/projects/{ref}': {
+            parameters: [{ name: 'ref', in: 'path', required: true }],
+            summary: 'Project detail',
+            get: { 'x-fga-permissions': [['project_admin_read']] },
+          },
+        },
+      },
+      { paths: {} }
+    )
+
+    const map = await buildAPIPermissionScopeMap()
+
+    expect(map.endpoints['GET /v1/projects/{ref}']).toEqual([['project_admin_read']])
+    expect(Object.keys(map.endpoints)).toHaveLength(1)
+  })
+
+  test('returns a copy of the tool mapping so callers cannot corrupt the module singleton', async () => {
+    stubSpecs({ paths: {} }, { paths: {} })
+
+    const map = await buildAPIPermissionScopeMap()
+    expect(map.mcp_tools).toEqual(MCPToolScopeMappings)
+    expect(map.mcp_tools).not.toBe(MCPToolScopeMappings)
+
+    const before = structuredClone(MCPToolScopeMappings.execute_sql)
+    map.mcp_tools.execute_sql.push(['tampered'])
+    expect(MCPToolScopeMappings.execute_sql).toEqual(before)
+  })
 })
diff --git a/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/buildAPIPermissionScopeMap.ts b/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/buildAPIPermissionScopeMap.ts
index 57c7ffc70f0..b6b568e6022 100644
--- a/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/buildAPIPermissionScopeMap.ts
+++ b/apps/studio/app/api/scoped-access-token-permissions/buildAPIPermissionScopeMap.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import lodash from 'lodash'
+import { cloneDeep } from 'lodash'
 import z from 'zod'
 
 // We don't have an OpenAPI that describes mcp tools security requirements so
@@ -12,96 +12,107 @@ import {
 } from '@/data/scoped-access-tokens/permission-scope-map-query'
 import { InternalServerError } from '@/lib/api/apiHelpers'
 
-// Default lodash merge does not correctly merge arrays so this custom merger fixes it
-function mergeArrays(objValue: unknown, srcValue: unknown) {
-  if (Array.isArray(objValue) && Array.isArray(srcValue)) {
-    return objValue.concat(srcValue)
-  }
-}
-
 /*
  * Builds the permissions/endpoint mapping by fetching the OpenAPI specs for our v1 and v2 APIs.
+ * The two specs are indexed together rather than merged afterwards: every v1 path starts with
+ * `/v1/` and every v2 path with `/v2/`, so they can't collide, and one pass de-duplicates a
+ * scope's endpoint list by construction.
  * @throws InternalServerError when it can't fetch the OpenAPI specs
  */
 export const buildAPIPermissionScopeMap = async (): Promise<PermissionScopeMap> => {
-  // Get the permissions map for the API v1
-  const apiV1SpecsJSON = await fetchAPIPermissionScope('v1')
+  const [apiV1SpecsJSON, apiV2SpecsJSON] = await Promise.all([
+    fetchAPIPermissionScope('v1'),
+    fetchAPIPermissionScope('v2'),
+  ])
   const apiV1Specs = API_SPECS_SCHEMA.parse(apiV1SpecsJSON)
-  const permissionScopeMapV1 = getEndpointsAndMCPToolsForAPI(apiV1Specs, MCPToolScopeMappings)
-
-  // Get the permissions map for the API v2
-  const apiV2SpecsJSON = await fetchAPIPermissionScope('v2')
   const apiV2Specs = API_SPECS_SCHEMA.parse(apiV2SpecsJSON)
-  const permissionScopeMapV2 = getEndpointsAndMCPToolsForAPI(apiV2Specs, MCPToolScopeMappings)
 
-  const permissionScope = lodash.mergeWith(
-    { mcp_tools: MCPToolScopeMappings },
-    permissionScopeMapV1,
-    permissionScopeMapV2,
-    mergeArrays
-  )
+  const { scopes, endpoints } = getScopesAndEndpointsForAPI({
+    paths: { ...apiV1Specs.paths, ...apiV2Specs.paths },
+  })
+  addMCPToolsToScopes(scopes, MCPToolScopeMappings)
 
-  return permissionScope
+  return {
+    scopes,
+    endpoints,
+    // Deep copy so a caller mutating the response can't corrupt the module-level mapping, which
+    // outlives every request in a long-running server.
+    mcp_tools: cloneDeep(MCPToolScopeMappings),
+  }
 }
 
 // OPEN API specs look like this (only kept the parts we're interested in):
 // {
 //   "paths": {
-//     "/v2/projects/{ref}/analytics/log-drains": {
+//     "/v1/projects/{ref}/branches": {
 //       "get": {
 //         "x-fga-permissions": [
-//           [
-//             "analytics_config_read"
-//           ]
+//           ["branching_development_read"],
+//           ["branching_production_read"]
 //         ]
 //       }
 //     }
 //   }
 // }
-export const getEndpointsAndMCPToolsForAPI = (
-  apiSpecs: z.output<typeof API_SPECS_SCHEMA>,
-  mcp_tools: McpMap
+// The extension value is a list of alternative permission groups: a token needs ALL permissions
+// of at least ONE group (OR between groups, AND within a group). Groups must be preserved verbatim,
+// not flattened, or OR-alternatives (e.g. development vs production branching) turn into impossible
+// conjunctions. An endpoint with no usable group is dropped entirely rather than recorded with an
+// empty requirement, which would read as "ungated" and mark it callable by every token.
+//
+// KNOWN DIVERGENCE: annotations are trusted verbatim, and the one on
+// POST /v1/projects/{ref}/database/query overstates access — the spec publishes
+// `[[database_read], [database_write]]`, but the route's guard requires database_read outright and
+// the write group is doc-only (see the execute_sql entry in MCPToolScopeMappings.ts). A token
+// granted only database_write is therefore shown this endpoint as callable when the guard would
+// reject it. Studio-created tokens can't hit this (write mode always grants the read scopes too),
+// so this stays a display inaccuracy for API-created tokens; the fix is correcting the annotation
+// upstream in the mgmt-api, not special-casing it here.
+export const getScopesAndEndpointsForAPI = (
+  apiSpecs: z.output<typeof API_SPECS_SCHEMA>
 ): Omit<PermissionScopeMap, 'mcp_tools'> => {
   const scopes: ScopeMap = {}
   const endpoints: EndpointMap = {}
 
-  // Loop over each API path to assign endpoints to their scopes and
-  // scopes to their endpoints
+  // Loop over each API path to record endpoint permission groups and index scopes -> endpoints
   Object.entries(apiSpecs.paths).forEach(([path, methods]) => {
     // Loop over each API path method (get, post, etc.)
     Object.entries(methods).forEach(([method, methodSpecs]) => {
       const endpoint = `${method.toUpperCase()} ${path}`
-      if (methodSpecs['x-fga-permissions'] == null) return
+      const groups = (methodSpecs['x-fga-permissions'] ?? []).filter(
+        (group): group is string[] => Array.isArray(group) && group.length > 0
+      )
+      if (groups.length === 0) return
 
-      methodSpecs['x-fga-permissions'].forEach((permissions) => {
-        permissions?.forEach((permission) => {
-          // Initialize scope object if needed
-          scopes[permission] = scopes[permission] || { endpoints: [], mcp_tools: [] }
+      endpoints[endpoint] = groups
 
-          // Initialize endpoints array if needed
-          endpoints[endpoint] = endpoints[endpoint] || []
+      groups.flat().forEach((permission) => {
+        // Initialize scope object if needed
+        scopes[permission] = scopes[permission] || { endpoints: [], mcp_tools: [] }
 
-          if (!scopes[permission].endpoints.includes(endpoint)) {
-            scopes[permission].endpoints.push(endpoint)
-          }
-          if (!endpoints[endpoint].includes(permission)) {
-            endpoints[endpoint].push(permission)
-          }
-        })
+        if (!scopes[permission].endpoints.includes(endpoint)) {
+          scopes[permission].endpoints.push(endpoint)
+        }
       })
     })
   })
 
-  // Assign the mcp tools to their scopes
-  Object.entries(mcp_tools).forEach(([mcpTool, toolScopes]) => {
-    toolScopes.forEach((toolScope) => {
-      if (scopes[toolScope] && !scopes[toolScope].mcp_tools.includes(mcpTool)) {
+  return { scopes, endpoints }
+}
+
+// Assign the mcp tools to their scopes. Scopes referenced only by tools (no endpoint lists them,
+// e.g. project_snippets_read) are initialized here so they don't vanish from the map. Ungated tools
+// reference no scope, so they're absent from this index by construction — they belong to no
+// capability and `getEnabledMcpTools` reports them for every token instead.
+export const addMCPToolsToScopes = (scopes: ScopeMap, mcp_tools: McpMap) => {
+  Object.entries(mcp_tools).forEach(([mcpTool, toolScopeGroups]) => {
+    toolScopeGroups.flat().forEach((toolScope) => {
+      scopes[toolScope] = scopes[toolScope] || { endpoints: [], mcp_tools: [] }
+      if (!scopes[toolScope].mcp_tools.includes(mcpTool)) {
         scopes[toolScope].mcp_tools.push(mcpTool)
       }
     })
   })
-
-  return { scopes, endpoints }
 }
 
 const NEXT_PUBLIC_API_DOMAIN = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_API_DOMAIN || 'https://api.supabase.com'
@@ -142,12 +153,22 @@ const OPEN_API_PATH_METHOD_SCHEMA = z.object({
   'x-fga-permissions': z.array(z.string().array().optional()).optional(),
 })
 
+const HTTP_METHODS = ['get', 'post', 'put', 'patch', 'delete', 'options', 'head', 'trace'] as const
+
+// OpenAPI path items may legally carry non-operation members (path-level `parameters`, `summary`,
+// `description`, `servers`, `$ref`). z.record with an enum key schema rejects unknown keys
+// outright, which would turn a benign upstream spec change into a 500 for this whole route —
+// strip them before validating the operations.
+const OPEN_API_PATH_ITEM_SCHEMA = z.preprocess(
+  (item) =>
+    item !== null && typeof item === 'object'
+      ? Object.fromEntries(
+          Object.entries(item).filter(([key]) => (HTTP_METHODS as readonly string[]).includes(key))
+        )
+      : item,
+  z.record(z.enum(HTTP_METHODS), OPEN_API_PATH_METHOD_SCHEMA)
+)
+
 const API_SPECS_SCHEMA = z.object({
-  paths: z.record(
-    z.string(),
-    z.record(
-      z.enum(['get', 'post', 'put', 'patch', 'delete', 'options', 'head', 'trace']),
-      OPEN_API_PATH_METHOD_SCHEMA
-    )
-  ),
+  paths: z.record(z.string(), OPEN_API_PATH_ITEM_SCHEMA),
 })
diff --git a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.fixtures.ts b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.fixtures.ts
index 5275f6ace06..f19ae68170a 100644
--- a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.fixtures.ts
+++ b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.fixtures.ts
@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ export const permissionRow = (
   organization_slug: string,
   actions: string[],
   resources: string[],
-  project_refs: string[] = []
+  // Org-wide rows serialize as [] or null on the wire (nullable in the API contract; the
+  // view-synthesized admin rows for auth.subject_roles/user_invites are null).
+  project_refs: string[] | null = []
 ): PermissionRowFixture => ({
   actions: actions as Permission['actions'],
   condition: null as unknown as Permission['condition'],
diff --git a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.permissions.test.ts b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.permissions.test.ts
index 7bd9bee642e..4aab626e393 100644
--- a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.permissions.test.ts
+++ b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.permissions.test.ts
@@ -4,14 +4,121 @@ import {
   computeOverallRisk,
   countConfigured,
   getCatalogEntry,
+  scopesToSelection,
   selectionToScopes,
   type PermissionSelection,
 } from './AccessToken.permissions'
 import {
   getEnabledEndpoints,
+  getEnabledEndpointsForCapability,
   getEnabledMcpTools,
+  normalizePermissionScopeMap,
+  type PermissionScopeMap,
 } from '@/data/scoped-access-tokens/permission-scope-map-query'
 
+const scopeMap = (partial: Partial<PermissionScopeMap>): PermissionScopeMap => ({
+  scopes: {},
+  endpoints: {},
+  mcp_tools: {},
+  ...partial,
+})
+
+describe('scopesToSelection', () => {
+  it('round-trips studio-created grants (full read/write sets)', () => {
+    expect(scopesToSelection(['database_read', 'database_write'])).toEqual({
+      'project:database': 'readwrite',
+    })
+    expect(scopesToSelection(['database_read'])).toEqual({ 'project:database': 'read' })
+    expect(scopesToSelection([])).toEqual({})
+  })
+
+  // API-created tokens can hold partial scope sets; the derived mode is an upper bound so the
+  // review UI never claims 'Minimal — no capabilities' for a token with real authority.
+  it('never drops partial grants from API-created tokens', () => {
+    // A lone create scope (one of the entry's three write scopes) still surfaces as readwrite.
+    expect(scopesToSelection(['branching_development_create'])).toEqual({
+      'project:branching_development': 'readwrite',
+    })
+    // A write grant without the read scopes still surfaces (upper-bound readwrite).
+    expect(scopesToSelection(['project_admin_write'])).toEqual({ 'project:admin': 'readwrite' })
+  })
+})
+
+describe('normalizePermissionScopeMap', () => {
+  // A stale CDN entry can serve the pre-groups payload (flat conjunctive string[] per endpoint)
+  // to a client whose evaluators expect string[][]; without normalization group.every crashes.
+  it('interprets a stale flat payload as single conjunctive groups', () => {
+    const normalized = normalizePermissionScopeMap({
+      scopes: {},
+      endpoints: {
+        'GET /v1/projects': ['projects_read', 'organization_projects_read'],
+      },
+      mcp_tools: { execute_sql: ['database_read', 'database_write'] },
+    })
+
+    expect(normalized.endpoints['GET /v1/projects']).toEqual([
+      ['projects_read', 'organization_projects_read'],
+    ])
+    expect(normalized.mcp_tools.execute_sql).toEqual([['database_read', 'database_write']])
+    // The normalized shape evaluates without throwing
+    expect(
+      getEnabledMcpTools({ grantedScopes: ['database_read'], permissionScopeMap: normalized })
+    ).toEqual([])
+  })
+
+  it('passes the current grouped payload through unchanged', () => {
+    const grouped: PermissionScopeMap = {
+      scopes: {},
+      endpoints: { 'GET /v1/branches': [['branching_development_read']] },
+      mcp_tools: { search_docs: [[]], broken_tool: [] },
+    }
+
+    expect(normalizePermissionScopeMap(grouped)).toEqual(grouped)
+  })
+
+  it('tolerates payloads missing any of the three maps entirely', () => {
+    const normalized = normalizePermissionScopeMap({})
+
+    expect(normalized.scopes).toEqual({})
+    expect(normalized.endpoints).toEqual({})
+    expect(normalized.mcp_tools).toEqual({})
+  })
+
+  it('fails closed (nobody) on values that are not arrays at all', () => {
+    const normalized = normalizePermissionScopeMap({
+      scopes: {},
+      endpoints: { 'GET /v1/projects': null },
+      mcp_tools: { execute_sql: 'database_read' },
+    })
+
+    expect(normalized.endpoints['GET /v1/projects']).toEqual([])
+    expect(normalized.mcp_tools.execute_sql).toEqual([])
+  })
+
+  // response.json() can legally produce any of these (a null body, an error string); the
+  // normalizer is the boundary and must return the fail-closed empty map, not throw.
+  it('fails closed on a top-level payload that is not an object', () => {
+    const empty = { scopes: {}, endpoints: {}, mcp_tools: {} }
+
+    expect(normalizePermissionScopeMap(null)).toEqual(empty)
+    expect(normalizePermissionScopeMap(undefined)).toEqual(empty)
+    expect(normalizePermissionScopeMap('internal server error')).toEqual(empty)
+    expect(normalizePermissionScopeMap([])).toEqual(empty)
+  })
+
+  it('empties a field whose record shape is wrong without discarding the rest', () => {
+    const normalized = normalizePermissionScopeMap({
+      scopes: { database_read: { endpoints: 'not-an-array', mcp_tools: [] } },
+      endpoints: { 'GET /v1/projects': [['projects_read']] },
+      mcp_tools: null,
+    })
+
+    expect(normalized.scopes).toEqual({})
+    expect(normalized.endpoints['GET /v1/projects']).toEqual([['projects_read']])
+    expect(normalized.mcp_tools).toEqual({})
+  })
+})
+
 describe('selectionToScopes', () => {
   it('ignores none and returns read scope for read mode', () => {
     const selection: PermissionSelection = { 'project:database': 'read', 'project:backups': 'none' }
@@ -75,56 +182,162 @@ describe('countConfigured', () => {
   })
 })
 
-describe('permission scope map (dual-scope enforcement)', () => {
-  it('enables a dual-scope MCP tool only when all required scopes are granted', () => {
-    // execute_sql requires both database_read and database_write
+describe('permission scope map (group enforcement)', () => {
+  it('enables a multi-scope MCP tool group only when all scopes of the group are granted', () => {
+    // create_project requires org read + org project create together (the handler's FGA checks)
+    const permissionScopeMap = scopeMap({
+      mcp_tools: { create_project: [['organization_admin_read', 'organization_projects_create']] },
+    })
     expect(
       getEnabledMcpTools({
-        // Only scope one is granted
-        grantedScopes: ['database_read'],
-        permissionScopeMap: {
-          scopes: {},
-          endpoints: {},
-          mcp_tools: {
-            execute_sql: ['database_read', 'database_write'],
-          },
-        },
+        grantedScopes: ['organization_projects_create'],
+        permissionScopeMap,
       })
-    ).not.toContain('execute_sql')
+    ).not.toContain('create_project')
     expect(
       getEnabledMcpTools({
-        // Both scopes are granted
-        grantedScopes: ['database_read', 'database_write'],
-        permissionScopeMap: {
-          scopes: {},
-          endpoints: {},
-          mcp_tools: {
-            execute_sql: ['database_read', 'database_write'],
-          },
-        },
+        grantedScopes: ['organization_admin_read', 'organization_projects_create'],
+        permissionScopeMap,
       })
-    ).toContain('execute_sql')
+    ).toContain('create_project')
   })
 
-  it('only lists endpoints whose every required scope is granted', () => {
+  it('enables a tool with alternative groups when any single group is fully granted', () => {
+    // execute_sql requires database_read OR database_write, depending on read-only mode
+    const permissionScopeMap = scopeMap({
+      mcp_tools: { execute_sql: [['database_read'], ['database_write']] },
+    })
+    expect(getEnabledMcpTools({ grantedScopes: ['database_read'], permissionScopeMap })).toContain(
+      'execute_sql'
+    )
+    expect(getEnabledMcpTools({ grantedScopes: ['database_write'], permissionScopeMap })).toContain(
+      'execute_sql'
+    )
+    expect(
+      getEnabledMcpTools({ grantedScopes: ['storage_read'], permissionScopeMap })
+    ).not.toContain('execute_sql')
+  })
+
+  it('reports ungated tools (one empty group) as enabled for any token, including one with no scopes', () => {
+    // search_docs hits the public content API and confirm_cost computes a local hash, so no
+    // permission gates either — the review step should say so rather than hide them.
+    const permissionScopeMap = scopeMap({
+      mcp_tools: { search_docs: [[]], confirm_cost: [[]] },
+    })
+
+    expect(getEnabledMcpTools({ grantedScopes: ['database_read'], permissionScopeMap })).toEqual([
+      'search_docs',
+      'confirm_cost',
+    ])
+    expect(getEnabledMcpTools({ grantedScopes: [], permissionScopeMap })).toEqual([
+      'search_docs',
+      'confirm_cost',
+    ])
+  })
+
+  it('never enables a tool whose alternatives were all dropped ([])', () => {
+    const permissionScopeMap = scopeMap({ mcp_tools: { broken_tool: [] } })
+
+    expect(
+      getEnabledMcpTools({ grantedScopes: ['database_read'], permissionScopeMap })
+    ).not.toContain('broken_tool')
+  })
+
+  it('lists endpoints when at least one alternative group is fully granted', () => {
     const endpoints = getEnabledEndpoints({
-      grantedScopes: ['database_read', 'database_write'],
-      permissionScopeMap: {
-        scopes: {},
+      grantedScopes: ['database_read', 'database_write', 'branching_development_read'],
+      permissionScopeMap: scopeMap({
         endpoints: {
-          'GET /api/valid_read': ['database_read'],
-          'POST /api/valid_write': ['database_write'],
-          'PUT /api/valid_both': ['database_read', 'database_write'],
-          'PUT /api/invalid': ['project_write'],
-          'PUT /api/incomplete': ['database_read', 'project_write'],
+          'GET /api/valid_read': [['database_read']],
+          'POST /api/valid_write': [['database_write']],
+          'PUT /api/valid_both': [['database_read', 'database_write']],
+          // development OR production: development alone is enough
+          'GET /api/valid_alternative': [
+            ['branching_development_read'],
+            ['branching_production_read'],
+          ],
+          'PUT /api/invalid': [['project_write']],
+          'PUT /api/incomplete': [['database_read', 'project_write']],
         },
-        mcp_tools: {},
-      },
+      }),
     })
     expect(endpoints).toEqual([
       { raw: 'GET /api/valid_read', method: 'GET', path: '/api/valid_read' },
       { raw: 'POST /api/valid_write', method: 'POST', path: '/api/valid_write' },
       { raw: 'PUT /api/valid_both', method: 'PUT', path: '/api/valid_both' },
+      { raw: 'GET /api/valid_alternative', method: 'GET', path: '/api/valid_alternative' },
     ])
   })
 })
+
+describe('getEnabledEndpointsForCapability', () => {
+  const rawPaths = (endpoints: ReturnType<typeof getEnabledEndpointsForCapability>) =>
+    endpoints.map(({ raw }) => raw)
+
+  it('attributes an endpoint to each capability whose scope is in a fully-granted group', () => {
+    const permissionScopeMap = scopeMap({
+      endpoints: {
+        'GET /api/branches': [['branching_development_read'], ['branching_production_read']],
+      },
+    })
+    const allGrantedScopes = ['branching_development_read', 'branching_production_read']
+
+    expect(
+      rawPaths(
+        getEnabledEndpointsForCapability({
+          capabilityScopes: ['branching_development_read'],
+          allGrantedScopes,
+          permissionScopeMap,
+        })
+      )
+    ).toEqual(['GET /api/branches'])
+    expect(
+      rawPaths(
+        getEnabledEndpointsForCapability({
+          capabilityScopes: ['branching_production_read'],
+          allGrantedScopes,
+          permissionScopeMap,
+        })
+      )
+    ).toEqual(['GET /api/branches'])
+  })
+
+  // The endpoint is callable, but thanks to the development alternative — production granted alone
+  // would not have enabled it, so it must not be listed under the production capability.
+  it('does not attribute an endpoint to a capability whose own group is unsatisfied', () => {
+    const enabled = getEnabledEndpointsForCapability({
+      capabilityScopes: ['branching_production_read'],
+      allGrantedScopes: ['branching_development_read'],
+      permissionScopeMap: scopeMap({
+        endpoints: {
+          'GET /api/branches': [['branching_development_read'], ['branching_production_read']],
+        },
+      }),
+    })
+
+    expect(enabled).toEqual([])
+  })
+
+  it('requires every scope of the capability group to be granted', () => {
+    const permissionScopeMap = scopeMap({
+      endpoints: { 'PUT /api/upgrade': [['project_admin_read', 'database_read']] },
+    })
+
+    expect(
+      getEnabledEndpointsForCapability({
+        capabilityScopes: ['database_read'],
+        allGrantedScopes: ['database_read'],
+        permissionScopeMap,
+      })
+    ).toEqual([])
+    expect(
+      rawPaths(
+        getEnabledEndpointsForCapability({
+          capabilityScopes: ['database_read'],
+          allGrantedScopes: ['database_read', 'project_admin_read'],
+          permissionScopeMap,
+        })
+      )
+    ).toEqual(['PUT /api/upgrade'])
+  })
+})
diff --git a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.permissions.ts b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.permissions.ts
index 3b94a29c952..1417df70d0d 100644
--- a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.permissions.ts
+++ b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.permissions.ts
@@ -447,7 +447,21 @@ const RESOURCE_METADATA_FALLBACK = (
     : 'Read-only access to this resource.',
 })
 
-export type PermissionLevel = 'user' | 'organization' | 'project'
+const PERMISSION_LEVELS = ['user', 'organization', 'project'] as const
+
+export type PermissionLevel = (typeof PERMISSION_LEVELS)[number]
+
+/**
+ * Runtime guard for the FGA namespaces: role evaluation branches on the level, so an unrecognized
+ * namespace must fail loudly (at module load, caught by any test importing the catalog) rather
+ * than silently evaluate as project-level.
+ */
+const toPermissionLevel = (scope: string): PermissionLevel => {
+  const level = scope.toLowerCase()
+  const match = PERMISSION_LEVELS.find((candidate) => candidate === level)
+  if (match === undefined) throw new Error(`Unknown FGA namespace: ${scope}`)
+  return match
+}
 
 export interface PermissionCatalogEntry {
   /** Derived resource key, e.g. "project:database" */
@@ -490,7 +504,7 @@ const buildCatalog = (): PermissionCatalogEntry[] => {
   >()
 
   for (const [scope, scopePerms] of Object.entries(FGA)) {
-    const level = scope.toLowerCase() as PermissionLevel
+    const level = toPermissionLevel(scope)
     for (const [permKey, perm] of Object.entries(scopePerms)) {
       const resourceKey = `${level}:${getResource(permKey)}`
       const action = getAction(permKey)
@@ -570,15 +584,22 @@ export const selectionToScopes = (
   return Array.from(new Set(scopes))
 }
 
-/** Reverses `selectionToScopes`: derives a selection from a token's granted FGA scope ids. */
+/**
+ * Reverses `selectionToScopes`: derives a selection from a token's granted FGA scope ids.
+ *
+ * Tokens created through the Management API can hold arbitrary scope subsets that the
+ * none/read/readwrite modes cannot represent exactly (e.g. a lone branching_development_create).
+ * Any granted scope of an entry marks it at the corresponding mode, so a partial grant is never
+ * dropped — the mode is an upper bound and may name specific operations the token lacks, but it
+ * never understates the token's authority or risk. The endpoint and MCP-tool lists, computed
+ * from the actual granted scopes, remain the precise view.
+ */
 export const scopesToSelection = (grantedScopes: string[]): PermissionSelection => {
   const granted = new Set(grantedScopes)
   const selection: PermissionSelection = {}
   for (const entry of PERMISSION_CATALOG) {
-    const hasWrite =
-      entry.writeScopes.length > 0 && entry.writeScopes.every((scope) => granted.has(scope))
-    const hasRead =
-      entry.readScopes.length > 0 && entry.readScopes.every((scope) => granted.has(scope))
+    const hasWrite = entry.writeScopes.some((scope) => granted.has(scope))
+    const hasRead = entry.readScopes.some((scope) => granted.has(scope))
     if (hasWrite) selection[entry.key] = 'readwrite'
     else if (hasRead) selection[entry.key] = 'read'
   }
diff --git a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.roles.test.ts b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.roles.test.ts
index ab3f229e318..e6011571470 100644
--- a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.roles.test.ts
+++ b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.roles.test.ts
@@ -22,7 +22,10 @@ import {
 
 type EvaluateTokenAccessArgs = TokenRoleContextArgs & { selection: PermissionSelection }
 
-/** Composes the two production entry points the way `useTokenAccessEvaluation` does. */
+/**
+ * Composes the two production entry points the way a consumer should: resolve the (expensive)
+ * role context once from its inputs, then apply the (cheap) selection to it on every change.
+ */
 const evaluateTokenAccess = ({ selection, ...contextArgs }: EvaluateTokenAccessArgs) =>
   applySelectionToRoleContext(computeTokenRoleContext(contextArgs), selection)
 
@@ -83,6 +86,19 @@ describe('project-scoped membership helpers', () => {
     expect(getIsProjectScopedOnly(developerRows(ORG.slug), ORG.slug)).toBe(false)
     expect(getIsProjectScopedOnly([], ORG.slug)).toBe(false)
   })
+
+  it('treats project_refs: null rows as org-wide, in any row order', () => {
+    // The real /platform/profile/permissions response serializes the view-synthesized
+    // Administrator/Owner rows (auth.subject_roles, user_invites) with project_refs: null, and
+    // the response carries no ordering guarantee.
+    const nullRow = row(ORG.slug, ['write:Create', 'write:Delete'], ['auth.subject_roles'])
+    nullRow.project_refs = null
+
+    expect(getIsProjectScopedOnly([nullRow, ...administratorRows(ORG.slug)], ORG.slug)).toBe(false)
+    expect(getIsProjectScopedOnly([...administratorRows(ORG.slug), nullRow], ORG.slug)).toBe(false)
+    // A lone null row is org-wide too, not project-scoped.
+    expect(getIsProjectScopedOnly([nullRow], ORG.slug)).toBe(false)
+  })
 })
 
 describe('requiredRoleForEntry', () => {
@@ -118,6 +134,35 @@ describe('evaluateTokenAccess', () => {
     expect(result.entries['project:database'].status).toBe('unknown')
   })
 
+  it('normalizes effectiveSelection on every path, not just the evaluated one', () => {
+    const selection: PermissionSelection = {
+      'project:database': 'readwrite',
+      'project:backups': 'none',
+      'not:a-real-key': 'read',
+    }
+    const expected = { 'project:database': 'readwrite' }
+
+    // Unknown path (permissions still loading)
+    expect(
+      evaluateTokenAccess({ ...baseArgs, selection, permissions: undefined }).effectiveSelection
+    ).toEqual(expected)
+    // Account path (selection tracks the owner by definition)
+    expect(
+      evaluateTokenAccess({
+        ...baseArgs,
+        selection,
+        resourceAccess: 'account',
+        organizationSlugs: [],
+        permissions: ownerRows(ORG.slug),
+      }).effectiveSelection
+    ).toEqual(expected)
+    // Evaluated path
+    expect(
+      evaluateTokenAccess({ ...baseArgs, selection, permissions: ownerRows(ORG.slug) })
+        .effectiveSelection
+    ).toEqual(expected)
+  })
+
   it('passes everything the user’s role covers', () => {
     const result = evaluateTokenAccess({
       ...baseArgs,
@@ -196,26 +241,88 @@ describe('evaluateTokenAccess', () => {
     })
     // Developer on the bound project: database readwrite is fine.
     expect(result.entries['project:database'].status).toBe('ok')
-    // But org-level scopes check the org-wide role, which is only member — and the failure
-    // carries their real per-project role so the UI can explain the distinction.
-    expect(result.entries['organization:members'].status).toBe('exceeds-role')
-    expect(result.entries['organization:members'].failingResources).toEqual([
+    // Org-level scopes can never be exercised through a project-scoped token — platform rejects
+    // them outright regardless of the owner's role, so no role evaluation applies.
+    expect(result.entries['organization:members'].status).toBe('unavailable-for-scope')
+    expect(result.entries['organization:members'].effectiveMode).toBe('none')
+    expect(result.entries['organization:members'].failingResources).toEqual([])
+    expect(result.unavailableEntryKeys).toEqual(['organization:members'])
+    expect(result.exceedingEntryKeys).toEqual([])
+    expect(result.effectiveSelection).toEqual({ 'project:database': 'readwrite' })
+  })
+
+  it('honors project-scoped roles for project entries on organization-scoped tokens', () => {
+    // An org member invited as Developer to one project: platform checks the owner's permission
+    // against the project object, so an org-bound token really can database_write there. Only the
+    // projects where the role is insufficient may be reported as failing.
+    const result = evaluateTokenAccess({
+      ...baseArgs,
+      selection: { 'project:database': 'readwrite' },
+      permissions: developerRows(ORG.slug, [PROJECT.ref]),
+      organizations: [ORG],
+      projects: [PROJECT, OTHER_PROJECT],
+    })
+    expect(result.entries['project:database'].status).toBe('exceeds-role')
+    expect(result.entries['project:database'].failingResources).toEqual([
+      { type: 'project', id: OTHER_PROJECT.ref, label: OTHER_PROJECT.ref, role: 'member' },
+    ])
+
+    // Developer on every project of the org: nothing fails, despite the org role being member.
+    const allProjects = evaluateTokenAccess({
+      ...baseArgs,
+      selection: { 'project:database': 'readwrite' },
+      permissions: developerRows(ORG.slug, [PROJECT.ref, OTHER_PROJECT.ref]),
+      organizations: [ORG],
+      projects: [PROJECT, OTHER_PROJECT],
+    })
+    expect(allProjects.entries['project:database'].status).toBe('ok')
+    expect(allProjects.effectiveSelection).toEqual({ 'project:database': 'readwrite' })
+  })
+
+  it('falls back to the org level for bound orgs with no accessible projects', () => {
+    const result = evaluateTokenAccess({
+      ...baseArgs,
+      selection: { 'project:database': 'readwrite' },
+      permissions: readonlyRows(ORG.slug),
+      organizations: [ORG],
+      projects: [],
+    })
+    expect(result.entries['project:database'].status).toBe('exceeds-role')
+    expect(result.entries['project:database'].failingResources).toEqual([
       {
         type: 'organization',
         id: ORG.slug,
         label: ORG.slug,
-        role: 'member',
-        projectScopedRoles: [{ label: PROJECT.ref, role: 'developer' }],
+        role: 'readonly',
+        projectScopedRoles: undefined,
       },
     ])
   })
 
-  it('explains org-level failures for members invited only to a project', () => {
-    // Read-only on one project, selecting Organization Settings read-write (requires Owner).
+  it('marks org-level entries unavailable on project-scoped tokens even for org owners', () => {
+    // Platform's getChecks throws for project-scoped tokens on organization endpoints before
+    // any FGA evaluation, so even an org owner's project token can never call them.
     const result = evaluateTokenAccess({
       ...baseArgs,
       resourceAccess: 'project',
       projectRefs: [PROJECT.ref],
+      selection: { 'organization:members': 'readwrite', 'user:organizations': 'read' },
+      permissions: ownerRows(ORG.slug),
+    })
+    expect(result.entries['organization:members'].status).toBe('unavailable-for-scope')
+    // User-level scopes are granted by the token grant alone (token -> scope tuple checks), so
+    // they stay exercisable for any resource binding.
+    expect(result.entries['user:organizations'].status).toBe('ok')
+    expect(result.effectiveSelection).toEqual({ 'user:organizations': 'read' })
+  })
+
+  it('explains org-level failures for members invited only to a project', () => {
+    // Read-only on one project, selecting Organization Settings read-write (requires Owner) on
+    // an organization-scoped token — the failure carries their real per-project role so the UI
+    // can explain the distinction.
+    const result = evaluateTokenAccess({
+      ...baseArgs,
+      resourceAccess: 'organization',
       selection: { 'organization:admin': 'readwrite' },
       permissions: readonlyRows(ORG.slug, [PROJECT.ref]),
       organizations: [{ ...ORG, name: 'Acme Corp' }],
@@ -242,8 +349,7 @@ describe('evaluateTokenAccess', () => {
     const strayOrgRow = row(ORG.slug, ['read:Read'], ['notifications'])
     const result = evaluateTokenAccess({
       ...baseArgs,
-      resourceAccess: 'project',
-      projectRefs: [PROJECT.ref],
+      resourceAccess: 'organization',
       selection: { 'organization:admin': 'readwrite' },
       permissions: [...readonlyRows(ORG.slug, [PROJECT.ref]), strayOrgRow],
       projects: [{ ...PROJECT, name: 'Acme production' }],
diff --git a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.roles.ts b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.roles.ts
index c4039ee8bb4..06eff7f10d9 100644
--- a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.roles.ts
+++ b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/AccessToken.roles.ts
@@ -201,7 +201,10 @@ export const estimateRoleLevel = (
   return isMember ? 'member' : 'none'
 }
 
-/** True when every permission row the user holds in the org is limited to specific projects. */
+/**
+ * True when every permission row the user holds in the org is limited to specific projects.
+ * Org-wide rows arrive as [] or null (the API contract is nullable) — both mean not scoped.
+ */
 export const getIsProjectScopedOnly = (
   permissions: Permission[],
   organizationSlug: string
@@ -211,7 +214,7 @@ export const getIsProjectScopedOnly = (
   )
   if (orgRows.length === 0) return false
   return orgRows.every(
-    (permission) => permission.project_refs !== undefined && permission.project_refs.length > 0
+    (permission) => Array.isArray(permission.project_refs) && permission.project_refs.length > 0
   )
 }
 
@@ -231,7 +234,12 @@ export const requiredRoleForEntry = (
 ): TokenRoleLevel =>
   mode === 'none' ? 'member' : requiredRoleForScopes(getEntryScopes(entry, mode))
 
-export type EntryAccessStatus = 'ok' | 'exceeds-role' | 'unknown'
+/**
+ * 'unavailable-for-scope': the entry's permission level can never be exercised through this
+ * token's resource binding, regardless of the owner's role — platform rejects project-scoped
+ * tokens outright on organization endpoints.
+ */
+export type EntryAccessStatus = 'ok' | 'exceeds-role' | 'unavailable-for-scope' | 'unknown'
 
 /** A token-bound resource where the user's current role can't exercise the selected mode. */
 export interface FailingResource {
@@ -275,7 +283,13 @@ export interface TokenAccessEvaluation {
   entries: Record<string, EntryAccess>
   /** Entry keys whose selected mode exceeds the user's current role. */
   exceedingEntryKeys: string[]
-  /** Selection reduced to what the user's current role can exercise. */
+  /** Entry keys the token's resource binding can never exercise (org entries on project tokens). */
+  unavailableEntryKeys: string[]
+  /**
+   * Selection reduced to what the user's current role can exercise. Always normalized to
+   * catalog-known, non-'none' entries — including on the 'unknown' and account paths, where no
+   * reduction applies.
+   */
   effectiveSelection: PermissionSelection
 }
 
@@ -307,7 +321,11 @@ export interface TokenRoleContext {
   hasNoAccessibleResource: boolean
   /** Per bound organization (or parent org in project mode). */
   orgLevels: FailingResource[]
-  /** Per bound project in project mode; mirrors orgLevels otherwise (org roles cascade). */
+  /**
+   * Per bound project in project mode; per accessible project of the bound orgs in organization
+   * mode (platform checks project permissions against the project object, so project-scoped
+   * roles count). Orgs with no accessible projects contribute their org level instead.
+   */
   projectLevels: FailingResource[]
   /** Weakest role across orgLevels / projectLevels. */
   orgLevel: TokenRoleLevel
@@ -435,15 +453,27 @@ export const computeTokenRoleContext = ({
     }
   })
 
+  const toProjectLevel = (project: { ref: string; organization_slug: string; name?: string }) => ({
+    type: 'project' as const,
+    id: project.ref,
+    label: project.name ?? project.ref,
+    role: roleFor(project.organization_slug, project.ref),
+  })
+
+  // In organization mode the token's scope cascades to every project of the bound orgs, and
+  // platform checks the owner's permission against the project object — so a project-scoped
+  // Developer really can exercise e.g. database_write on their project through an org-bound
+  // token. Evaluate project-level entries per accessible project rather than by the org-level
+  // role, falling back to the org level for orgs with no accessible projects. Future projects
+  // only ever inherit the org-level role; the per-project view can't warn about those.
   const projectLevels: FailingResource[] =
     resourceAccess === 'project'
-      ? accessibleProjects.map((project) => ({
-          type: 'project' as const,
-          id: project.ref,
-          label: project.name ?? project.ref,
-          role: roleFor(project.organization_slug, project.ref),
-        }))
-      : orgLevels
+      ? accessibleProjects.map(toProjectLevel)
+      : orgSlugsForLevels.flatMap((slug) => {
+          const orgProjects = projects.filter((project) => project.organization_slug === slug)
+          if (orgProjects.length === 0) return orgLevels.filter((level) => level.id === slug)
+          return orgProjects.map(toProjectLevel)
+        })
 
   return {
     status: 'evaluated',
@@ -468,6 +498,15 @@ export const applySelectionToRoleContext = (
   context: TokenRoleContext,
   selection: PermissionSelection
 ): TokenAccessEvaluation => {
+  // Every path reports entries and effectiveSelection over the same normalized key set, so
+  // consumers can iterate either without special-casing 'none' modes or unknown catalog keys.
+  const selectedKeys = Object.keys(selection).filter(
+    (key) => selection[key] !== 'none' && getCatalogEntry(key) !== undefined
+  )
+  const normalizedSelection: PermissionSelection = Object.fromEntries(
+    selectedKeys.map((key) => [key, selection[key]])
+  )
+
   const base = {
     status: context.status,
     inaccessibleOrgSlugs: context.inaccessibleOrgSlugs,
@@ -475,11 +514,10 @@ export const applySelectionToRoleContext = (
     hasNoBoundResources: context.hasNoBoundResources,
     hasNoAccessibleResource: context.hasNoAccessibleResource,
     exceedingEntryKeys: [] as string[],
-    effectiveSelection: selection,
+    unavailableEntryKeys: [] as string[],
+    effectiveSelection: normalizedSelection,
   }
 
-  const selectedKeys = Object.keys(selection).filter((key) => selection[key] !== 'none')
-
   // Account-scoped (legacy/user) tokens track the owner's access by definition — every entry is
   // exercisable, so requiredRole/failingResources (only read for 'exceeds-role' entries) stay inert.
   if (context.status === 'evaluated' && context.resourceAccess === 'account') {
@@ -509,6 +547,7 @@ export const applySelectionToRoleContext = (
   const { orgLevel, projectLevel, orgLevels, projectLevels } = context
   const entries: Record<string, EntryAccess> = {}
   const exceedingEntryKeys: string[] = []
+  const unavailableEntryKeys: string[] = []
   const effectiveSelection: PermissionSelection = {}
 
   for (const key of selectedKeys) {
@@ -516,6 +555,23 @@ export const applySelectionToRoleContext = (
     const entry = getCatalogEntry(key)
     if (!entry) continue
 
+    // Platform rejects project-scoped tokens outright on organization endpoints (getChecks
+    // throws before any FGA evaluation), so the owner's org role is irrelevant there and
+    // role-based evaluation would wrongly report these entries as exercisable. The one
+    // exception — organization_admin_write is additionally enforced on a few project-ref
+    // routes via the model's `from parent_organization` indirection — is deliberately
+    // ignored: this advisory UI fails closed.
+    if (context.resourceAccess === 'project' && entry.level === 'organization') {
+      entries[key] = {
+        status: 'unavailable-for-scope',
+        effectiveMode: 'none',
+        requiredRole: requiredRoleForEntry(entry, mode),
+        failingResources: [],
+      }
+      unavailableEntryKeys.push(key)
+      continue
+    }
+
     const availableLevel =
       entry.level === 'user' ? 'owner' : entry.level === 'organization' ? orgLevel : projectLevel
 
@@ -544,7 +600,7 @@ export const applySelectionToRoleContext = (
     if (effectiveMode !== 'none') effectiveSelection[key] = effectiveMode
   }
 
-  return { ...base, entries, exceedingEntryKeys, effectiveSelection }
+  return { ...base, entries, exceedingEntryKeys, unavailableEntryKeys, effectiveSelection }
 }
 
 export interface FailingResourceGroup {
diff --git a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/Scoped/Form/RiskMarker.tsx b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/Scoped/Form/RiskMarker.tsx
index a9e5bdf292c..92c99c051ae 100644
--- a/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/Scoped/Form/RiskMarker.tsx
+++ b/apps/studio/components/interfaces/Account/AccessTokens/Scoped/Form/RiskMarker.tsx
@@ -76,8 +76,12 @@ export const RiskMarker = ({
         )}
         {mcpTools.length > 0 && (
           <div className="space-y-1">
+            {/* getMcpToolsForScopes is associative, not conjunctive: these scopes contribute to
+                the listed tools, but a tool may need scopes from other capabilities too — the
+                review step's enabled-tools list is the authoritative view. Keep this heading
+                distinct from the review step's "MCP tools". */}
             <p className="text-[11px] font-mono uppercase tracking-wide text-foreground-lighter">
-              MCP tools
+              Related MCP tools
             </p>
             <p className="font-mono text-xs text-foreground-light">{mcpTools.join(', ')}</p>
           </div>
diff --git a/apps/studio/data/scoped-access-tokens/permission-scope-map-query.ts b/apps/studio/data/scoped-access-tokens/permission-scope-map-query.ts
index 976b6a0d127..604cc8d68eb 100644
--- a/apps/studio/data/scoped-access-tokens/permission-scope-map-query.ts
+++ b/apps/studio/data/scoped-access-tokens/permission-scope-map-query.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { useQuery } from '@tanstack/react-query'
+import { z } from 'zod'
 
 import { scopedAccessTokenKeys } from './keys'
 import { BASE_PATH } from '@/lib/constants'
@@ -28,17 +29,35 @@ export interface ScopeMapEntry {
   }
 */
 export type ScopeMap = Record<string, ScopeMapEntry>
-// e.g { 'GET /v2/projects/{ref}/analytics/log-drains': ['analytics_config_read'] }
-export type EndpointMap = Record<string, string[]>
-// e.g { 'deploy_edge_function': ['edge_functions_write'] }
-export type McpMap = Record<string, string[]>
+
+/** A set of scopes that must ALL be granted (conjunctive). */
+export type ScopeGroup = string[]
+/**
+ * Alternative scope groups, mirroring the mgmt-api `x-fga-permissions` semantics: a token satisfies
+ * the requirement when it holds ALL scopes of at least ONE group — OR between groups, AND within a
+ * group. `GET /v1/projects/{ref}/branches` is annotated
+ * `[['branching_development_read'], ['branching_production_read']]`, and either alternative alone
+ * authorizes the call.
+ *
+ * Standard disjunctive-normal-form semantics apply at the edges, so no special cases are needed:
+ * `[[]]` — one empty group — is satisfied by every token (an empty AND is true), which is how MCP
+ * tools that make no Management API call are recorded. `[]` — no alternatives at all — is satisfied
+ * by nobody (an empty OR is false), so an item that somehow loses its groups is hidden rather than
+ * advertised to everyone.
+ */
+export type ScopeGroupAlternatives = ScopeGroup[]
+
+// e.g { 'GET /v1/projects/{ref}/branches': [['branching_development_read'], ['branching_production_read']] }
+export type EndpointMap = Record<string, ScopeGroupAlternatives>
+// e.g { 'deploy_edge_function': [['edge_functions_write']] }
+export type McpMap = Record<string, ScopeGroupAlternatives>
 
 export interface PermissionScopeMap {
   /** scope id -> the endpoints / MCP tools it (partially) authorizes */
   scopes: ScopeMap
-  /** endpoint -> ALL scopes it requires (conjunctive) */
+  /** endpoint -> alternative scope groups (OR between groups, AND within a group) */
   endpoints: EndpointMap
-  /** MCP tool -> ALL scopes it requires (conjunctive) */
+  /** MCP tool -> alternative scope groups (OR between groups, AND within a group) */
   mcp_tools: McpMap
 }
 
@@ -57,10 +76,15 @@ const splitEndpoint = (raw: string): EnabledEndpoint => {
   return { method: raw.slice(0, spaceIndex), path: raw.slice(spaceIndex + 1), raw }
 }
 
+// Plain disjunctive-normal-form evaluation: some group where every scope is granted. An empty
+// group is vacuously satisfied, which is exactly what "nothing gates this" should mean.
+const isSatisfied = (groups: ScopeGroupAlternatives, granted: Set<string>) =>
+  groups.some((group) => group.every((scope) => granted.has(scope)))
+
 /**
  * Given the set of granted scope ids, returns the Management API endpoints the token can call.
- * An endpoint is only enabled when ALL of its required scopes are granted (conjunctive), which is
- * how the mgmt-api `FgaPermissionsGuard` evaluates the `@AuthWithFgaPermissions` decorator.
+ * An endpoint is enabled when ALL scopes of at least ONE of its alternative groups are granted,
+ * matching the `x-fga-permissions` contract described on `ScopeGroupAlternatives`.
  */
 export const getEnabledEndpoints = ({
   grantedScopes,
@@ -73,13 +97,15 @@ export const getEnabledEndpoints = ({
 
   const granted = new Set(grantedScopes)
   return Object.entries(permissionScopeMap.endpoints)
-    .filter(([, required]) => required.length > 0 && required.every((scope) => granted.has(scope)))
+    .filter(([, groups]) => isSatisfied(groups, granted))
     .map(([raw]) => splitEndpoint(raw))
 }
 
 /**
- * Given the set of granted scope ids, returns the MCP tools the token can call. As with endpoints,
- * a tool is only enabled when ALL of its required scopes are granted.
+ * Given the set of granted scope ids, returns the MCP tools the token can call: those with at least
+ * one fully-granted scope group. Ungated tools — recorded as one empty group (`[[]]`), see
+ * ScopeGroupAlternatives — are vacuously satisfied and so reported for every token. A tool with no
+ * alternatives at all (`[]`) is reported for nobody.
  */
 export const getEnabledMcpTools = ({
   grantedScopes,
@@ -92,15 +118,18 @@ export const getEnabledMcpTools = ({
 
   const granted = new Set(grantedScopes)
   return Object.entries(permissionScopeMap.mcp_tools)
-    .filter(([, required]) => required.length > 0 && required.every((scope) => granted.has(scope)))
+    .filter(([, groups]) => isSatisfied(groups, granted))
     .map(([tool]) => tool)
 }
 
 /**
- * Endpoints that (a) are fully satisfied by the complete granted-scope set AND (b) require at least
- * one of `capabilityScopes`. Used by the review step to group enabled endpoints under the capability
- * that contributes them, while still honouring dual-scope requirements (a dual-scope endpoint only
+ * Endpoints that are enabled by the complete granted-scope set AND owe that to `capabilityScopes`:
+ * some fully-granted group must contain at least one capability scope. Used by the review step to
+ * group enabled endpoints under the capability that contributes them (a multi-scope group only
  * appears once all its scopes are granted, and shows under each contributing capability).
+ *
+ * An endpoint enabled purely through a group that holds none of `capabilityScopes` is not
+ * attributed to this capability, and an ungated item is never attributed to any capability.
  */
 export const getEnabledEndpointsForCapability = ({
   capabilityScopes,
@@ -116,11 +145,11 @@ export const getEnabledEndpointsForCapability = ({
   const granted = new Set(allGrantedScopes)
   const capability = new Set(capabilityScopes)
   return Object.entries(permissionScopeMap.endpoints)
-    .filter(
-      ([, required]) =>
-        required.length > 0 &&
-        required.every((scope) => granted.has(scope)) &&
-        required.some((scope) => capability.has(scope))
+    .filter(([, groups]) =>
+      groups.some(
+        (group) =>
+          group.some((scope) => capability.has(scope)) && group.every((scope) => granted.has(scope))
+      )
     )
     .map(([raw]) => splitEndpoint(raw))
 }
@@ -146,6 +175,59 @@ export const getMcpToolsForScopes = ({
   return Array.from(tools)
 }
 
+/**
+ * The endpoint's payload changed endpoint/tool requirements from a flat conjunctive scope list
+ * (string[]) to alternative groups (string[][], ScopeGroupAlternatives) at the same URL, and the
+ * response is CDN-cached (s-maxage + stale-while-revalidate). Right after a deploy a new client
+ * can still receive a stale flat payload; evaluating it as groups would call group.every on a
+ * string and crash the render. Interpret a flat list as what it was — a single conjunctive group.
+ */
+const isScopeGroup = (value: unknown): value is ScopeGroup =>
+  Array.isArray(value) && value.every((scope) => typeof scope === 'string')
+
+const normalizeGroups = (groups: unknown): ScopeGroupAlternatives => {
+  // A non-array value is not a shape any server ever emitted — fail closed (nobody) rather
+  // than crash the defense itself.
+  if (!Array.isArray(groups)) return []
+  if (groups.every(isScopeGroup)) return groups
+  if (groups.every((scope): scope is string => typeof scope === 'string')) return [groups]
+  return []
+}
+
+const scopeMapEntrySchema = z.object({
+  endpoints: z.array(z.string()),
+  mcp_tools: z.array(z.string()),
+})
+
+// Group values stay unknown here — normalizeGroups upgrades legacy flat payloads and fails closed
+// per entry, which a strict schema would turn into all-or-nothing. `.catch({})` empties a field
+// whose record shape is wrong without discarding the salvageable rest of the payload.
+const rawPermissionScopeMapSchema = z.object({
+  scopes: z.record(scopeMapEntrySchema).catch({}),
+  endpoints: z.record(z.unknown()).catch({}),
+  mcp_tools: z.record(z.unknown()).catch({}),
+})
+
+const EMPTY_PERMISSION_SCOPE_MAP: PermissionScopeMap = { scopes: {}, endpoints: {}, mcp_tools: {} }
+
+export const normalizePermissionScopeMap = (raw: unknown): PermissionScopeMap => {
+  const parsed = rawPermissionScopeMapSchema.safeParse(raw)
+  // A non-object body (null, an error string) has nothing salvageable — fail closed (empty map)
+  // instead of throwing out of the query fn.
+  if (!parsed.success) return EMPTY_PERMISSION_SCOPE_MAP
+
+  const { scopes, endpoints, mcp_tools } = parsed.data
+  return {
+    scopes,
+    endpoints: Object.fromEntries(
+      Object.entries(endpoints).map(([endpoint, groups]) => [endpoint, normalizeGroups(groups)])
+    ),
+    mcp_tools: Object.fromEntries(
+      Object.entries(mcp_tools).map(([tool, groups]) => [tool, normalizeGroups(groups)])
+    ),
+  }
+}
+
 export async function getGetScopedTokenPermissionsForScope(signal?: AbortSignal) {
   const response = await fetch(`${BASE_PATH}/api/scoped-access-token-permissions`, {
     signal,
@@ -175,13 +257,14 @@ export async function getGetScopedTokenPermissionsForScope(signal?: AbortSignal)
     )
   }
 
-  return await response.json()
+  const payload: unknown = await response.json()
+  return normalizePermissionScopeMap(payload)
 }
 
 export type ScopedAccessTokenPermissionsForScopeError = ResponseError
 
-export const useGetEnabledEndpointsForCapability = <TData = PermissionScopeMap>() => {
-  return useQuery<TData, ScopedAccessTokenPermissionsForScopeError, TData>({
+export const useGetEnabledEndpointsForCapability = () => {
+  return useQuery<PermissionScopeMap, ScopedAccessTokenPermissionsForScopeError>({
     queryKey: scopedAccessTokenKeys.permissions(),
     queryFn: ({ signal }) => getGetScopedTokenPermissionsForScope(signal),
   })
diff --git a/apps/studio/types/base.ts b/apps/studio/types/base.ts
index 089e876b3fa..23852a697bc 100644
--- a/apps/studio/types/base.ts
+++ b/apps/studio/types/base.ts
@@ -77,7 +77,11 @@ export interface Permission {
   organization_slug: string
   resources: string[]
   restrictive?: boolean
-  project_refs: string[]
+  /**
+   * Projects the row is limited to. Organization-wide rows arrive as [] or null — the API
+   * contract is nullable and some view-synthesized rows serialize as null.
+   */
+  project_refs: string[] | null
 }
 
 export interface ResponseFailure {